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CHAPTER I
SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY:
THE NEGLECTED .FIELD
I. Introduction 
Nation-states characterized by limited population, small 
geographic size, and military inferiority are a vital part of 
the contemporary political scene. With the decline of 
feudalism, such political units developed possessing all the 
attributes of larger counterparts except magnitude. Since 
1648, any reasonable dichotomy of nations by size shows the 
smaller ones to outnumber the larger fay a wide margin. This 
numerical superiority of small over large states has never 
been greater than presently. Indeed, the proliferation of 
new sovereign states since the Second World War may be the 
most distinctive characteristic of this era.
Another development which has emerged over the last few 
centuries is the interest in political studies as distinct 
from jurisprudence, economics, and history. Study of foreign 
policies grew out of this interest and now claims to be an 
ijsiportant sub-field of political science. Accelerated 
activity in the contemporary international system has pro­
duced a corresponding response from academic and government 
researchers in an attempt to make sense of the oft-times
puzzling world scene. Scholars still are striving to close 
the gap between observation and explanation, between experi­
ence and understanding.
Traditionally, students of world politics have chosen 
their objects of study according to the importance and poten­
tial impact of the issue. This reasonable method helps ex­
plain why interest in foreign policy analysis has centered 
since Machiavelli's time on the large and powerful states.
It was, after all, the mighty who played the dominant roles 
on the international stage, while the weak acted in a sup­
porting capacity or even in bit parts. Thus, attention to 
small nations' external affairs was cursory and scant. Cus­
tomarily, they were considered in the footnotes and conclu­
sions of books on the great powers.
This apparent weakness or oversight in analyses of 
national foreign policies should not be too harshly criti­
cized, for the realities of international life also have 
traditionally relegated small states to decidedly inferior 
positions. A summary review of recent history amply illus­
trates this fact. •
II. Small Power Influence Since 1815
Napoleon's demise and the construction of the balance 
of power system at Vienna provides a natural starting point 
for a look at contemporary small nation influence. Waterloo 
marked the end of more than two decades of intermittent
strife. During this fight for survival the small states had
fought alongside the larger allies to help secure victory.
Yet, even before the Congress of Vienna convened, it was
deemed expedient by the large powers to institutionalize the
1
power differential between large and small states.
As a result, the lesser powers were denied equality of 
representation and had no voice in major decisions at Vienna, 
this at a time when political equality was widely hailed.
They had no choice "but to accept a settlement which the
2
concert had agreed upon and which it was ready to enforce." 
With slight variation, this was the prevalent pattern of 
relations during the balance of the nineteenth century.
As the Concert system eroded it became possible for the 
small states to assume more independence from great power 
domination. The last decade of the nineteenth century and 
the first decade of the twentieth witnessed an increase in 
maneuverability and influence of lesser nations as the large 
power blocs fell into disarray. Thus it was that a small 
nation could have attained the importance to receive blame 
for igniting World War One. In retrospect this seems flat­
tering to Serbia; history shows the breakdown of the alliance
^Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 11-13.
2
Genevieve Peterson, "Political Inequality at the 
Congress of Vienna," Political Science Quarterly, LX 
(December, 1945), p. 552.
system should more correctly bear the onus. Be that as it 
may, the discrediting of the balance of power system, which 
was a direct result of the war, gave new hope to the small 
states.
Negotiations to conclude a treaty at Versailles pre­
sented the lesser powers with enhanced political opportunity 
which stands in contrast to the Vienna experience. While 
the Big Three certainly made their presence and wills felt, 
views from men like Smuts of South Africa and Koo of China 
were frequently heard, if not always accepted and enacted as 
policy. Development of the League of Nations provided 
numerous previously unsuspected chances for voicing small 
nation perspectives and exerting the force of morality, in 
which weaker states have traditionally prided themselves.
Interwar experience proved disheartening for those who 
placed great faith in collective security. To be sure, small 
powers played an increasingly important role in League 
affairs. However, when pressure was greatest on the organi­
zation, the small powers felt impelled to hedge on their 
original commitment, as evidenced by the Declaration of 
Copenhagen in July, 1938. This amounted to a collective 
denunciation of the League, but stopped short of a complete 
pull-out. For the seven signatories, all small states, this, 
signalled the end of hope for the ill-fated League, and a
3
retreat into neutrality.
^See Nils Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-1941 
(Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953), p. 188ff.
World War II provided another important opportunity for 
extending small nation influence. Active in war, many lesser 
states emerged intact and hopeful of playing a meaningful 
role in the restructuring of the war-ravaged globe. In some 
measure their expectations were fulfilled by the prominent 
position accorded them at the San Francisco Conference which 
laid the groundwork for the League's successor. Though still 
dominated by the large victorious states, the conference 
heard opinions and suggestions from numerous small state 
representatives, acting favorably on some. One prominent 
observer noted that "the voice of the middle and small Powers 
[was] louder, more insistent, and . . . more productive"
4
than theretofore.
Under the auspices of the United Nations a host of 
sovereign states have come into being since 1945 (a listing 
of these may be found in Appendix B). Several characteristics 
distinguish the majority of these, i.e., a colonial heritage, 
underdeveloped economic and political systems, and military 
impotence. Not insignificant is the small geographic size 
of almost all new states.^ By virtue of this dramatic 
numerical increase in small nations, the composition of the 
United Nations has changed, the bi-polar world has undergone
4
Philip C. Jessup, "The Equality of States as Dogma 
and Reality," Political Science Quarterly, LX (December, 
1945), p. 528.
^George C. Abbott, "Size, Viability, Nationalism, and 
Politico-Economic Development," International Journal, XXV 
(Winter, 1969-70), p. 58.
great stress while competing for their allegiance, and the 
"power of the weak" has continued to grow.®
With the obvious extension in numbers and influence of 
small states, there has developed a corresponding burgeoning 
of academic interest in their external relations, among other 
topics. This interest has resulted in an increasing number 
of works devoted to the unique problems and potentialities 
of small states in world affairs. It is to the literature 
of small nation foreign policy that we now turn^
III. Review of Literature on Small Nation Foreign Policy 
In-depth research on small state external relations has 
been undertaken only recently. To be sure, some attention 
has always been paid small country roles, but the treatments 
were neither comprehensive nor very useful. Most references 
to lesser powers were simply to fill in gaps in a larger 
study, and lacked incisiveness and depth. In order to find 
early works on the subject one must look into materials from 
other fields, most notably history and economics. A few 
scattered efforts appeared in the first half of the twentieth 
century and will be noted below. However, it was not until 
after World War II that significant studies were presented. 
Since 1945 there has been a steady increase in research and 
writing, until at present there is available a small but
®Arnold Wolfers' phrase quoted in: Erling Bjol, "The
Power of the Weak," Cooperation and Conflict, III (1968), 
p. 157.
respectable list of books and articles devoted to small 
nation foreign policy.
Due to the relative newness of small state studies, 
most suffer from weaknesses typical of newer foci for re­
search. Not unlike the study of foreign policy in general, 
small nation research has been conducted without benefit of 
adequate theory. Most works do attempt to test a few as­
sumptions, but there has been virtually no uniformity in 
hypotheses. The result is a "shotgun approach" which, while 
often suitable for isolated study, fails to provide much 
basis for comparison with related works. Any assumption 
that small state foreign policies are too diverse for com­
parison would be premature, as approaches used thus far have 
not attempted general comparative models.
Another weakness of existent works lies in their charac­
teristically unimaginative methodology. Description charac­
terizes most accounts of single nation foreign affairs. 
Analysis is generally lacking, as most case studies concen­
trate on relating chronological development of policies or 
treat only one overriding issue. In short, scholarly 
inquiries into the nature, characteristics, and specifics 
of small nation foreign policy lack the imagination and 
creativity of research in related fields. A review of the 
available material reveals a positive trend toward overcoming 
some of these shortcomings. The following chronological list­
ing evaluates those works which represent the most direct 
attempts at small nation foreign policy analysis.
8The earliest works focusing exclusively on small state 
external affairs seem to have been stimulated by the creation 
of the League of Nations in particular and the post-World 
War I political climate in general. Several studies emerged 
chronicling a budding interest in lesser states' roles in the 
new system. H. A. L. Fisher's "The Value of Small States" 
(1920) and Arnold Wolfers' "The Role of Small States in the 
Enforcement of International Peace" (1923) attest to a 
slowly awakening concern for small state matters.^ These 
works were followed by some shorter glimpses into small na­
tion viewpoints in the 1930*s. Sean Lester recounted the
g
Manchurian Incident as lesser countries saw it, and William
E. Rappard evaluated the influence and positions of small
g
states in the League of Nations.
Before proceeding into the 1940's, another vein of 
study should be noted. During early decades of the twentieth 
century, geopoliticians presented their interpretations of
H. A. L. Fisher, "The Value of Small States," Studies 
in History and Politics, London, 1920; Arnold Wolfers, "The 
Role of Small States in the Enforcement of International 
Peace," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 21, 
pp. 24ff. Cited in David Vital, The Inequality of States;
A Study of the Small Power in International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 193; and Rothstein,
Alliances .. . . , p^ 37n.
Q
Sean Lester, "The Far Eastern Dispute from the Point 
of View of the Small States," Problems of Peace, 8th Series 
(1934), pp. 120-135.
9
William E. Rappard, "Small States in the League of 
Nations," Political Science Quarterly, IL (December, 1934), 
pp. 544-575.
world developments. Some treatments from this school of 
thought bore relevant hypotheses for small countries during 
the interwar period. Strict geographic determinist ideas 
presently are in scientific disrepute, but the small political 
entity cannot afford to ignore its geographic assets and 
limitations when assessing foreign policy alternatives. Such 
factors as size, location, and accessibility to natural re­
sources are treated below in Chapter II. It suffices the 
present discussion to mention several of the more astute 
students of environmental influences and to point out in 
broad terms their major contributions to external affairs 
analysis.
Nicholas Spykman of Yale University emerged as foremost 
among the American interpreters of MacKinder, Bowman, and 
the Haushofer s c h o o l . N o n e  of his works devotes exclusive 
attention to small states, but no discussion of foreign 
policy as influenced by geography is complete without inclu­
sion of Spykman's v i e w s . S i n c e  Spykman, the leading in­
terpreters of environmental phenomena to political science 
have been Harold and Margaret Sprout of Princeton University.
For examples of their works see: Halford J. MacKinder,
"The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, 
XXIII (1904); Isiah Bowman, The New World (Yonkers, New York: 
World Book, 1922); and Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of 
World Conçuest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1922).
^^None of Spykman's many works more succinctly states 
his views on foreign policy than; "Geography and Foreign 
Policy," American Political Science Review, XXXII (1938), 
pp. 28-50.
10
After a disciplinary lapse in interest following the Second 
World War, this husband and wife team insistently brought 
the view of political scientists back to geographic consid­
erations. They have made modest claims for their approach, 
but have persuasively demonstrated the relevance which 
ecological influences still have for foreign policy analysis.
Others have trumpeted the message of geography, e.g., Bernard
13Cohen, Richard Hartshorne and Charles Fisher, but none has 
touched so directly the foreign policy question as have the 
Sprouts and Spykman.
World War II forced a curtailment of scholarship gen­
erally, and only one contribution emerged which assumed the 
focus of earlier works, i.e., a second article by Arnold 
Wolfers, "In Defense of the Small Countries. Wolfers de­
fended the viability of small states against critics who 
advocated reducing the number of small sovereign states. He 
pointed out the durability of lesser nations and made sugges­
tions as to how they might play even more effective roles in 
international affairs.
12
12See: Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological
Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton, New Jersey: Prince­
ton University Press, 1965). This is their most complete 
work on the topic.
^^For examples of their works see: Saul Bernard Cohen,
Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Random
House, 1963); Richard Hartshorne, Perspective on the Nature 
of Geography (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally, 1959); and
Charles Fisher, ed.. Essays in Political Geography (London: 
Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1968).
l^The Yale Review, XXXIII (Winter, 1944), pp. 201-220.
11
The bare trickle of studies on small state foreign
policy received a substantial infusion by the publication of
four major books during the 1950's. Although these works
did not gain immediate acclaim, they are now looked upon as
meaningful landmarks in this basically uncharted expanse.
First to appear was Nils Orvik's The Decline of Neutrality,
1914-1941 in 1953.^^ This thoughtful descriptive volume
added to the understanding of small state activity during
the important years between the onset of World War I and
World War II. Appearing in 1957, George Liska's International
Equilibrium focused on the balance of power concept, and gave
much more consideration to small state roles than any previous
16volume on the same topic. Liska also provided more theo­
retical substance than any previous writer, even though his 
concern was not for small nations per se, but for their 
ability to influence internation balance.
Sir Hilary Blood added The Smaller Territories; Problems 
and Future in 1958.^^ This brief treatment looked at those 
British dependencies which were then clamoring for statehood 
and the majority of which attained it shortly thereafter. 
Blood's analysis focused on less developed areas which 
inherently shared the consequences of small size with older
Full citation in footnote #2 above.
16 (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press,
1957.)
1958).
17 (London, England: The Conservative Political Centre,
12.
small nations. Narrower in scope and intent, this work is 
somewhat overshadowed by each of the others in the decade.
Last to appear was Annette Baker Fox's The Power of
18Small States, in 1959. Restricted to analyzing the diplo­
macy of six small nations in the Second World War, this 
nevertheless was the first book-length analysis which con­
sciously focused attention on small entities and their be­
havior as the major unit of study. In each previous tome, 
the small were at best additional variables in a power 
equation; with Fox they occupied the central position. Al­
though this work was theoretically limited, it was a stimulus 
to the writers of the 1960's, a time when small state foreign 
policy research experienced its most profound growth.
A number of books and articles appeared during the last 
decade which demonstrated the continued interest of academi­
cians in small nation relations. In 1960, E. A. G. Robinson 
chaired a symposium which he later substantially reproduced
19in the volume Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations. 
Recognized experts from economics and related fields de­
livered papers on selected topics concerned with the size of 
domestic markets, level of development, and other highly 
pertinent factors for small states. Conclusions drawn at 
the conference remain applicable today, and the Robinson
18 (Chicago, Illinois; University of Chicago Press, 1959)
19 (London, England: MacMillan & Company, Ltd., 1960).
13
study has no peer in the area of economic influence on foreign 
policy of lesser nations.
In the mid-sixties the rate of publication increased 
markedly for writings on small nation foreign affairs. Pur­
suing his earlier interest. Nils Orvik examined the role of 
lesser members in the NATO alliance;and a fellow Nordic
scholar, Johan Galtung, performed a comparative study of small
21nations within the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. Both of 
these articles provided perceptive insights into the role of 
lesser countries in alliances; the latter offered the most 
innovative application of methodology utilized in small state 
studies thus far. Robert Rothstein added a fine article ana­
lyzing the comparative advantages of alignment and nonalign-
22ment policies for small nations in the postwar world.
One scholar dubbed 1967 the "annus mirabilis" of the
23small state in international politics. Several reasons 
were given for such a christening, one of which was the rapid- 
fire appearance of five books on small nation foreign policy. 
Of these, two are in English; Burton Benedict's The Problems
20"NATO: The Role of the Small Members," International
Journal, XXI (Spring, 1966), pp. 173-185.
21"East-West Interaction Patterns," Journal of Peace 
Research, III (1966), pp. 146-177.
22"Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945-
1965," International Organization, XX (1966), pp. 397-418.
23William E. Paterson, "Small States in International 
Politics," Cooperation and Conflict, IV (1969), p. 119.
14
of Smaller Territories and David Vital's The Inequality of 
24States. The former provided a compilation of articles 
treating various aspects of smallness, e.g., sociological 
aspects. This volume rendered reasonably adequate syntheses 
of previously held views on the topic. However, it failed 
to break new ground in the area of foreign policy.
Vital’s book, conversely, provided the field of small 
state studies with its most theoretical work yet. Using 
historical examples to verify his assumptions, the author 
drew a bleak picture of what the future seems to hold for 
small nations in world affairs. One cannot help surmising 
that Vital's personal experience as an Israeli may have 
colored his outlook. He is open to criticism on several 
points, e.g., a failure to establish a class of small states 
which is obviously distinct. Also, his analysis is restricted 
to the nonaligned state, which leaves much ground unturned.
In spite of these and other weaknesses. Vital has done a 
service in setting forth the beginnings of a theory of small 
nation international behavior.
24Complete citations: Burton Benedict, ed.. The Problems
of Smaller Territories (London: Athlone Press, 1967); and
David vital. The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small
Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967). The other three volumes mentioned are; Daniel Frei, 
Neutralitat-Ideal Oder Kalkul? (Verlag Huber, 1967); Hans 
R. Kurz, Bewaffnete Neutralitat (Verlag Huber, 1967); and 
Gustav Daniker, Stratégie des Kleinstaats (Verlan Huber,
1967).
15
Robert Rothstein's book Alliances and Small Powers
completes the list of existing full-length treatments on the
25subject at hand. Focusing on small states in alliances,
he complements Vital’s work nicely, providing in the two
books a well-balanced treatment of all lesser units.
Rothstein uses history to an even greater extent than Vital,
and examines the Little Entente, the Classical Period of the
nineteenth century, and other typical examples of small state
behavior in alliance systems. He concludes, as does Vital,
with an analysis of strategic implications for non-nuclear
small nations.
After the works of Vital and Rothstein, later analyses
seem to lack depth and scope. However, several articles
have added to the growing bibliography in the field. One of
the best of these is Donald Neuchterlein's essay "Small States
in Alliances; Iceland, Thailand, and Australia," which ap- 
26peared in 1969. He effectively compares the diverse inter­
ests, power, and milieu of the three and makes some cautious 
prognoses.
It seems clear from the foregoing analysis that definite 
progress has been made in overcoming the lack of theoretical 
foundations for small nation foreign policy study. However, 
each of the major attempts has clear limitations, and
25
CNew York: Columbia University Press, 1968.)
Orbis, XIII (Summer, 1969), pp. 600-623.
16
therefore applies only to certain small states. If small 
nations are to constitute a unique subject matter field, 
theory must continue to fill in gaps. Hopefully, some 
standard hypotheses could be developed for universal applica­
tion, even given the vast diversity found among lesser 
entities. Such a goal presents obvious difficulties, if it 
is attainable at all. However, no such attempt has failed 
yet, since none has been undertaken.
Methodology remains conservative, largely descriptive, 
and lacking in imagination. With the many new tools and 
techniques now available, it is necessary that some of them 
be applied to small state studies if current interest is to 
be maintained. Johan Galtung's article mentioned above pro­
vides the only deviation from a standard narrative treatment, 
and more attempts of this type are sorely needed.
As might be expected. Table 1 indicates that scholars 
from Scandinavia have been among the leaders in the number 
of small nation foreign policy studies produced. However, 
their contributions have been less theoretical, less macro 
in character, and more case-study oriented. Great Britain 
Jias kept up a vital interest in small states, and her 
scholars have provided a number of valuable studies. The 
works of Rothstein, Neuchterlein, Fox, and others have en­
abled the United States to share in the advance of the field. 
It has, therefore, been a joint effort, and the results.
17
while not spectacular, indicate possible future advances 
along the lines suggested above.
TABLE 1
WORKS ON SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY 
BY HOMELAND OF AUTHOR
Country or Region Books Articles Total
Nordic Region 2 8 10
United States 3 4 7
Great Britain 3 1 4
Others 1 2 3
Total 9 15 24
Source : Appendix A
IV. Small Nations— A Separate Class?
Despite the growing literature which treats small states 
as unique entities in world affairs, there remain serious 
doubts as to the justification for such a segregation. At 
worst the relegation of small nations to a separate category 
has brought frank and open denial of difference from big na­
tions. William E. Rappard expressed the following view con­
cerning small states in the League of Nations.
In fact the so-called Small States within 
the League of Nations have nothing in com­
mon which distinguishes them from others, 
except that they enjoy no permanent repre­
sentation on the Council. . . . Nothing 
more decisively proves the fragility of
18
the concepts of Small States and Great 
Powers than the lack of any doctrine or 
creed uniting either of the two groups
and opposing it to the other.2?
This near-total rejection of a large-small dichotomy repre­
sents a viewpoint still held strongly by a few scholars.
At best, the advocates of the uniqueness of small state
problems and policy rest their case on somewhat suspect under­
pinnings. This results in part from some thorny methodologi­
cal difficulties, e.g., the problem of definition of 
smallness. However, plausible differences do exist which 
warrant treating small states as distinct from large ones.
A very obvious difference pertains to dimensions of size, 
both geographic and demographic. Natural and human resources 
bear an uncertain but real relationship here. While it is 
certainly true that technology and national ingenuity can go 
far in overcoming smallness, important limitations to eco­
nomic and military development cannot go disregarded.
Directly dependent on the foregoing factors is the power 
potential of a given nation. Clearly, differences in power 
exist among states, resulting in role differentiation which 
separates large from small. It seems obvious that analysis 
of such diverse entities as Switzerland and the Soviet Union 
requires the application of different theories and methods 
due to the immense gulf which exists in their respective 
power potentials.
27Rappard, "Small States . . . ," pp. 544, 571-2,
19
More subtle but no less real are psychological and
emotional differences held by citizens and decision makers
of strong and weak states. Both Vital and Rothstein devote
considerable attention to this issue. The former spends an
entire chapter discussing the mental and administrative con-
28sequences of being small and weak. Included in his discus­
sion are such factors as the second-hand information which 
must be received from larger nations' intelligence files, 
smaller diplomatic corps, and knowledge that in a serious 
security threat outside assistance would be needed to avoid
disaster. Rothstein speaks of the "psychology of fear" which
29tends to complicate decision making for small state leaders.
As a result of these and other factors, the lesser nation 
has a much different world view and operates with less 
margin for error.
When Rappard assessed possible differences between large 
and small in the League, he commented thusly; "Except as 
regards a general conception of the League, . . . we do not 
believe differences e x i s t . W h i l e  denying policy differ­
ences, he touched on the fundamentally different outlooks, 
the separate concepts held by large and small in the League 
of Nations. His refutation of differences thus became an 
explanation that unique feelings and emotions did exist, and
28Vital, Inequality . . . , pp. 10-38.
29Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 28.
^^Rappard, "Small States . . . ," p. 570. My emphasis
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that in and of themselves they constituted concrete evidence 
supporting a large state-small state dichotomy.
These various "differences" are all subject to question. 
Wide diversity among the many small powers means that for 
some the range of difference between larger states and smaller 
"micro-states" will be difficult to explain. Thus, for 
example, Sweden possesses one of the most capable military 
establishments in Europe, more powerful than some of the 
large states. To compare it to Fiji and other fledgling 
entities would seem more ridiculous than comparison to, say, 
Italy. This type of exception could be pointed out in regard 
to economic strength, psychological and emotional outlook, or 
any other measure of difference applied to the categories of 
states.
Therefore, the most meaningful distinction between large 
and small states is the one in analysts' minds. However weak 
and seemingly untenable the alleged differences at times ap­
pear to be, the assertion that important factors distinguish 
small from large states has gained acceptance. Common usage 
of such labels as "Great Powers" or "Superpowers" connotes a 
classification of abundant size and strength. By the same 
token, diminutiveness provides us with the opposite type of 
nation-state. For observers of world politics these two 
categories have provided a useful, if not always clearly 
portrayed, distinction.
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Some novel labels have been adapted to illustrate more
clearly the relationship of the strong to the weak. Johan
Galtung dubbed them as "topdog" and "underdog," respectively.^^
Andrew Boyd of the Economist referred to the big powers as
32"lions" and to their small counterparts as "mice." Perhaps 
most political scientists now accept some distinction between 
large and small states as reflecting the realities of inter­
national politics. However, much less agreement is found on 
the problem of definition of "small nation" and on appropriate 
methods of studying them.
V. What is a "Small Nation"?
In spite of the concept's attraction, the problem of 
definition has prevented the analysis of small nation foreign 
policy from gaining more unqualified acceptance. Size is a 
relative dimension. Among the 130 plus nation-states in 
existence today, nearly every conceivable geographic and 
population variance may be witnessed. Drawing the line be­
tween various divisions has proved an unsatisfying task. 
Regardless of whether a two-fold, three-fold, or multi-fold 
classification is designed, there will be some who recognize 
the categories for what they are, i.e., arbitrary and man- 
made. It may seem fruitless to attempt overcoming this
^^Galtung, "East-West . . . ," p. 146.
32Andrew Boyd, "The Role of the Great Powers in the 
United Nations," International Journal, XXV (Spring, 1970), 
p. 359.
22
problem, but a review of previous definitions and usages
does shed light on the nature of the problem.
Most analysts have refused to join the ranks of those
who attempt definition. Some prominent works on small nation
33foreign policy ignore the question entirely. There seems
to be the assumption that everyone understands the difference
between small and large. This is obviously not the case.
Paul Doty has studied the problems related to small nations
34attaining nuclear capabilities. In his treatment he re­
counts the experiences of France and Great Britain as examples 
of what small states aspiring to membership in the nuclear 
club may expect. Doty used the best available examples from 
among the nuclear powers, perhaps, but if the claim that 
small powers are distinct is plausible, his observations as 
related to France and England lack relevance for lesser 
states, such as Finland, Belgium, and New Zealand.
For those who have seriously attempted definition, a 
common result has been admitted failure at precision. Sir 
Hilary Blood stated that he "clearly could not set out these
33For example, see; Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, 
"An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Bruce M. Russet, ed., . 
Economic Theories of International Politics (Chicago, Illinois; 
Markham Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 25-45. In this 
article, the authors postulate that small nations do not 
bear their fair share of alliance debts. No definition of 
smallness is given.
Paul M. Doty, "The Role of Smaller Powers," in Donald 
G. Brennan, ed.. Arms Control, Disarmament, and National 
Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 305-6.
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criteria of size in any kind of formula.Obviously 
countries can be small in one sense and not in another.
Since smallness is only one variable, the issue of definition 
remains cloudy.
Authors have devised definitions to suit the needs of
particular analyses. Some of the best of these have lacked
precision, but have conveyed the essential meaning of what
smallness means in a state's foreign policy. A case in point
is Robert Rothstein's attempt.
. . .  a Small Power is a state which 
recognizes that it can not obtain secur­
ity primarily by use of its own capabil­
ities, and that it must rely fundamentally 
on the aid of other states, institutions, 
processes, or developments to do so; the 
Small Power's belief in its inability to 
rely on its own means must also be recog­
nized by the other states involved in its 
international politics.^ °
Although vague, this definition conveys the intended meaning 
well, i.e., that small states are not self-sufficient in 
security matters and need explicit or tacit promises of as­
sistance in case of threat.
Another type of definition has been the attempt to draw 
definite limits on population which reflect smallness. This 
has been adapted by some to show differences in level of 
development, and the major criteria of size have gained gen­
eral acceptance. Robinson's study Economic Consequences of
35Blood, The Smaller . . . , p. 7. 
^^Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 29.
24
the Size of Nations based its research on populations which
37did not exceed fifteen million. Michael Michaely added
the dimension of development and judged $300 per capita per
annum to be the dividing line between developed and under-
38developed economies. Vital adopted Michaely's standards
but included an additional category of from 20 to 30 million
39population for underdeveloped countries. None of these 
attempts at definition is completely satisfactory. Arbi­
trariness is the standard, and thus continual criticism will
be the lot of those who attempt hard and fast statements of 
40
definition.
For the current study, a definition is needed. It would 
be folly to assume that the arbitrariness and restrictiveness 
which has characterized past definitions could be eliminated. 
Therefore, the following definition is offered with attending 
explanations: a small nation is one which (1) cannot be
completely self-sufficient in any sense; (2) has no more than 
15 million citizens of $300 per capita per annum nor more 
than 30 million citizens of less than $300 per capita per
37Particularly see: Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth of
Small Nations," in Eobinson, Economic Consequences . . . , p. 14
^^Michael Michaely, Concentration in International Trade 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1962), p. 16 n.
39Vital, Inequality . . . , p. 8.
40For example, see William Paterson's critique of 
Vital's definition in: Paterson, "Small States .
p. 119.
II
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annvun; and (3) whether aligned or nonaligned must rely on 
outside powers for aid in times of dire security threats.
The first characteristic is noneontroversial in nature.
No state in our day can indefinitely maintain itself without 
external trade and other relations. When superpowers find 
it expedient to engage in international intercourse, small 
states, with presumably lesser natural resources, find it 
even more necessary to import the goods and services of other 
nations.
Admittedly arbitrary, part two of the definition pro­
vides us with definite guidelines concerning population size 
and level of development. The reader will readily note ex­
ceptions to certain hypotheses stated below in Chapter II. 
Exceptions must be labelled as such, for general statements 
can scarcely hope to be universally applicable. The wisdom 
of lumping developed and underdeveloped states into one mass 
is subject to serious question. In defense it may simply be 
said that the problems of security, economic growth, and 
international identity apply to all these states, and that 
they are felt more acutely as the population size and level 
of development are reduced.
As to the third part of the definition, it is felt that 
neither the protection of an alliance nor the moral appeal of
41For a list of states which fit the writer's definition, 
see Appendix B. Because of lack of source material from be­
hind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, communist countries are 
not included. States which are not members of the United 
Nations are also excluded.
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nonalignment give completely acceptable protection to the 
threatened small state. The comparative advantages of each 
basic policy have been outlined in depth elsewhere.Much 
of Chapter II treats the justification of this facet of all 
small nation foreign policies which may be termed "inherent 
vulnerability."
VI. Object of This Study
Faced with the nearly limitless possibilities for study­
ing small nation foreign policy, it is necessary to determine 
the most worthwhile areas of study. It would be presumptuous 
to suppose that one additional work on the subject could fill 
all the gaps which exist. However, if one or two could be 
adequately filled and some thoughtful suggestions offered on 
fruitful areas for further research, this project could be 
deemed successful.
In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always sev­
eral ways of approaching the phenomena. The number of ap­
proaches has multiplied rapidly in recent years. For some 
time the so-called "great debate" raged between the champions 
of various methodologies, each maintaining that his pet 
method held the best prospect of successful explanation and 
prediction. In the opinion of many, among whom James N. 
Rosenau stands out, the "contentiousness of the 1960's has 
been replaced by an acceptance of diversity and a readiness
42See Chapter 5 of Vital, Inequality . . . , pp. 87-115.
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to get on with the job” of conducting research and
43perfecting theory. The existence of numerous routes to 
knowledge is now readily accepted.
Still, the question of choosing a method which will fit 
the object of study presents a problem. Differing approaches 
offer special types of advantages and disadvantages which 
must be considered in light of available resources. In 
adapting a method of study for this project, the following 
diverse methods and tools were considered, many of which 
could be adapted successfully to small nation research.
Two efforts at analyzing international behavior illus­
trate the type of studies which can be done using computer
aids. Rudolph Rummel of the University of Hawaii has worked
44intensively on the subject of internation conflict. Also
the husband and wife team of Rosalind and Ivo Feierabend from
45San Diego State University have performed similar research. 
The use of quantitative methods to analyze aggregate data 
enables the scholar to scan a wide range of activities and
43James N. Rosenau, "Introductory Note," in James N. 
Rosenau, ed.. International Politics and Foreign Policy: 
Revised Edition (New York; The Free Press, 1969), pp. 1-2.
^^Among other works, see; R. J. Rummel, "Some Dimen­
sions in the Foreign Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace 
Research, III (1966), pp. 197-224.
45Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Level of Develop­
ment and Internation Behavior," in Richard Butwell, ed.. 
Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1969), pp. 137-188.
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to proffer some generalizations based on the processing of 
magnitudinous data.
Examination of ideological strains has been profitably 
used in analyzing some small states. Among the newly inde­
pendent, less developed countries, an affinity for ideology 
is well-known. Nationalism and neutralism, among other con­
cepts, have a tendency to assume strong ideological signifi­
cance for entire countries, providing the setting for analysis 
of the meaning of such doctrines to foreign policy execution. 
There has been a reaction against this type of approach in 
recent years since it tends to overlook broad strategic 
interests in favor of such factors as religious outlook, 
social philosophy, or other parochialism.^^
Systems theory has developed into a prominent and useful 
tool for political scientists. The structure and order which 
it provides has enabled it to find uses beyond the early 
macro level of analysis employed by Morton Kaplan, Charles 
McClelland, and others. Development of sub-system foci 
promise to make possible even greater use of the systems 
approach. Michael Brecher and Leonard Binder provided 
successful early applications of the sub-system approach to
For an example of one type of underdeveloped nation 
ideology see: Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, England:
Leicester University Press, 1963); for a criticism of the 
ideological approach see; Kenneth Thompson and Roy C. 
Macridis, "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in 
Roy C. Macridis, ed.. Foreign Policy in World Politics 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962),
pp. 1-3.
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47South Asia and the Middle East. A more recent article by
Peter Berton suggests that sub-system, or submacro, analysis
could be used to study national groupings other than those
48which share geographic regions. This is partially what is
attempted below in Chapter II.
"Geopolitics" still has value for analysts of small na­
tion foreign policy. Harold Sprout properly has rejected 
geography as the "master variable," but geographic factors
play a major, if not decisive, role in lesser states' external 
49affairs. Raymond Aron singles out "geographical situation" 
and "resources" as the two most important factors which in­
fluence small state foreign relations.Other scholars, 
including John Herz,^^ have reconsidered earlier predictions
Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian 
Studies; The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia,"
World Politics, XV (January, 1963), pp. 213-235; and 
Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate Interna­
tional System," World Politics, X (April, 1958), pp. 408- 
429.
^®Peter Berton, "International Subsystems: A Submacro
Approach to International Studies," International Studies 
Quarterly, XIII (December, 1969), pp. 329-334.
^^Harold Sprout, "Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technolo­
gical Perspective," World Politics, XV (January, 1963), 
p. 187.
50Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International
Relations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966),
p. 138.
‘51In 1959 Herz said, " . . .  the nation-state is giving 
way to a permeability which tends to obliterate the very 
meaning of unit and unity, power and power relations, sover­
eignty and independence." International Politics in the 
Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),
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of the decline of territoriality. Factors like Cohen's
52space, time, and national vantage points. Wood's "remote- 
53ness," and Gottman's "accessibility" and "movement" are 
regaining some of their relevance and i m p o r t . I t  remains 
to be seen whether the renewed interest in geopolitics will 
extend to the study of small state foreign affairs. It 
would seem logical that such a focus would attract environ­
mental studies by the very importance of ecology to the 
lesser entities.
From other possible additions to the foregoing survey 
of appropriate methodological approaches, the current study 
has undertaken the application of two methods. The first 
of these deploys a macro-analytic stratagem and focuses on 
systemic behavior patterns, while the second is micro in
p. 41. A decade later he said, "Developments have rendered 
me doubtful of the correctness of my previous anticipa­
tions . . . .  There are indicators pointing in another direc­
tion; not to 'universalism' but to retrenchment; not to 
interdependence but to a new self-sufficiency; toward area 
not losing its impact but regaining it; in short, a 'new 
territoriality.'" Quoted from: "The Territorial State
Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State,"
in James N. Rosenau, ed.. International Politics and Foreign 
Policy: Revised Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969),
p. 77.
52Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World 
Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), p. xxxi.
53D. P. J. Wood, "The Smaller Territories: Some Politi­
cal Considerations," in Burton Benedict, ed., Problems of 
Smaller Territories (London: Athlone Press, 1967), p. 29ff.
^^Jean Gottman, "The Political Partitioning of Our 
World: An Attempt at Analysis," World Politics, IV (July,
1952), pp. 513-515.
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scope and attempts to apply a newer methodological schema. 
Since the two form distinct though related efforts, discus­
sion of each in its own right is necessary,
a. A Pre-Theory of Small State Foreign Policy
Political theory predates precise scientific study of 
political phenomena. The early theoretical writings of 
Socrates and Plato, not to mention the Oriental thinkers, 
set the stage for the empirical studies of Aristotle. Down 
through the intervening millenia the inductive method has 
characterized numerous political studies. Its use is still 
prevalent.
Centuries of theorizing yielded diverse ideas about the 
nature of the state, sovereignty, relationship of church to 
state, and countless other topics. These treatises were 
usually one man's notions concerning the current political 
scene in a given country or region. Although frequently 
alleged to be universal verities, the postulates set forth 
rarely possessed lasting applicability, since most of them 
were responses to local situations and circumstances. In­
deed, objective hypothesizing was not seriously attempted 
by most. Normative prescriptions about what "ought to be" 
preoccupied the thoughts of men intention bringing reality 
into line with their ideals.
Attempts to find theory which could be universally ap­
plied for the purpose of comparative analysis have intensified 
in recent centuries and even decades. The respective
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prescriptions of Marx in economics, Darwin in the biological 
sciences, and Einstein in physics provide rigorous explana­
tions for an assortment of phenomena, each purporting to 
give universal insight into a particular subject matter field, 
The merit of these and other lesser known efforts have been 
subjected to continuing scrutiny.
In the comparatively new study of politics, more modest 
claims generally have been made for recent theories. Trea­
tises similar in scope to Plato's Republic and Augustine's 
City of God rarely are undertaken by serious students of 
politics today. With the astronomical number of variables 
and the specialization in professional training, theorizing 
has become more narrow in scope, fitting Stanley Hoffman's 
category of "partial" theories.This seems a wise trend 
since many of the sub-fields of political science are still 
in their adolescence.
International relations, which has been established as 
an academic field for only about forty years, fits this 
youthful description. To be sure, there was theory on 
internation interaction, but it had not reached a very
55Stanley Hoffman, The State of War: Essays on the
Theory and Practice of International Relations (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 6.
56Charles A. McClelland, "International Relations: 
Wisdom of Science," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International 
Politics and Foreign Policy: Revised Edition (New York:
The Free Press, 1969), p. 3.
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sophisticated level. Theorizing on foreign policy developed 
out of more general works on war, trade relations, and 
colonial policies. It lacked wide applicability and was 
thus not very useful for comparative research.
This weakness has been attributed by James Rosenau to 
a lack of "pre-theory" in foreign policy research. A per­
ceptive scholar, Rosenau believes that data must be given a 
"preliminary processing" which would determine whether the
raw materials were truly comparable and ready for serious 
57theorizing. He further assumes that the widespread use of 
pre-theories, as in economics, sociology, and other areas, 
would result in the accumulation of data which would be com­
parable, even though diverse views might result in a variety
58of pre-theories. Patterns of thought would emerge and 
similar ideas would be easily sorted out.
In illustrating the utility of the pre-theory concept, 
Rosenau outlined a five-dimensional scheme into which he 
contended all foreign policy data could be categorized. 
Listed in order of their increasing time and place distance 
from the decision making source, the five sets of variables 
are as follows : idiosyncratic, or decision making traits;
role, i.e., external behavior of officials generated because
57James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign 
Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Compara­
tive and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: North­
western University Press, 1966) , p. 40.
58Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ,"  p . 51.
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of the role occupied and likely to occur regardless of who
holds office; governmental, or those aspects of a government's
structure which help or hinder foreign policy formulation and
execution; societal, i.e., the nongovernmental aspects of a
society which influence external relations; and systemic,
or any influences from the external environment which condi-
59tion the choices of decision makers.
For further illustration, Rosenau suggests applying the 
sets of variables to various types of states. He employs 
three diads, large versus small states, developed versus 
underdeveloped, and open versus closed political systems.
In each of these three dichotomies, he ranks the five sets 
of variables according to importance in the foreign policy 
machinery. The resultant grid provides an excellent basis 
for comparing nations, checking to see if the order of 
variables remains the same for certain open, large, developed 
countries, or whether variation may be seen.
Such an elaborate model would be nearly impossible for 
the single researcher to test on large numbers of states. 
However, Rosenau only attempted to present the scheme and 
illustrate its usefulness. On a similar scale, this is what 
the writer attempts in Chapter II. The paucity of theory 
on small nation foreign policy lacks universal applicability
59Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ," p. 42.
60Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ,"  p . 47.
35
among states of our general definition. Each attempt thus 
far has so pared the total number of smaller countries, for 
purposes of narrow analysis, that a truly "macro" type of 
theory cannot be said to exist for small entities. Compari­
sons have been limited to a few states, opening up authors 
to the aforementioned criticism of inadequate definition by 
virtue of omission. While admittedly general, the proposed 
pre-theory in the second chapter opens the case for general 
comparison, and suggests refinements to clarify and qualify 
the many exceptions. Cast in terms of "pre-theory," it is 
understandably tentative and general, but it attempts to 
test the validity of comparative small nation foreign policy 
analysis with due regard for previously restrictive defini­
tions .
Both the method of obtaining the generalizations and 
the presentation of them in Chapter II bear explanation.
The explicit and implicit literature on the subject has been 
perused, and an inventory of statements, propositions, and 
hypotheses has been compiled. These have been reduced to a 
manageable number which have a maximum scope of applicability 
and overlap minimally. Inconsistencies in interpretation, 
conflicting views of various authors, as well as general 
agreement and strength of argument are noted and receive 
comment. This chapter consists, therefore, of syntheses of 
scholarly opinion and judgment as to what of the existent
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material is valid and applicable to the group of small states 
which fall within the domain of the above definition.
In order to set forth the pre-theory clearly and co­
gently, an outline system of analysis is utilized. Hypo­
theses are made in the form of linked propositions to give 
continuity and order to the development of i d e a s . M a n y  of 
the propositions appear, and indeed are, self evident; but 
they provide the opportunity of re-exploring some of the 
"givens" of small nation foreign policy study and allow for 
easy mental movement from one theoretical statement to the 
next.
Summarily, what is attempted is a macro-level of analy­
sis of small nation external behavior. By assessing past 
common and diverse policies, hypotheses are stated providing 
for comparison of states on the basis of the crude pre-theory. 
Methods by which aspects of the pre-theory could be tested 
are also suggested.
b. "Linkage Politics" in New Zealand
The second major portion of this project involves the 
application of one newer methodological technique to the 
study of a small nation. Such an application performs sev­
eral useful tasks. In the first place, recently developed 
methods have not been widely adapted to small state foreign
This method has been used to good advantage by Andrew 
M . Scott in his volume The Functioning of the International 
System (New York; The MacMillan Company, 1967).
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policy inquiries. The present attempt hopes to demonstrate 
the value of one newly developed analytical tool, i.e., the 
concept of "linkage politics." A further contribution in­
volves partially fulfilling a need which William Paterson
notes, namely "more intensive" study on the policy process
62of individual small states. The linkage politics concept, 
therefore, is applied to New Zealand with the intention of 
understanding more clearly the underlying influences affect­
ing one small country's external ties. Thorough knowledge 
of the linkage idea and of the characteristics which render 
New Zealand a suitable situation for study are needed for 
interpreting Chapter III.
The profession's intellectual debt to James Rosenau 
is obvious in the preceding pages. In view of his percep­
tive and creative contributions over many years, it is not 
surprising that he has been instrumental in developing the 
linkage concept into an accepted tool for foreign policy 
research. His efforts were tlie key in producing the major 
work to date on this subject. Linkage Politics, in 1969.^^ 
Chapters I and III of this volume are Rosenau's explanation 
of what a "link" consists of and how the phenomenon may be 
studied.
^^Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 123.
^^Full.citation; James N. Rosenau, ed.. Linkage Politics ; 
Essays on the Convergence of National and International Sys­
tems (New York: The Free Press, 1969) .
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Linkage theory is based on the assumption that science 
and technology have reduced the effectiveness of such pre­
viously formidable dividers as space and time. As this pro­
cess has become pronounced in recent decades, dependence of 
one state upon another for trade or protection or both has
A .
resulted in a "heightened interdependence" among states.
As nations have come closer together for purposes of mutual 
benefit, incursions into each other's policy machinery and 
even execution have become commonplace. The "linkage" is 
that contact of national and international systems that makes 
possible the penetration of the nation by the environment and 
vice versa.
Linkages are found everywhere and so would seem readily 
available for research. No society can isolate itself from 
the influences of outside political forces. However, past 
study of links between domestic and international milieux 
treated this phenomenon as a dependent variable until 
Rosenau's efforts at highlighting it. Nevertheless, there 
has been widespread recognition of the blurring of national 
policy boundaries for some years.
Examples of scholarly adherence to the linkage concept. 
are easy to uncover. As early as 1949 one author noted that 
"the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy have for
^^Rosenau, Linkage . . . , p. 2.
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all practical purposes disappeared."^^ Joseph Frankel noted 
more recently that "the distinction between domestic and 
foreign is much less clear [than the distinction between 
separate sovereign nation-states] and the divorce between the 
two has never been c o m p l e t e . C a r l  Friedrich reached the 
same conclusion and further noted that " . . .  the inter- 
meshing of domestic and foreign policy is so intricate that 
it has become difficult to define foreign policy satisfac­
torily."^^ Perplexed by this seamless web he queried "what 
is genuinely foreign policy in a world shaped by a variety 
of international organizations?"^^
These examples scarcely reveal the top of the iceberg.
It is no longer realistic to separate domestic from foreign 
policy for analytic purposes.However, in spite of general
Rowland Egger, International Commitments and National 
Administration (Charlottesville, Virginia: Jarman Printing
Company, 1949), p. iii.
Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 84.
^^Carl J. Friedrich, "Intra-national Politics and 
Foreign Policy in Developed (Western) Systems," in R. Barry 
Farrell, ed.. Approaches to Comparative and International 
Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press, 1966), p. 98.
6 A
Friedrich, "Intranational . . . ," p. 98.
^^A few references to separation may be found. One such 
is Fred Sondermann's article, "The Linkage Between Foreign 
Policy and International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, ed.. 
International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York; The 
Free Press, 1961), pp. 8-17. He makes a clear distinction 
between domestic and foreign policy on page 9, asserting 
that such concerns as education and labor policies need not 
be influenced by foreign policy.
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acceptance of linkages, the work on isolating and studying 
the relationship wherein domestic and foreign sectors combine 
has proceeded slowly. This may be attributed to several 
factors.
In the first place, linkages are not easy to isolate, 
observe, count, or measure. Being the stated object of in­
ternational relations research, i.e., focusing on the inter­
action of nations, has not made systematic study any less 
difficult. Until Rosenau's study, no one had proposed any 
pattern for researching links, and so they remained obvious 
in everyone's mind, but almost untouched by rigorous study.
A second reason why the linkage concept has not been widely 
applied is that inadequate theory existed which would pro­
vide testable hypotheses and propositions. Rosenau noted 
this lack and through the articles in Linkage Politics went 
far in providing some beginning theory to challenge case 
study application. Thus the difficulty in finding methods 
of study and the lack of adequate theory have been largely 
overcome, although continued refinements will no doubt be 
made.
The articles in Rosenau's work are very general, and 
there is need for widespread application of the linkage con­
cept. Although they do suggest a variety of ways in which 
links can be approached, it is left for many deeper and 
narrower projects to develop the intricacies of linkages 
as they exist in different types of real world states. The
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current work constitutes, one such attempt at applying an 
adaptation of Rosenau's linkage politics concept to a small 
nation, i.e.. New Zealand. Detailed explanation of the re­
search design is found in the introduction to Chapter III.
Many characteristics render New Zealand a suitable 
country in which to undertake small nation foreign policy 
research. For one thing, it fits the definition of small 
states given above. Population figures suggest that in early 
1971 there were 2,856,000 inhabitants.^^ An independent, 
parliamentary government, composed of a stable two-party 
system, rules the populace, while retaining close ties to 
the British Commonwealth. Memberships in the United Nations 
and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization allow for active 
international political involvement. In addition, the ANZüS 
Pact provides military guarantees from two larger allies, 
the United States and Australia. Thus, New Zealand may be 
considered a typical, economically developed small state.
Another fact which makes New Zealand desirable for this 
type of study is the concentrated venue of the major govern­
mental and non-governmental linkage groups. Wellington 
serves as the government's seat and also as headquarters for 
the bureaucracy, which comprises a high percentage of this 
welfare state's total work force. In addition, pressure 
groups representing the major interests maintain offices in
70New Zealand Official Yearbook (Department of Statistics, 
Wellington, 1970), p. 65.
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the capital. Thus it is possible to study thoroughly all 
linkage groups of consequence without excessive movement 
about the country..
The most attractive characteristic which New Zealand 
offers to researchers of linkages is its smallness. It would 
be practically impossible for a lone student to attempt an 
exhaustive study of major linkages in the United States,
Great Britain, or France. Their size, complexity, and diver­
sity would complicate such a task immeasurably. However, New 
Zealand constitutes an ideal laboratory for linkage research. 
Developed politically, yet manageable in size, links between 
external and internal environments can be identified and 
analyzed profitably.
CHAPTER II
A PRE-THEORY OF SMALL-STATE FOREIGN POLICY
I. Introduction 
Works on small state foreign affairs which have 
appeared thus far have focused on various sub-types of the 
general category. Thus Fox treated six European developed 
states in wartime; Vital dealt with unaligned nations, re­
gardless of development, but excluded Central and South 
American countries; and Rothstein devoted his attention ex­
clusively to aligned polities, which had faced up realisti­
cally to their weakness (he also excluded Latin America).
All other works have made similar qualifications and distinc­
tions resulting in the paring away at the general class of 
smaller states.
The reason for such specialization is obvious; simply 
stated, the staggering diversity and range of capabilities 
and interests renders small states en masse too wide a field 
for analysis. Thus students of these countries have spared 
themselves by not attempting theoretical generalizations 
which would attempt to cover the entire group of such enti­
ties. As a result, there is no general theory of small state 
foreign relations, even though considerable thought has been 
given to specific groups of small states.
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One might assume, therefore, that a comprehensive theory 
of small nation external affairs is impractical and impossible. 
However, several reasons exist to throw doubt on such an as­
sumption. First and most basic is that no one has yet at­
tempted a general theory. Various types of partial theories 
have been set forth, but no one has ventured out in the un­
charted sea of general theory. A second reason for doubting 
the aforementioned assumption is the evident lack of "pre­
theorizing" on the part of authors to date.
In the two most ambitious studies, i.e., those of Vital 
and Rothstein, neither devoted more than cursory attention to 
the possibility of including all small states in his analysis. 
Vital analyzed nations acting alone because this independent 
posture allegedly enabled him to compare the small state with 
the large, which he assumed act independently.^ Rothstein
dismissed a study of all small states as "clearly impossible"
2
because of the extreme range of polities. While both chose 
to focus on less expansive topics, each included some treat­
ment of states outside the realm of his stated limits. 
Rothstein utilized an entire chapter to discuss comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of alignment, and Vital noted
that aligned small states had to face similar situations as 
3nonaligned.
^Vital, Inequality . . . , p. 5.
^Rothstein, Alliances . . - , p. 1.
^Rothstein, Alliances . . . , Chapter 8, pp. 237-264; 
Vital, Inequality . . . , p. 185, for example.
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There is thus insufficient evidence to conclude that a 
general theory is either impossible or nonessential. While 
interested scholars do not deny the utility of such general 
theorizing, none has as yet launched into the task. Indeed, 
before such a feat could be accomplished, the subject would 
require extensive "pre-processing" in order to discern whether 
small states are in fact comparable. This involves what 
Rosenau calls construction of "pre-theories."* It is the 
purpose of this chapter to construct such a pre-theory, and 
in the process to try to demonstrate that small states do 
form a distinguishable analytic category.
II. Analytical Problems 
Before the proposed pre-theory can be accepted seriously, 
three issues must be treated which heretofore have been 
stumbling-blocks to general theory. First is the issue of 
alignment versus nonalignment. This will be followed by con­
sideration of differing levels of political and economic 
development. Finally the problems of analyzing territories 
and populations of widely different dimensions are reviewed,
a. Alignment Versus Nonalignment
The first issue involves a difference of opinion over 
whether the most viable strategic posture for a small state 
is to be under the wings of larger allies, or to act alone 
and be dependent on its own resources and other states' good
*Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ,"  p . 40.
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will. Few have held firmly to one position or the other.
Vital and Rothstein stand at the two poles in their respec­
tive books on the subject, but both concede that the immedi­
ate international mood determines which policy holds promise 
for greater advantage. Briefly, the alleged comparative 
advantages are as follows.
Nonalignment offers the best possibility of small nation 
influence when the power positions of the large states are 
fairly evenly balanced. It is in this situation that a lesser 
state can demand more in aid from the opposing blocs and can 
make its voice heard out of all proportion to its weight 
militarily or otherwise. As Liska says, "The smaller the 
margin of power that favors either of two contending parties, 
the more relevant is the total power of the intrinsically
5
weak third party." It follows that a nonaligned state's 
prestige and influence is highest during a big-power stale­
mate. On the other hand, neutral minor states are expendable 
and vulnerable when the balance of power shifts drastically 
to one side or the other.
Small states enter alliances for several reasons. Liska 
mentions three: security, stability, and status.^ Whether
these goals are attainable depends again on the international
George Liska, "The Third-Party: The Rationale of Non-
alignment," in Laurence W. Martin, ed.. Neutralism and Non- 
alignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 80.
^George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore, 
Maryland : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 27.
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political environment. As with a nonaligned policy, 
alignment tends to bring attention and advantage when the 
balance is stable. When a clear advantage is maintained by 
either large bloc, the lesser allies' interests may be over­
looked and their requests ignored. Thus the position of the 
minor states seems characterized by dependence on what direc­
tions their larger counterparts take.
It is thus possible to see advantages in either adopting 
an alignment or nonalignment policy. Nonaligned states have 
been fairly secure since World War II. Likewise, aligned 
small states have benefitted by their posture. In a status 
quo alliance system such as the present one, all small states 
possess considerable freedom of action and maneuverability.
Should uneasy peace fade into general war, the whole 
picture would undergo instant transformation. A situation 
resembling that before 1939 could re-emerge. Herbert 
Dinerstein characterized this era as one in which genuine 
security for small powers was not to be found in or out of 
alliance folds.^ He discounts the possibility of a return 
of the international system to such a setting; such a prog­
nosis may be rational, but is unrealistic. Contingency 
planning should never exclude war as a possibility.
Thus, small states either aligned or neutral have 
profitted in recent years by their respective positions.
^Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance 
Systems," American Political Science Review, LIX (September, 
1965), p. 593.
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However, should a serious threat to leSser powers' security 
arise, grave doubts exist for the advantages of either type 
of policy. In the arms race, nonalignment has resulted in 
procurement from several camps. The wartime situation would 
place the neutral in a precarious position. Raj Krishna ad­
mits that India, while not small in all regards, takes for 
granted that forces of some other power will assist her if 
serious threats endanger her security. Explaining this he 
says, "In other words, non-alignment has always been, in 
reality, an informal, unstated, unilateral alignment with un­
named Powers."®
In view of the relative military weakness of virtually 
all small states, the distinction between aligned and non- 
aligned seems to break down. The advantages of each in 
stable times gives way to the uncertainties which both experi­
ence in wartime or in a state of political imbalance. Just 
as larger allies serve their own interests before attending 
to small friends, the neutral must hope for a protective big 
nation to prevent disaster. For the purposes of this study, 
therefore, there is no distinction drawn between partisan and 
neutral, aligned and nonaligned,
b. Differing Levels of Development
Of the three analytical problems mentioned above, the 
difficulty in evaluating states at widely differing levels
Q
Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," India Quarterly, 
XXI (April-June, 1965), p. 122.
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of development is the most troublesome. Taking two nations, 
one highly developed and the other underdeveloped, and attempt­
ing to compare their effectiveness in executing foreign policy 
presents the scholar with serious complications. Military, 
political, and economic potentials all relate to the level of 
development which a given nation has attained. These in turn 
largely determine the policy options open .to the government. 
Thus comparison of a state such as Sweden with, say, Mali, 
becomes of dubious value, especially if the researcher's only 
interests are two lone states rather than seeing them as mem­
bers of a class of small states.
Numerous studies have been done of developed and under­
developed states, but the utility of this simple dichotomy 
has been neither universally granted nor rejected. Scholars 
studying the new nations of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific 
Islands have found the distinction very useful. Thus far, 
the international relations field in general has not treated
9
level of development as a major variable. Developmental 
hypotheses are beginning to appear in international relations 
study, and Rosenau has included the developed-underdeveloped 
dichotomy in a sample pre-theory.
On the other hand, there are good reasons for not 
dividing all small states according to this basically
9
Richard Butwell, Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation 
(Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 6.
^^Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ,"  p . 48.
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economic formula. For one thing, foreign policy does not 
depend solely on productivity. Leadership, geography, and 
numerous other factors also play a role. Furthermore, the 
concept of the developed-underdeveloped division is of 
western origin, and, according to Wilson C. McWilliams, it 
"conceals more than it reveals." McWilliams interprets the 
doctrine as suggesting that "to learn the universal and gen­
eral, men should study those states that are developed, 
whereas to learn the exotic and particular, men should study 
those states that are developing.McWilliams therefore 
rejects the developed-underdeveloped dyad and treats small 
states as a class with common problems that are intensified, 
but not necessarily made different, because of economic back­
wardness.
This attitude toward the level of development typifies 
other accounts. B, K. Blount, for example, theorizes that 
in the future power will move away from states with small 
populations and to states with a large populace. His think­
ing is that all countries are experiencing scientific revo­
lutions, and that in the long run, the states with the most 
manpower, will produce more and therefore have great physical 
power. China and India, he projects, will become "leading 
nations, eclipsing, perhaps, even Russia and the United States,
Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Political Development and 
Foreign Policy," in Richard Butwell, ed.. Foreign Policy and 
the Developing Nation (Lexington, Kentucky; University of 
Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 14.
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and the little countries of Europe— Britain and Germany,
12France and Holland— will sink into obscurity." Blount's 
assumptions are suspect, and the larger view of international 
relations taken in his article definitely relegates the small 
states to a similar, lowly position without regard for level 
of development.
For the purposes of this study, a global perspective is 
assumed. Our broad pre-theory views economic development as 
only one contributing factor— albeit an extremely important 
one— to foreign policy formulation and execution. Exceptions 
exist to many hypotheses stated below. In such cases, the 
essential variable being considered is the common quality of 
smallness as defined in Chapter I, rather than the particular 
level of development enjoyed or endured by one state,
c. Size Differences
A brief glance at Appendix B suffices to demonstrate the 
differences of national populations which are included in the 
definition of "small state" adopted for this study. From the 
Maldive Islands to Ethiopia, a broad spectrum of nations is 
presented. Some of these are making major contributions to 
international affairs; others scarcely deserve to be called 
sovereign states. Certainly their dimensional diversity 
raises reasonable doubt as to the comparability of such 
nations.
12B. K. Blount, "Science Will Change the Balance of 
Power," The New Scientist, 2 (June 27, 1957), p. 9.
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Admittedly, this broad category leaves the writer's 
definition open to question. Vital received criticism for 
not having established a class of small states that was ob­
viously distinct in their external relations.If viewed 
from a narrow perspective, the present study would be even 
more vulnerable to similar disapproval.
However, the nature of a pre-theory demands a comprehen­
sive look at the phenomena, even though subsequent refinements 
certainly will be required. Also, it is maintained that simi­
lar types of problems face Sweden and Somalia, Western Samoa 
and Ceylon. These involve the problem of small size in a 
world dominated by giants. Certainly size is relative, but 
the mental, economic, political, and metaphysical outlooks 
of small states bear marked resemblance whether they be in 
Asia or Latin America, Africa or Scandinavia.
Therefore, as the subsequent pre-theory unfolds, the 
reader is asked to remember the limitations and aims of the 
study. Whenever generalizations are applied to ninety-seven 
nations, exceptions will be numerous. On the other hand, the 
set of hypotheses provides a basis for further research on 
and refinement of more specialized categories.
III. The Pre-Theory 
The organization of the pre-theory follows three broad 
areas which set small states apart from larger ones. First
^^Paterson, "Small S tates . . . ,"  p . 119.
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and most important are questions of survival. Security 
troubles all states to some degree; however, several factors 
highlighted below show how tenuous self-preservation can be 
for the small nation. Secondly, the pressures and problems 
of international economic existence are treated. Finally, 
some propositions relating to the psychological and emotional 
characteristics are set forth. In each of these areas the 
small nations find themselves in contrasting situations to 
the large. The sets of linked propositions provide the 
theoretical base which posits the similar character of small 
states. Where exceptions to the pre-theory exist, they are 
noted.
A. Security Policy
Any country's security policy comprises several facets. 
Among other things, geographic position and potential, diplo­
matic and military capabilities, and possible policies toward 
global and regional political entities stand out. In order 
to fully grasp the status of small state security policy, a 
thorough appreciation of these three factors is necessary.
Before turning to a separate analysis of each variable, 
several propositions concerning the totality of small state 
foreign policy should be put forward.
1:1 For the small state, matters of security 
dominate foreign policy considerations; 
and
1:2 therefore, foreign policy often gets
more attention than domestic policy; and
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1:3 therefore, questions related to military 
posture, alignment or non-alignment, and 
appropriate external responses assume 
proportionately greater significance than 
in large states.
These statements require some comment since there exists
scant scientific proof of their validity. The primacy of
security frequently has been noted among scholarly works on
small states. One Nordic student has noted, "The foreign
policy of a small nation can have but one purpose: the safe-
14guarding of its independence and security." This general­
ization expresses the life-or-death importance of defense to 
the lesser countries, particularly in time of crisis. In 
wartime, large defeated states often have forced upon them 
total disarmament, steep reparation schedules, and terri­
torial partitions, but they usually remain intact as nations. 
The small state rarely fares as well. More often the fate 
of the Baltic states awaits minor powers found attached to 
the losing side in a major war. With such an ignominious 
demise ever a possibility, the questions of maintaining 
identity and independence become all-important for the small 
state.
The overriding importance of foreign policy derives from 
several conditions which exist among substantial numbers of 
small states. First, of course, is the demand for security 
already mentioned. Secondly, the need for international
14Half Torngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," Foreign 
Affairs, XXXIX (July, 1961), p. 601.
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trade causes an intense awareness of external affairs among 
such states as Ceylon, Switzerland and New Zealand. Thirdly, 
for certain underdeveloped countries, an ebullient foreign 
policy is thought to save face for a faltering domestic 
policy. Peter Lyon further notes an ideological uncertainty 
among some neutrals as to whether domestic matters for them 
should take precedence over foreign policy or whether Ranke's 
primacy of foreign policy includes the nonaligned.For 
these reasons, external problems consistently capture more 
attention than domestic affairs in many small states. Sys­
tematic studies should be undertaken to scientifically test 
this hypothesis, but indications based on existent literature 
tentatively validate the assumption.
In regard to the third proposition several qualifying 
factors must be taken into account. For many lesser states 
the answers to questions of military strength, alignment 
policy, and external affairs in general already have been 
decided. Older small states, e.g., Switzerland and Sweden, 
hold to long-standing policies; however, the facing of these 
problems by newly independent nations has become a recurrent 
source of frustration and perplexity. The majority have 
settled such issues as size and composition of military, 
position in relation to competing political alignments, and 
other important fundamental policy imperatives. Especially
15Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, England: Leicester
University Press, 1963), p. 74.
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for the new states, the development of an army as a symbol 
of sovereignty has assumed a high priority. Even among older 
neutral states, such as the two just mentioned, the mainte­
nance of an appropriate defense force occupies much of the 
time of their planners. Thus, these related concerns become 
major issue areas among small states because of the survive- 
or-perish stakes which confront small states in the event of 
war.
1:4 The overriding importance of security causes 
the inherently weak small state to seek out­
side assistance in order to ensure maintenance 
of sovereignty;
1:5 therefore, the prevalent policies adopted by 
lesser entities have been the result of 
leaders' assessments of national interest; 
and
1:6 therefore, the posture of older, developed 
states has tended toward alignment with the 
Western democracies, while the newer, under­
developed states have pursued nonalignment 
policies.
The essential truth of these statements should not con­
ceal several important exceptions. Weakness has forced small 
states to turn beyond their borders for assurances of assis­
tance. The nature of this external help has differed from 
country to country.
Some nations have taken refuge in alliances and allowed 
other states to take the major responsibility for their de­
fense. An example of this type of state is Panama who in one 
survey ranked 88th of 88 nations in percentage of population
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in the military.Despite being situated in the heart of 
volatile Latin America, Panama has entrusted her defense 
entirely to her American ally.
An opposite sort of outside request has been proffered 
by Switzerland, i.e., that her neutrality be respected. Along 
with Sweden, Geneva asks no military intervention or financial 
assistance, only that her status as neutral not be violated.
In between these extremes are a host of different situ­
ations. By and large they fit hypothesis 1:6, although 
special circumstances exist for many. Careful analysis 
demonstrates the supreme importance which national interest 
assessments have for policy formation. For some, adherence 
to nonalignment seems to best serve interests in procuring 
aid from all sides. For others, historic and cultural ties 
preclude nonalignment and encourage close cooperation with a 
major power. In either case, external assistance is solicited 
and necessary for viability in the realm of security.
1. Geographic Considerations
In assessing national interests, geographic factors play 
an important part. Despite technological advances which have 
overcome many natural boundaries to travel and communications, 
there remain significant geographic considerations which 
neither small nor large nations can ignore. In light of this
Bruce M. Russett, et aJ^ ., World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1964), p. 75.
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truism the following proposition related to small states is 
offered.
1:7 Geographic factors such as position, accessi­
bility, insularity, and natural boundaries may 
largely determine the security and economic 
fate of a small nation.
Even to suggest geographic determinism necessitates a 
rather complete explanation of this hypothesis. In recent 
years there has been a fairly systematic rejection of geo­
graphy as having more than peripheral bearing on a state's 
development. Due to the development of intercontinental 
bombers, atom bombs, and jet planes, even geographers were 
ready to admit to a lessening influence of natural factors 
on political strategy. Harold and Margaret Sprout noted in 
1952, "Broadly speaking, the geographical layout of lands and
seas and the configuration of the lands have lost much of the
17military-political value once attached to these factors."
If one turned to the most recent, reputable books on
small state foreign policy, i.e., those of Vital and Rothstein,
it could be assumed that geographic factors had lost even the
devalued importance which they retained in the Sprouts' views
of two decades past. Neither The Inequality of States nor
Alliances and Small States devotes more than an occasional
18passing mention to geography. The paucity of attention
^^Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Geography and 
International Politics in Revolutionary Change," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, iv (March, 1952), p. 160.
18Very brief mention is made in Vital, pp. 59, 65, 89 and 
147; in Rothstein there is also very little, e.g., see p. 61.
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paid by these two scholars scarcely matches that of numerous 
other works, and the avoidance of geography constitutes one 
point upon which both men's works have been criticized.
In contrast to the Vital and Rothstein attitudes, stand 
several other works which place geography among the most im­
portant factors in the analysis of small state foreign affairs. 
For example, Raymond Aron singles out geographic position and
resources as the two "decisive" factors in determining lesser 
19nations' fates. However, the strongest defense of geo­
graphic relevance to small states comes from Professor Erling 
Bjol of the University of Aarhus. He begins a recent article 
with a discussion of the troubled relationship between Albania 
and the U.S.S.R. since World War II. According to Bjol, the 
Soviet Union did not possess the kind of power which could be 
used successfully against her smaller foe because of the 
geographic location of the latter. Furthermore, he coined 
the phrase "security geography," the importance of which he 
maintained as follows;
I would suggest that security geography 
would be one of the first categories to 
take into consideration if one wants to 
elaborate a conceptual framework for the
19Raymond Aron, Peace . . . , p. 138. Others sharing a 
similar view on the place of geography are Charles A. Fisher, 
Essays in Political Geography (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
1968), pp. 4-5; Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and 
Politics . . . , entire first chapter; also, numerous case 
studies, some of which will be mentioned below, highlight 
geographic considerations.
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analysis of the role of small states in 
international politics. ^
Bjol proceeds to list three factors which assume great 
import for the small state. First is natural boundaries, 
most notably mountains and water; second is the climatic 
dimension; and finally is position. Although Bjol in his 
article fails to develop the security significance of these, 
they are treated hereafter in the order listed.
Few would dispute the historic importance of natural 
boundaries to worldwide development. For example, geographic 
limitations enabled parts of the Far East to remain isolated 
for centuries, even when western technological advances were 
facilitating travel and communication elsewhere; and a narrow 
strip of water has successfully kept England from invasion 
by ground or sea forces for over nine centuries. The two 
most significant barriers are mountains and water. Mountains 
have played a major role in insuring neutrality for Switzerland, 
ideological independence for Albania, and military protection 
to a number of states in varying degrees. Naturally, moun­
tains do not provide protection from air attack by planes or 
missiles, but they do deter conventional ground and artillery 
attacks. It is questionable whether the interests of a large 
power would be saved by launching a sophisticated nuclear 
attack on a nation fitting our definition of "small." More 
is said on this point below.
^^B jol, "The Power . . . ,"  p . 158.
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Water; likewise, provides an inhospitable barrier. As 
previously noted, even a small body of water can present 
tactical and strategic problems to the would-be aggressor.
The English Channel, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of 
Gibraltar provide examples wherein water has become a barrier 
to aggression. Having mentioned these it scarcely seems 
necessary to note the barriers which oceans present.
Particular advantage lies with insular states. Iceland 
and the Caribbean and the Pacific Island nations all share 
certain definite advantages which Finland, Austria, and 
Rhodesia do not share. There seems to be greater freedom 
of action for the former states. From a different perspec­
tive, no threat is presented large states by small island 
nations. However, Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste 
Duroselle note that island states suffer with some burdens 
which tend to balance the advantages. Their usefulness as 
bases for military and economic ventures of large states 
often makes them subject to pressures for concessions. Also,
resources not available locally must be imported. Quite
21often foodstuffs must be brought from outside. Thus with 
greater political freedom goes possible economic dependence.
Climatic characteristics can play an important role in 
the small state's security considerations. Growing season.
21Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduc­
tion to the History of International Relations (London; 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 15.
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rainfall, and temperature variation determine the food supply 
and vegetation. These factors influence the type of foreign 
policy by affecting the degree of dependence on outside 
sources of food. Also, the direct security factor can be 
seen here. Climate may determine whether a nation is sus­
ceptible to or immune from guerrilla warfare. There are 
numerous other implications of climatological factors, but 
they need not receive further attention here.
Geographical position or location also weighs heavily 
in security considerations of small states. It is obvious 
that Switzerland and Sweden enjoy advantages of position over 
Czechoslovakia and Finland, respectively. Likewise, the lo­
cation of Laos puts it in a more difficult strategic and 
security position than, say, Iceland.
Two of the myriad problems which frequently face small 
nations are (1) bordering a major power and (2) not having 
direct access to the ocean lanes. In the first instance 
Finland provides a classic example. Experience over the past 
centuries has demonstrated the need of Finland's maintaining 
amicable relations with Moscow. When the smaller state re­
fused to give in to the larger state's will in 1939-40, the
22great power pushed her aside. The possibility of such 
action constitutes a permanent feature of contingency planning
22Max Jakobson tells this story very thoroughly in his 
The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
Harvard University Press, 1961).
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among small states in a similar position. Austria, the former 
Baltic States, and the Himalayan countries are among those who 
must ponder this truism.
The landlocked state has other problems. Military as­
sistance against aggression, economic trade, and other types 
of international exchange become subject to the possible 
restrictions of neighboring states. While not itself a 
nation-state, Berlin in 1948-49 provides an extreme example 
of the potential for disruption which a land bound state must 
face. A number of central African nations find themselves in 
this position. Quite often this type of country finds itself 
cast in the role of a buffer. For the lesser powers this can 
spell doom.^^
Having briefly enumerated some of the major consequences 
which geographic factors may impose, one is brought back to 
the question of why the works of Vital and Rothstein appar­
ently do not deem physical attributes important to under­
standing small state external affairs, particularly security 
policy. Several possible explanations exist. William 
Paterson asks if examination of geographic characteristics 
might too strongly highlight the differences of each small 
state, and thereby score the idea of a class of lesser entities. 24
23See, for example, Hugh Toye, Laos; Buffer State or 
Battleground (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
24Paterson, "Small S tates . . . ,"  p . 121.
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Another explanation might be derived from the fact tliat 
both Vital and Rothstein deal at length with the plight of 
small nations in the nuclear environment. Their analyses 
seem to indicate a belief that small states are considered 
fair game by the five holders of the nuclear monopoly. Ad­
mittedly several small states have examined the possibility 
of acquiring their own nuclear forces, an act which would 
leave them susceptible to large power pressure and planning. 
However, the political likelihood of any small power attain­
ing independent nuclear weapons still seems remote, even 
though a number possess the necessary knowledge and materials 
to do so.
The most plausible explanation for the omission of geo­
graphy in the analyses of Vital and Rothstein seems to be 
the assumption held by many that technology has forever 
changed man and his world. There is, in fact, ample evidence 
to support such an opinion without considering the topic here. 
However, in face of such evidence, counter opinion exists 
which demonstrates the need for examining carefully such 
factors as geography, even in the face of gigantic techno­
logical strides. Eugene Skolnikoff of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology supports this position;
Technology, instead of minimizing conscious^ 
ness of national sovereignty, has exaggerated 
it; instead of discouraging the emergence of 
weak, small states, has made proliferation of 
states possible; instead of bringing about 
sharp changes in attitudes and assumptions 
of governments toward foreign affairs, has
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allowed continuation of "traditional" 
approaches to the workings of the inter­
national system. ^
In view of the foregoing analysis it is unnecessary to 
defend further the relevancy of geography to security affairs 
of small states. Traditional geographic factors continue to 
have meaning for the minor state. Very few are seriously 
threatened directly by the presence of nuclear weapons in 
the world. They must still look first to their physical as­
sets and liabilities in formulating security policy.
2. Diplomatic and Military Capabilities
Whereas no state can chose the climate, physical loca­
tion, and natural barriers with which it must face the world, 
diplomatic and military factors are less static. In fact, 
of the components of security, these facets offer the small 
state the greatest opportunity of changing its status, for 
better or worse. However, small size inherently places cer­
tain limitations upon a country's diplomatic and military 
sectors which again render it different from the large state:
1:8 Because of size differences, small states 
suffer weaknesses diplomatically and 
militarily which severely limit their ac­
tivities vis-a-vis large powers; and
1:9 therefore, diplomacy of lesser states 
is narrower in scope, more limited in 
manpower, dependent on others for
25Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "The International Functional 
Implications of Future Technology" (unpublished paper pre­
sented to annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Los Angeles, California, September, 1970),
p. 1.
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intelligence, and more conscious of 
efficiency than that of larger counter­
parts ;
1:10 however, size disparity can bring advan­
tages which somewhat balance disadvantages 
in the diplomatic field.
Diplomacy offers the small state a chance of overcoming 
some of the limitations it suffers in other areas. Unlike 
economic and military affairs, size of a diplomatic corps 
does not determine quality and effectiveness of policy. How­
ever, despite the real opportunity which diplomacy offers, 
the small state still labors under handicaps.
Being largely intangible, diplomatic activity deals in 
such products as influence, intelligence, and prestige. Rep­
resentation abroad provides a key avenue of influence and 
negotiation; small states cannot be as completely represented 
around the world as large states. Their financial and man­
power resources prohibit placing numerous, large missions on 
2 6a global scale. Likewise in the field of information 
gathering, the minor states cannot maintain hired agents on 
a scale which would provide masses of first-rate intelligence. 
Therefore, there is the necessity of cooperating with other 
small states, such as the New Zealand-Australian collabora­
tion example, or seeking information from major nations' 
espionage networks.
26vital. Inequality . . . , pp. 16-23. This is the most 
thorough evaluation available which compares large and small 
state diplomatic machinery.
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At first glance these weaknesses would seem to render 
ineffective the external representation of a small country. 
Indeed for some, e.g., the land-locked central African na­
tions, their foreign relations are conducted without benefit 
of many trained experts, adequate intelligence, or numerous 
overseas legations. Countries such as Uganda and Mali fre­
quently rely on larger countries, usually former colonial 
mentors, to care for some diplomatic duties in areas where 
they have no representation. In view of these facts it is 
obvious that the small country cannot compete successfully 
against the large state.
Before writing off the small state in diplomatic affairs, 
several points should be raised which qualify the rather 
somber picture just presented. In the first place, small 
states do not plan globally, but locally. There is no need 
to have representation in every country or even in every main 
region. The relevant environment for the small state is nar­
row, and thus the lack of worldwide representation presents 
few problems. Secondly, intelligence gathering may be given 
exaggerated importance by large government officials. It is 
most comforting to have information readily available, but 
the degree to which secret intelligence would alter a small 
nation's policy options is subject to question.
Thirdly, small diplomatic corps and limited information 
should not drastically affect the formulation of small state 
foreign policy. Foreign policy for any nation involves what
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27Aron calls "a share of adaptation to circumstances." For
small states this involves an even greater necessity to adapt
than in the large ones, since the materials from which a
strong, positive policy may be constructed are denied the
former. Minor states live in what Cohen calls the "world
of indirect power capability," one in which the weak act when
28the situation allows, not necessarily when they choose.
Thus, a smaller number of interests and a narrower relevant
geographic area mean that greater attention may be given to
structuring a viable policy. Paterson feels that the lesser
state has a better possibility of formulating a coherent
29policy than major states.
Several factors, if present, can help to fulfill this 
high expectation for the small state diplomatic machinery. 
Liska mentions organization, social cohesion, morale, and 
statesmanship as key traits needed to overcome diplomatic 
weakness. Small state diplomats need to be aware of the 
unique tools available to them, e.g., the emotional impact 
which can be elicited if threatened by a major power. Max 
Jakobson maintained that if the military and world opinion 
were used as criteria, Finland defeated the Soviet Union in
27Aron, Peace . . . , p. 284.
28Cohen, Geography and Politics . . . , p. 28
29Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 122. 
^^Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 25-26.
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the Winter War. In his words, "A pawn had beaten a 
c a s t l e . P r o b a b l y overstated, this nevertheless demon­
strates the effect emotional appeals may have for the under­
dog state. If all the available resources can be mustered,
small diplomatic efforts can exert an influence far beyond 
their expected potential.
1:11 Disparity of size prevents the small state 
from being truly competitive militarily 
with the large state at the present time 
and for the foreseeable future; and
1:12 therein lies the basis of the tenuous
character of small states, since economic, 
psychological, and political well-being 
ultimately depend on security as provided 
by the military.
Taking these general statements in order, a number of 
qualifying remarks are appropriate. However, their essential 
truth to most small states has been accepted for centuries.
As noted in the introduction in Chapter I, lesser countries 
always have been ignored and maneuvered by large states 
against their wishes. Arnold Wo1fers noted during World War 
II that the military weakness characteristic of smaller en­
tities provided a temptation to expand for strong, aggressive 
32states. More recently, another student of international 
relations has noted the parallels between the situations in 
the Balkans before World War I and in Southeast Asia since 
World War II and has concluded that the presence of numerous
^^Jakobson, The Diplomacy . . . , p. 5. 
^^olfers, "In Defense . . . ," p- 210.
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small states in one geographic area constitutes "a classic
33case of a power vacuum." One is tempted to view this con­
dition as axiomatic.
However, before leaving this point it should be under­
stood that while small states cannot fight a successful war 
against a great power, neither can some states which claim 
large power status. As Rothstein says, "Italy could not de­
feat France; France could not defeat Germany, and Germany
34could not defeat the United States." Furthermore, some
small states might be able to wage successful wars against a
larger neighbor. Sweden, for example, contains a strong air
force produced domestically, a very unusual thing for small
states. Also, the civilian defense system is highly trained
and has highly developed conventional power capabilities.
Also, Switzerland, possesses the ability to forestall any
invasion except a nuclear missile strike. Its geography and
defense system make it secure from all but the most sophis-
35ticated aggression. Also, as Paterson suggests, Sweden 
may be a stronger power militarily than France.
33Donald Neuchterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security 
in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, VIII (September, 1968), 
p. 807.
34Eothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 21.
^^For a good assessment of Switzerland's capability see: 
George A. Codding, Jr., "The New Swiss Military Capability," 
Foreign Affairs, XL (April, 1962), pp. 488-494.
^^Paterson, "Small S ta tes  . . . p . 120.
71
Israel's military prowess has been amply demonstrated during 
its harried, brief history. Though small numerically and 
exposed geographically, the Israelis have defended themselves 
well against their foes. This remarkable example owes much 
to preparedness, high morale, and extensive overseas funds.
These three states are quite exceptional. However, even 
in view of their past successes in the military field, the 
thought of attempting an offensive war against a major, in­
dustrial state would be suicide in the long run. They are 
simply too small in too many ways to seriously consider a 
major war. Much additional proof could be mustered to demon­
strate this assertion, but it would be expounding on the ob- . 
vious.
In the second statement above the term "tenuous character" 
is applied to small states. This clearly requires explanation. 
As was noted in the introduction to this study, small states 
are today more numerous, more influential, and more productive 
than at any time in past history. It would seem a contradic­
tion of fact to suggest that their continued existence is 
tentative or in danger. It should be stressed in explanation 
that the hypothesis applied specifically to the military 
weakness which small nations share. This makes them subject 
to unusual stress in times when relationships between great 
powers are out of balance. If war is a possibility, the 
small state's security is threatened, depending, of course, 
on its strategic importance and geographic position relative
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to the disputing factions. Thus, the statement was made with 
the possibility of military action in mind. Militarily, 
small states are weak and must seek to derive the most pos­
sible benefit from the non-military facets of its foreign 
policy. This brings us to the consideration of various 
policy alternatives available to the small state.
3. Policy Alternatives
Having enumerated the assets and liabilities which charac­
terize a small state's diplomatic, military, and geographic 
circumstances, the importance of policy matters seems obvious. 
A knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses which smallness 
bestows on a state is the first necessity for the statesman 
dealing in foreign policy.
It is in the realm of policy that the individual differ­
ences of small states become most apparent. To set forth 
specific, viable policy guidelines applicable to all small 
entities would demand listing pages of footnotes explaining 
the various exceptions to presumably universal rules. In 
view of this diversity, only basic statements are made and 
only the most noteworthy exceptions mentioned.
1:13 Because of their diminutive size, small
states necessarily view the international 
system with a much narrower perspective 
than large states;
1:14 therefore, policy actions tend to hold
local rather than world-wide significance; 
and
1:15 these policies tend to be more strongly 
dependent on the external world than
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policies pursued by large states; and
1:16 this results in a negative foreign policy 
which is largely a reaction to stimuli 
from without, rather than a policy which 
is positively planned and executed from 
domestic origin.
In discussing these hypotheses, several natural subjects 
emerge. The first two statements highlight the small state's 
limitated security interests; secondly, the two broad security 
policies entered into by lesser powers are alignment and non- 
alignment; and finally, the importance of international or­
ganization policy to small countries is widely recognized.
Each of these topics is treated below, and appropriate con­
clusions drawn at the end of this section.
Global versus regional interests.— In the field of 
security, small states are severely handicapped by their 
size. As already mentioned, smallness tends to have its ef­
fect on every segment of society. This effect is particularly 
noticeable in the field of national security. Not only are 
manpower resources slight, but natural resources also are 
generally limited. Thus the range of security policies open 
to small states is restricted.
This being true, a global policy is not usually feasible 
for the smaller powers. On this point the scholarly community 
expresses unanimous accord. For example, William E. Paterson 
observes, "It is, in any case, usually more important for a 
small state to provide for its defence against possible
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enemies in its own sub-system (e.g., Israel) than to defend 
itself against a Super-Power."^^
Not only is the small state able to concentrate on her 
own region, ordinarily she can concern herself only with 
those states which share a common border. For the lesser 
power bordering a major power this is certainly enough with 
which to be preoccupied. Afghanistan, Finland, Israel, Laos, 
and Nepal, among others, all face peculiar problems because 
of their proximity to major military powers. The signifi­
cance of close physical contact with a major power intensi­
fies the security problems shared by all lesser powers.
This regional interest results both from necessity and 
choice. Small powers cannot realistically consider pursuing 
a global strategy. Their policy must focus on the local en­
vironment by which they are most affected. Although certainly 
aware of multiple warhead missiles and hardened silos, the 
lesser states are much more concerned with restive political 
groups in a nearby state, or how to best use the limited re­
sources available to them. In summing up deposed Cambodian 
Head of State Norodom Sihanouk's policy of a few years back,
John Armstrong used the phrases "politics of weakness" and
38"how to get more bang without any bucks." For small powers
37Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 120. Other refer­
ences to the essentially regional character of small state 
foreign affairs includes; Bjol, "The Power . . . ," p. 159; 
Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 62.
38John P. Armstrong, Sihanouk Speaks (New York: Walker
and Company, 1964), p. 148.
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operating in a large power dominated world, these words have 
deep meaning.
In view of these realities, the choice of a general 
strategem becomes very important. During peacetime the type 
of overall policy frequently dictates considerations beyond 
the field of security, e.g., it might help determine trading 
partners. During wartime, the choice of policy might ulti­
mately decide the fate of the nation. Unfortunately, the 
small state that minds its own affairs and operates a non- 
aggressive foreign policy is not guaranteed continued exis­
tence. The historic case of Poland testifies to the 
sometimes precarious condition of any small state caught in 
the aftermath of war. This possibility of a modern day 
Poland may seem remote, but the uncertainty experienced by 
small states in their policy choices is very current. For­
eign policy concerns are very crucial to their general wel­
fare.
In deciding what policy to pursue, many options are open 
to the small state. George Liska states that "the range of 
policies of small countries runs from biased neutralism
39through strict nonalignment to outright alliance membership." 
Such a range of policy should not be surprising for anyone 
aware of the ninety-eight states listed in Appendix B.
39George Liska, "The 'Third Party': The Rationale of
Nonalignment," in Laurence W. Martin, ed.. Neutralism and 
Nonalignment (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 
1962), p. 92.
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However, despite many variations and individual 
circumstances, most of these states can be classified simply 
as aligned or nonaligned. It is to the implications of 
these policies that we now turn.
Alignment versus nonalignment.— A definition of terms 
is scarcely necessary in regard to these key small state 
policies. It is, however, advisable to discuss at some 
length the types of factors which induce adoption of one or 
the other policy. Naturally, the perceived national inter­
est of a given state would largely dictate which stance to 
assume. In addition, there are historic, domestic, political, 
and other like factors which play strong roles in influencing 
which strategy would best serve the individual state. In the 
following pages a review is provided of what factors motivate 
a state's leaders in their decision to pursue either an align­
ment or neutralist stance and of some of the comparative ad­
vantages of each.
Alignment involves entering into an agreement with other 
nation-states whereby joint efforts are taken to ensure the 
security of all signatories. This implies several things for 
the small state in alliance. First, a tacit admission of 
dependence and reliance on another or several other powers 
is formally made. Second, a record before the world is made 
signifying in which camp the sympathies of the nation lie. 
Finally, the aligned power becomes automatically a party to 
the good and bad actions of any contesting alliances. Thus,
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in a very real way the small state rejects the opportunities 
which isolation and independent action may offer, and be­
comes a cog in a much larger machine. In this role its 
voice may be infrequently adhered to or heard. It may be­
come temporarily important, but if a large power is also a 
member, long range influence is almost certain to be elusive.
Benefits may accrue from membership in an alliance.
Loans, gifts, and shared use of military equipment may be 
forthcoming. Access to large state training and intelligence 
services may be gained. Promises of assistance in case of 
external aggression are somewhat nebulous at times, but they 
are among the most desirable benefits.
Generally, small states prefer aligning themselves with 
nations who share similar security problems. For this reason, 
alliance systems seem to be formed in the face of some geo­
graphic threat, real or perceived. The free world alliances 
since World War II have all had a regional character, even 
though membership tended to stretch beyond certain natural 
geographic boundaries. In these cases, either dominant inter­
ests of a major power or strong cultural and historical ties 
expanded the membership to include far-flung nations. Albert 
Wohlstetter explained this phenomenon in these words: "Dis­
tance bears no simple relationship either to interests or 
military strength." He noted that "cultural interests have 
never fallen off with distance," and that Englishmen
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have found Australians and New Zealanders quite congenial
40culturally even when they could not understand the French.
Small state costs for alliance membership are difficult 
to calculate. In terms of monetary outlay, the small country 
probably gets a good return for its investment. A recent 
scholarly study shows a tendency toward disproportionate as­
sumption of alliance financial responsibilities by the large 
states. Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhouser have produced 
evidence which shows that small states tend to fall short of 
their assigned quotas in alliances and international organi­
zations. They attribute this finding to the fact that "each 
ally gets only a fraction of the benefits of any collective
good . . . but each pays the full cost of any additional
41amounts of the collective good." Thus, say the authors, 
when a small state has paid its share for whatever level of 
defense it deems personally sufficient, it discontinues pay­
ment and the large nations take the rest of the bill upon 
themselves.
Intangible costs may not leave the small state in as 
advantageous position. Whatever independence of policy 
they possess resulting from geographic situation, possession 
of a valued natural resource, or other advantage, may be 
sacrificed to the interests of the group. If a major power
40
Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," Foreign 
Affairs, XLVI (January, 1968), pp. 244, 247.
*^01son and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory . . . ," 
p. 43.
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is also a member of the alliance, the chance for enhancing 
one's position by playing one large state against another 
would be lost. Also, the assumed stance of moral superiority 
taken by neutrals could not be utilized. Thus, the positive 
and negative factors seem to be fairly evenly balanced. What 
reasons then cause small states to seek alliance membership?
Several factors influence choice of alignment rather
than nonalignment. Donald Neuchterlein has mentioned several
possible reasons in his comparative study of Iceland,
42Thailand, and Australia. In the first place, decision to 
align frequently follows the failure of a neutralist policy. 
Rothstein notes that nonalignment is a viable policy only in 
certain circumstances and that these conditions usually do 
not exist. Therefore, many neutralist policies become "a 
euphemism for a policy of indecision and fear."^^
Neuchterlein's examples, Iceland and Thailand, demonstrate 
the frustration and fear which sometimes causes states to 
align.
A second condition which causes some states to opt for 
alignment is the absence of a recent colonial experience.
The old adage "familiarity breeds contempt" may apply to many 
former colonies who prefer enduring some of the disadvantages
42Donald Neuchterlein, "Small States in Alliances," 
Orbis, XIII (Summer, 1969), p. 622.
43Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 34. He lists the 
conditions which are suitable for a neutralist policy on 
p. 32.
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of neutrality rather than once again find themselves taking 
orders from a new master in the field of security. At any 
rate, no such fears inhibit states like Thailand, never an 
official colony, and Iceland, independent since 1918.
Other conditions which render alignment advantageous
include agreement between the major and minor power on the
"nature and source of the principal security threat," and
the small state's confidence in the great power's intention
44to defend the small in face of a security threat. Another 
factor which helps maintain alliances is the alternative 
which faces the state who pulls out for whatever reason. 
Although there are few examples of this, the presence of 
apprehension as to what route the small state just detached 
from an alliance can take has been expressed. Singaporean 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew voiced his concern over the pos­
sible breakup of the Commonwealth system. After noting the 
troubled world situation and pointing to the value of the 
former colonial ties he remarked that despite quarrels and 
disputes, "the former dependencies may find the British and 
their technological and industrial power the most valuable 
and the most comfortable to make use of. . . The allied
small state can extricate itself from its ties only at the
44
Neuchterlein, "Small . . . ," p. 622.
45Lee Kuan Yew, "Hitching on to Some Other Wagon May Be 
Exacting and Stifling," Commonwealth Journal, XII (February,
1969), p. 5.
8]
risk of losing what security it possesses even though 
alliance arrangements are unsatisfactory. Distrust is sure 
to persist among potential allies of a state which changes 
alliance policies.
Nonalignment presents for some a viable alternative to 
binding security ties. If Rothstein's previously noted al­
legation that neutralism succeeds only under certain circum­
stances is true, there are certainly numerous small states 
which feel that such conditions exist now. However, the con­
ditions described by Professor Rothstein differ markedly from 
a similar list provided by Herbert Dinerstein, a scholar with 
a more sympathetic view of nonalignment.
Whereas Rothstein posits that the small power must be
"strategically irrelevant and politically nonprovocative"
46to be neutrally viable, Dinerstein sees in the post-World 
War II international system three major changes from pre-war 
alliances which make it plausible for a state to remain un­
aligned. These alterations are: (1) the supercession of
military by political goals; (2) the significant alteration 
in the relative power and number of participating states; and
(3) the emergence of ideology as a major factor in alignment 
47choice. Dinerstein feels that the raison de etre for seek­
ing alignments is deterrence against war rather than
^^Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 32.
47Dinerstein, "The Transformation . . . p. 593.
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preparation for war. He notes that greater independence in
foreign affairs characterizes small state policy and observes
the broadened sphere of choice taken by Eastern European
client states. His analysis preceded the Czechoslovakian
experience in 1968. So different from Rothstein, Dinerstein
concludes that "whatever the origin of the present security
of the smaller powers, the present reality is that both
diplomatic and ideologic non-alignment are realistic policies
48for the weaker nations in the international system."
Turning from professional difference of opinion, we can 
note a number of conditions for or motivations to non-align­
ment. This type of stance presumes that competing factions
exist. Ernest Lefever simply notes, "It takes three to make 
49a neutral." Since 1945 the competition for emerging states 
has certainly been keen between the two Superpowers. Further­
more, non-alignment fills several deep-seated needs of small 
states. Particularly among newly independent nations, non- 
alignment fills the need of having a national policy which 
is recognized as worthy by outside states. This tends to 
focus the attention of the people on common goals and to 
diminish their feelings of separateness. Thus, as Liska 
maintains, neutralism is "inspired largely by domestic
48Dinerstein, "The Transformation . . . ," p. 594.
49Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on 
Neutralism," in Laurence W. Martin, ed.. Neutralism . . . , 
p. 116.
83
50concerns.” Liska believes that both political and 
economic needs are served by a nonalignment policy. Bolster­
ing these various domestic areas serves to build nationalism,
which Lefever sees as ”the primary concern of all neutralist 
51states."
Internationally a nonalignment policy is presumed to
convey an aura of moral superiority. This positive facet of
neutralism receives frequent mention, especially by adherents,
Marshal Tito captured the feeling which these states hold for
themselves when he referred to them as the "conscience of 
52mankind." This self-righteousness causes the nonaligned 
to see themselves as uncorrupted by power, and possessing a 
detachment and innocence which qualifies them to speak rea­
sonably and humanely.
In the view of others, this scene hardly approximates 
reality. Nils Orvik, himself a Norwegian, admits the self­
ishness of small states in the interwar period. He says:
They [small states] were not saints in 
international relations more than anyone 
else. . . . They declined the honor of 
becoming martyrs. The small states were 
primarily concerned with themselves and
50George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 217.
^^Lefever, "Nehru . . . ," p. 116.
52Marshal Tito, "Excerpts From Addresses at the Opening 
of Neutral Leaders' Talks in Belgrade," New York Times, 
September 2, 1961, p. 2.
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their own eternal, insolvable problem of 
sovereignty and security. 3^
In the same vein Rothstein remarks, "If power corrupts, so
does the lack of i t . T h u s  it is questionable as to just
how untarnished the badge of respectability of nonaligned
states in fact is.
Neutralist states possess a certain freedom of choice 
which may be thought advantageous. Sweden and Switzerland 
enjoy this privilege and are able to have their opinions 
widely respected. Perhaps as important as their stated 
policies are their highly capable military machines located 
in advantageous geographic locations. Other neutrals cer­
tainly do not fare as well. With more exposed physical situ­
ations, less adept security provisions, and poorer trade 
advantages, many small states are "taken for granted," thus 
rendering their decisional independence of questionable 
value. Still, they do enjoy the pursuit of an "independent 
foreign policy."
It is obvious that domestic needs and external prestige 
play important roles in the decisions of states that opt for 
nonalignment. There are numerous types and variations of 
nonaligned policies. The efficacy of such policies depends 
on several factors over which the small state may or may not 
have influence. Geographic and resource potential remain
^^Orvik, The Decline . . . , p. 194. 
54R o th s te in , A llia n c e  . . . , p . 11.
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fairly constant. Government policy can be altered, and has 
a major responsibility in ensuring the success of nonalign­
ment. For example, small state neutralist leaders must make 
it abundantly clear that they intend to "avoid any disputes
with other states" which might adversely affect their ability
55to maintain independence. The ability to withhold a needed 
export item from foreign buyers may buy time and goodwill, 
although such a policy could become a temptation to aggres­
sion.
Finally, Herbert Tingsten notes a factor which is in­
tangible, impossible to quantify, and hardly academic, but 
which surely must come into play, "pure luck."^^ In explain­
ing his country's foreign policy, i.e., Sweden, Tingsten re­
fused to credit his government and people with any particular 
moral fortitude. He pointed out the ambivalence of debates 
on alliance policy, and generally conveyed the impression 
that Sweden has succeeded in her neutralism by chance and by 
the possession of a strong military establishment.
In summing up the pros and cons of alignment we may 
conclude that at times small states' interests may be best 
served by adhering to an independent course in their external 
affairs. Certainly the Cold War has presented the combination
55William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 248.
^^Herbert Tingsten, "Issues in Swedish Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1959), p. 475.
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of circumstances allowing for profitable pursuance of
57nonalignment, as has been pointed out frequently. However, 
if the Cold War should escalate into general war, neutrality 
would probably not provide any more security for the lesser 
states than it has for most neutrals in past wars. This gen­
eral situation underlines a basic fact inherent in small 
size: success or failure of any foreign policy depends in
large measure on the international political milieu. This, 
in turn, depends on the actions and policies of the major 
powers.
In such a situation, small states could take a fatalis­
tic view of the future. Some indeed have. For example, John 
Galtung of the Peace Research Institute refers to the essen­
tial dependence of small on large states as the "feudal sys- 
58tem." Dubbing small and large entities as "underdog" and
"topdog," he systematically demonstrates that the bigger
powers ignore the lesser powers and control international
relations for their benefit. He concludes pessimistically:
What, then, does all this add up to? In 
one sentence: that international politics
(not non-governmental interaction) is big 
power politics, for good and for bad, be­
tween friends and (particularly) between 
enemies, in the past, at present and in the
For an excellent analysis of this theme, see: Cecil
V. Crabb, Jr., "The Testing of Non-Alignment," The Western 
Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1964), pp. 517-542.
C O
Galtung, "East-West . . . ,"  p . 1 4 6 f f .
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foreseeable future, probably to some extent 
as long as nations exist.59
The result of this situation for small nation foreign 
policy is ambivalent. Some scholars, leaders, and citizens 
in lesser states see little reason in spending money, time, 
and effort to construct and implement a policy which probably 
won't be listened to or heeded. This type Of attitude results 
in the feeling that external relations are beyond the scope 
of the small country's influence and that they are pawns in 
a chess game dominated by queens. This helpless feeling has 
been expressed to the writer on numerous occasions during the 
course of his research activity in New Zealand. Claude 
Phillips received similar responses in a project undertaken 
in Nigeria, although certainly not by our definition a small 
nation. Citizens there told Phillips that, "Nigeria does 
not have a foreign p o l i c y . H e  interpreted this to mean 
that there was no predictable reaction, no consistent policy 
to external stimulus. When decisions were required, Britain's 
lead usually was followed. For many small states this is a 
typical non-policy.
Other states realize their disadvantaged plight, but 
look upon the positive side of things. Every small state 
possesses some advantage which, if exploited fully, can help
59
Galtung, "East-West . . . ," p. 168.
^^Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian 
Foreign Policy (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press, 1964), p. viii.
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overcome its inherent weakness. Such advantage might be 
geographic, or presence of a highly desirable resource, or 
even utter and complete helplessness which elicits support 
for its continued existence. The resourceful small state 
has been known to parlay its assets into considerably more 
influence than ordinarily would be expected. For some this 
influence may be short-lived, as was the case with Cambodia 
under Sihanouk. For others the influence is still being 
maintained, as with Sweden. Essential to small state foreign 
policy success is the capitalization on any available strengths, 
and in the process offsetting the material and size dispari­
ties which will always exist.
In essence, the small state is constantly adapting to 
forces in its environment. James Rosenau quite adequately 
conceives of all foreign policy as "adaptive behavior." He 
maintains the importance of the "salient environment" and 
constructs a pre-theory for the purpose of analyzing the 
adaptations.^^ It is reasonable that small states are re­
quired to make greater adaptations than large states. Their 
dependence, in many areas, on their large counterparts puts 
the onus on the lesser for making necessary changes that 
will preserve the system.
In trying to adapt to their inferior power and diplo­
matic status, small states have found a forum for their
^^James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior," 
Comparative Politics, II (April, 1970), pp. 371-2.
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diverse views in international organizations. It is to this 
facet of policy that we now turn.
International organization policy.—
1:17 Small nations support the principles, 
activities and institutions which have 
tended to further the causes of col­
lective security, dissemination of 
technical knowledge, and spreading of 
economic advantage; and
1:18 their activities in such organizations 
are aimed at substituting small state 
wishes for policies regarding colonial­
ism, military development, and economic 
imperialism, and thus represents a major 
facet in the essentially negative nature 
of small state policies;
1:19 positive contributions as mediators and 
peace enforcers neither assure the suc­
cess of the respective organization nor 
conceal the basic self-interest motiva­
tion which results in enthusiastic small
nation support for international organi­
zations .
From the Hague Conferences til the present, the small 
powers have been in the vanguard of efforts to strengthen 
and extend the purview of international organizations. There 
are several reasons for this beyond the obvious use of col­
lective security measures to ensure peace. Not the least of 
these motivations is the diplomatic scope which an organiza­
tion like the United Nations provides. Certainly the much 
talked of "forum" provided does make it possible for small 
states to express their views in the presence of worldwide 
representatives.
There is also the chance for leadership which is afforded
small power statesmen. Trade advantages and aid grants may
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also accrue from membership in multinational groups. These 
obvious advantages touch only the easily observable benefits, 
and the analysis of the scope of action of small powers in 
international organizations still has not been explored in 
depth.
In spite of continual efforts and support, it is ques­
tionable as to just how great an influence small states exert 
on international organizations. Their need of this type of 
forum has frequently been mentioned. Andrew Boyd has para­
phrased both Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant as dubbing the
United Nations as a "smaller members' organization, because
6 2they need it more than major powers do." Despite their 
need of such associations, small states participation does 
not show a perfect record by any means. In fact, the 
criticisms of lesser powers outweigh in some minds the posi­
tive contributions made. A look at both viewpoints reveals 
not only the record of small power activities, but also the 
potential for service which current organizations provide.
In this analysis, only the two most significant collective 
security organizations are treated; economic groups are dis­
cussed below and regional defense organizations generally 
follow the pattern of the world wide ones.
VThen forming the League of Nations there were contrast­
ing opinions concerning the proper place and influence of the
®^Boyd, "The Role . . . ,"  p . 367 -8 .
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small nation. Woodrow Wilson defended small nation rights 
as part of his strong adherence to equality. On the other 
hand, Lord Robert Cecil was critical of what he felt were 
"excessive demands" presented to the Versailles Conference 
by some small s t a t e s . I n  the final agreement, the in­
equality of states was institutionalized with the recognition 
of three distinct classes of states; Great Powers, Inter­
mediate Powers, and Small Powers. This arrangement did not 
suit all parties, as might be expected. Representation on 
the Council was denied lesser states but the number of in­
dividual leadership positions held by small power statesmen 
and the general advantages of the League caused the small 
states to accept their inferior status.
As the high hopes for the League faded in the face of
repeated aggression during the 1930's, lesser powers found
themselves facing possible military attack without internal
strength or external guarantees of assistance. Most of this
pressure was brought to bear in northwestern Europe, as most
other areas receiving pressure were still held as colonies.
The Italo-Ethiopian war opened the eyes of those who had
trusted their security to the League. Large states reacted
by firming up alliance commitments, while the small and weak
"started digging up the decaying remnants of traditional 
64
neutrality."
^^Rappard, "Small States . . . pp. 553-555. 
^^Orvik, The Decline . . . , p. 172.
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This retreat to neutrality did not succeed in 
immunizing the Scandinavians and others from the conflict 
after 1939. However, the unsuccessful attempts of the League 
to prevent general war during the late 1930's did not in­
hibit small state interest in a successor organization. Due 
to the perceived advantages which such an association pro­
vides, lesser states were eager participants in San Francisco 
in April, 1945, at the conference to formulate a Charter for 
the United Nations. As in the League, smaller members tried 
to exercise as much influence as possible over all matters of 
importance. Great power dominance did not allow for much 
lesser state influence in the seemingly important security 
field. Nevertheless, the small nations capitalized on any 
advantages which breaches in large state solidarity allowed. 
More significantly, the small states "sank their teeth into 
the . . . question of the secretariat."^^ From this position 
of Secretary General to the clerical and stenographic tasks, 
small nations have played a central if not dominant role in 
the day to day operation of the United Nations.
Several characteristics of small state participation in 
the United Nations demonstrate something of the thinking which 
motivates the lesser power generally. For one thing, there 
has been a tendency toward bloc voting in an effort to exert 
influence over the large states. This has been specifically
G^Boyd, "The Role . . . ,"  p . 359.
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noted with reference to non-aligned states.However, in a
quantitative analysis of General Assembly roll call votes
there was a "fairly high correlation between supranationalist
6 7voting and a country’s smallness." The same study noted 
that in the four Assembly sessions studied (1947, 1952, 1957, 
and 1961), there were attempts made by the smaller members to 
impose their will on the larger and wealthier nations.
This desire to express their will over the large states 
springs from another trait of small nations and their role in 
international organizations, i.e., their emphasis on principle. 
Small states are very concerned with such concepts as sover­
eignty, equality, self-determination, and freedom of choice.
As George Liska points out, this emphasis on principle is in 
their best interests, as states which are light on the scales 
of power find a show of idealism to be a realistic and viable 
p o l i c y . T h e i r  idealism often leads small states to criti­
cize military expansion, neo-colonialism via economic means, 
and other alleged large state incursions into their spheres 
of interest. Such a self-righteous stance is particularly 
well-suited to the non-aligned.
Lefever, "Nehru . . . ," p. 119.
^^Hayward R. Alker and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics 
in the General Assembly (New Haven, Connecticut; Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1965), p. 130n.
6 8
Alker and Russett, World Politics . . . , p.129.
69L is k a , In te rn a tio n a l . . . , p . 67 -8 .
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Another characteristic of lesser power activity in the 
United Nations has been the participation of their military 
contingents in Emergency Force efforts. In the 1956 Suez 
War, in the Lebanon and Congo crises, small power forces were 
committed under the auspices of the organization to preserve 
peace and help stabilize volatile situations. This type of 
action provides an outlet for small states and serves the 
entire United Nations well. Although this type of contribu­
tion has been well-received, future efforts of this type will 
need to deal with a number of problems relating to the or­
ganic relationship of the small state and the United Nations 
force, among others.
In a related area, small nations could aid United Nations 
sponsored efforts at disarmament by moral influence and by 
offering help as mediators. This could lead to a major role 
for individuals from small states as inspectors, liaisons, 
or even prime movers in establishing and carrying out dis­
cussions involving the major states. This type of activity 
has already been partially realized as small, neutral states 
have provided facilities for U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions on 
limitation of nuclear arms.
These characteristics of small state activity demonstrate 
to what degree small powers attempt to use international
For a review of these problems see: Hidejiro Kotani,
"Peace-keeping: Problems for Smaller Countries," International
Journal, XIX (Summer, 1964), pp. 308-325.
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organizations to benefit themselves and the global community
as a whole. Prognoses for the future vary. Some observers,
among them Francis 0. Wilcox, believe that if smaller members
support the organization vigorously and enthusiastically,
"they will have a magnificent opportunity to give vitality
71and direction to the United Nations." This view seems 
over-optimistic in view of the monopoly which the large powers 
have been able to maintain over substantive issues. At the 
very most, international organizations provide no panacea for 
the small power either economically or militarily. The con­
sequences of smallness remain, even though membership in an 
association such as the United Nations can help alleviate 
some of the problems. It is probably in the area of techno­
logical support that many underdeveloped small states can 
profit from participation in international organizations.
The time has not yet arrived when an international group can 
provide for any state's security, least of all the safety of 
a small nation.
B. International Economic Policy
For numerous small states, foreign policy considerations 
revolve more around economic than diplomatic or security in­
terests. Even though continued survival politically is deemed 
of primary importance, most lesser entities are not faced with 
imminent threats to their continued existence. Thus other
71Francis 0. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the 
United Nations," in Laurence W. Martin, ed.. Neutralism . . 
. , p. 136.
96
problems weigh more heavily on them than such issues as 
military preparedness and protection of sovereignty. There­
fore, in the last tliird of the twentieth century, economic 
prosperity and development is uppermost in the minds of 
citizens and statesmen in most small nations.
2:1 Small nations suffer economic problems 
which make them more vulnerable to 
international pressure than large states;
2:2 while not insurmountable, problems such 
as size of domestic market, difficulty 
of marketing goods overseas, and lack of 
natural resources force the small nation 
to always function near the limits of 
economic viability;
2:3 dependency on overseas trade for natural 
resources and as an outlet for manufac­
tured goods places the small state in a 
precarious position when global economic 
trends change;
2:4 the result of these factors is to cause 
small states to seek special privileges 
in trading communities or common market 
arrangements which tend to reduce trade 
barriers.
The total implications of these statements may be seen 
when a close look at the intricacies of small-state economic 
life is undertaken. To facilitate the task, four topics are 
subsequently treated which demonstrate the handicaps imposed 
by small size and the various methods by which lesser powers 
have attempted to overcome their limitations. The topics are; 
accessibility to natural resources, trade policies, views on 
international economic integration, and policies of giving 
and receiving aid. Knowledge of smaller nations' policies in
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these areas helps the student understand why so much foreign 
policy activity is devoted to economic matters.
Access to Natural Resources
No nation can hope to have all the natural resources 
which might be desired in developing a diverse economy. This 
is true even for the large, developed country. The small 
state, particularly if it has a modern, diversified economy, 
feels even more acutely the need of finding sources for those 
raw materials which are crucial to maintaining its producti­
vity. This search for resources inevitably results in the 
extension of foreign trade, a factor discussed below.
While accessibility to needed resources is important, 
the inherent or actual resources of a small state are even 
more important. Unfortunately, most small countries lack in 
their own territories the diversity and volume of resources 
necessary to support a balanced economy. Still, the posses­
sion of even one abundant resource can ensure the interest of 
foreign individuals and governments in the product of the 
respective small state. Naturally, if the commodity is of 
strategic value or is in short supply the interest is 
heightened. Contrast the current comparative positions of 
the Persian Gulf States and New Zealand; the Middle Eastern 
small states find no problem in securing buyers for their 
petroleum, while the government in Wellington faces serious 
economic woes when Britain's entry into the European Economic 
Community slices its overseas dairy produce outlet.
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Fortunately, most states have some natural resource
which provides potential access to overseas trading partners.
Possession of such a resource frequently results in foreign
policy alterations which may or may not be beneficial for the
smaller power. For example, Libya was found to possess vast
quantities of oil. This discovery, according to Charles
Cecil, "changed the nature of the 'givens' of Libyan foreign 
72policy." Even the possession of rich soil and rainfall, 
as in the case of the Southeast Asian "rice bowl," may have 
foreign policy implications if combined with other geographic 
and demographic factors.
In times of political stress, the ability to withhold a 
much needed resource from a foreign power can result in 
heightened prestige and influence for the small power. How­
ever, the mere possession of a needed resource by a small 
nation could constitute a sufficient temptation for a larger 
power to take control. Thus, the diplomacy of the lesser 
power must be very aware of the interdependence of geographic, 
natural resource, and political factors.
It is not difficult to see that exportable natural re­
sources are important. However, some small states seem almost 
totally lacking in this area. Luxembourg and Switzerland are 
examples, yet their economic stability has been remarkable. 
Obviously the reasons for this phenomenon must be found in
72Charles 0. Cecil, "The Determinants of Libyan Foreign 
Policy," The Middle East Journal, XIX (Winter, 1965), p. 23.
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explanations other than abundance of natural resources.
Simon Kuznets believes that "every small nation has some
advantage in natural resources. . . . But some show a
73capacity to build on it." For explanations as to why one
small nation deals successfully with its problems and another
does not, we must look further into the economic and social
systems.
Trade Patterns
Because of their size, small states necessarily are
dependent on trade for supplying the products which cannot
be manufactured domestically. Small home markets make it
impossible to produce certain types of goods in sufficient
quantity to compete with prices of overseas and international
imports. For example, only Sweden, among the states fitting
the definition of smallness in this study, has both aircraft
and automobile industries. Most of the lesser nations have
neither. There are other examples which could be given, but
the basic limitations which small size impose are well 
74known. Having to rely on outside producers for a high 
proportion of their consumers goods, presents the small state 
with the necessity to trade, resulting in some problems which 
larger nations do not have.
73Kuznets, "Economic Growth . . . ," p. 28.
74A. D. Knox gives an excellent analysis of the trade 
problems of small nations in "Some Economic Problems of Small 
Countries," in Burton Benedict, ed.. Problems of Smaller 
Territories (London; Ahtlone Press, 1967), pp. 35-44.
100
For example, because they must trade, small nations 
cannot greatly influence the prices of its imports and ex­
ports. Thus they seek out and cultivate trading partners 
who will be generous in handling their export goods. Fur­
thermore, the limited domestic market and restricted re­
sources force specialization in the number of articles 
manufactured by the lesser state; consequently most small 
states produce a narrow range of commodities for sale or 
trade. Since the quantity of goods produced is usually 
small, the number of nations buying from the small state is 
also small. And, since imports tend to come from those 
countries who buy exports, the number of trading partners 
for the small state is fewer than for a large state. This 
circumstance is unfortunate for several reasons.
In the first place, the small country needs to reduce
its economic dependence by any means. Hirschman pointed out
some years ago that dependence can be lessened by distributing
75trade among many countries. This lesson has not been put 
into practice by small states. He further noted that the 
lesser nation should not direct too large a share of its trade 
to any single great trading country, lest integration into the 
larger economic system rob the small power of its independence. 
This lesson also has not been completely translated into small 
state trade policy. Thus we frequently see the small nation 
faced with severe strains because of what cutting off trade
75Hirschman, N a tio n a l Power . . . , p . 31.
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with its major partner would mean for the economic life of 
the country. A case in point is the New Zealand scramble 
for new markets to replace the United Kingdom which is enter­
ing the European Economic Community.
This combination of factors places the small state in a 
vulnerable position vis-a-vis its trading partners. In some 
cases, small states may be excluded from some of their for­
eign markets. More commonly they have to accept terms of 
trade which favor larger countries. The result of size, 
therefore, is one of placing the small state at a disadvan­
tage in several key areas. The significance of these handi­
caps is more severely felt by the smaller states. Simon 
Kuznets found that the ratio of foreign trade to national
income usually rises as the average size of population de- 
7 6dines. Thus the stake of trade in the economy increases 
the possibility of financial pressure increases. Theoreti­
cally, then, the smaller the nation and the more specialized 
its exports, the more vulnerable that state is to interna­
tional economic pressure.
This analysis of trade weaknesses could be extended 
further, but would not greatly expand on the ideas already 
presented. The fact remains that many small states live with 
the very conditions described above and do quite well. Rea­
sons for the success of Switzerland, the Scandinavian
^^Kuznets, "Economic . . . ,"  p . 20.
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countries, and other small states are found primarily in the 
nature of the society. One might credit economic success to 
a fortunate possession of some natural resource. It is the 
opinion of most authors, however, that the abilities and 
motivation to develop what natural assets exist is more im­
portant than the simple possession of such. This factor 
relates to the national character, particularly the educa­
tional and the technological skills which a small country has. 
These are influenced in turn by the homogeneity or hetero­
geneity of the society, and the ability of the government 
to maximize the efforts of the populace. Such contingencies 
are discussed in fuller perspective a little later in this 
chapter, but are of great importance to trade.
In summary, small states operate their trade with some 
distinct disadvantages which invariably affect the foreign 
policy of the country. In fact, for most small nations, the 
foreign and domestic spheres cannot be separated because of 
the vital part played in both by trade.
Economic Integration
Problems of small economies have been enumerated and 
discussed above, and thus need not be recounted. In seeking 
solutions for such economic problems, there have been a 
variety of policies suggested which analysts thought would 
assist lesser states. Interest in economic integration, 
possible institution of free trade areas, and collective 
bargaining by groups of small nations vis-a-vis larger states
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are some of the theoretical alternatives which have seemed to 
offer relief to the beleaguered economies of lesser states. 
However, there is little hard evidence which tends to vindi­
cate the early optimism of the few attempts by small states 
at economic integration, and collective bargaining and free 
trade areas seem to offer less hope.
In spite of the basically non-productive efforts to date, 
there continues to be some interest in economic integration
schemes along the lines of those pursued in East Africa and 
77Latin America. One very basic problem which has plagued
efforts at economic integration has been the tendency for it
to spill over into the area of political integration. It was
this factor which partially caused the crisis in the East
7 8African Common Services Organization in 1963. Such spill­
over has been particularly prevalent in less developed 
countries, precisely the types of polities which are least 
prepared emotionally for relinquishing some of their sover­
eignty to a federated union.
Because of political spillover, and other lesser problems, 
the successes of economic integration have been few among 
small nations. Supra-national economic associations have
77For articles describing these experiences see J. S. 
Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," Inter­
national Organization, XIX (Autumn, 1965), pp. 870-884; and 
Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of 
Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies, V (June, 
1967), pp. 315-343.
7 f t Nye, "Patterns . . . ,"  pp. 874-876.
104
been either avoided, or have been tried and found less
79satisfactory than had been hoped. With a very few excep­
tions, one of which could be the Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Association, small states have not found integration 
a satisfactory economic solution. Although they will prob­
ably continue to attempt integration schemes, the value of 
which cannot be now judged, past experience would not bring 
cause for future hope.
Foreign Aid
In no other area of this study is there a clearer dif­
ferentiation between developed and underdeveloped small na­
tions than in their practices concerning aid. Quite clearly, 
no small country will have the surplus goods, services, or 
hard cash to grant aid on the scale of the large developed 
and politically competitive nation. However, most small 
countries participate in aid programs in some way: develop­
ing nations as recipients, and developed nations as donors. 
The rationale for foreign aid in general may be reduced
to four main objectives: (1 ) defense, (2) economic,
80
(3) humanitarian, and (4) political. Which of these may 
be the motive of the small country depends on whether the
79See R. J. Harrison, "European Integration and the 
International System," Political Science (New Zealand), XVIII 
(September, 1966), p. 3.
80
Lloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Van Nostrand Company, 1968), p. 13ff.
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lesser power is on the giving or receiving end of a 
transaction.
Small country donors generally give because of humani­
tarian and/or political reasons. In this there is a very 
real difference seen in the strategies of large and small 
states. Large states seem to use foreign aid more as a lever 
for securing defense and economic advantages, while smaller 
donor nations give with fewer strings attached. This conclu­
sion is reached by looking at the comparative methods of dis­
pensing aid. The large country gives most of its aid through 
bilateral agreements. Whereas the smaller countries provide
most of their aid in "the form of contributions to interna-
81tional agencies." This reveals the less politicized moti­
vation of small nation aid as well as the desire to cut the 
cost of administering aid. Nevertheless, the more humani­
tarian and cooperative spirit of small country aid is obvious 
One only need read Burdick's Ugly American and Lasky's Ugly
Russian to see the large country motivation in some of its 
82crasser detail.
Developing nations receive aid basically for economic, 
and in some cases, defense reasons. There is very little 
discrimination used in selection of donor countries, as may
81Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New 
York; Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 3.
82Eugene Burdick and William Lederer, The Ugly American 
(New York; Norton, 1958); and Victor Lasky, The Ugly Russian 
(New York: Trident Press, 1965).
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be observed in the frequently used "highest bidder" formula. 
Also, small backward economies constitute neither a political 
threat nor much of a political prize, and must therefore take 
what they can secure from whatever sources. Generally, the 
most beneficial aid seems to derive from international and 
regional organizations.
In conclusion, the small state donor appears to be more
altruistic than his bigger counterpart. This may not always
be true, as is pointed out in an article on Nordic aid by
8 3Per Olav Reinton, but it serves as a rule of thumb. Small 
nation recipients think less of political consequences and 
implications than their larger counterparts. In this area 
generalization may be hazardous, and the constant reminder 
of individual differentiation among states must be considered.
To sum up, economic disadvantages which small states 
labor under are more pronounced among developing states than 
developed ones. Even among highly developed lesser states 
there exists a different set of problems than those faced by 
the large state. However, such a factor as level of develop­
ment seems more important than size, as there are numerous 
examples available of small states which have overcome their 
diminutiveness and successfully compete with larger neighbors 
in economic affairs. Smallness does play an important role
83Per Olav Reinton, "Nordic Aid and the Politics of 
Inequality," Cooperation and Conflict, V (1970), pp. 112- 
124.
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in economics. However, the full impact of small size is felt 
only when other variables are equally unhospitable.
C. Psychological and Emotional Characteristics
Because of the more concrete and tangible differences 
between large and small states, the following propositions 
are offered concerning the distinctness with which the lesser 
power views the world.
3:1 Small nation publics view the world from
a different perspective than large nations;
3:2 this difference is more pronounced in the 
newer, less-developed states than in older, 
established states;
3:3 differences seem to derive from the level
of perceived ability to alter the respective 
state's political position and economic 
condition;
3:4 small nations appear to either accept their 
lot knowingly or through the imitation of 
large states try to act a part they cannot 
fulfill.
States have increasingly been referred to and analyzed 
in recent years in much the same way as individuals. Once 
looked upon as institutions of stone and steel, the modern 
nation-state is recognized as possessing the attributes of 
an organism. Although the concept of an organic state is 
not new, the careful attention to such items as "national 
character" and "psychological makeup" is novel. A few years 
ago Philip C. Jessup noted, " . . .  states are not factually 
equal, for their powers differ; states have 'feelings* and
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the psychological factor cannot be ignored any more than the 
84power factor.”
Despite Jessup's admonition, most analysts have ignored
the "feelings" of states. This has particularly been the
case with small nations. With few exceptions, among these
is Biafra, the lesser territories, states, or racial units
have had their psychological makeup largely ignored.
David Vital has done more by way of analyzing small
country mental perspectives than any other writer to date.
He points out some factors which demonstrate the obvious
handicaps which the small state must endure. These factors
have been listed and discussed above, but a brief recounting
85serves to illustrate Vital's main points. Among the char­
acteristics mentioned are the small number of people from 
which to draw public servants, the reliance for intelligence 
information on the generosity of larger states, the problem 
of the "brain drain" which prevails in many lesser nations, 
and the military impotence which is all too common. These 
factors, while not all present in all small states, certainly 
are not unfamiliar to the decision maker in the lesser power.
Nor do these difficult circumstances escape the man-on- 
the-street. The reactions to these problems are widely 
divergent, depending on the particular state involved.
^^Jessup, "The Equality . . . ," p. 528.
85See: Vital, The Inequality . . . , Chapter 2, "Mental
and Administrative Perspectives," pp. 10-38.
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Participation in the international system by the small power
depends on its individual ability, or lack of ability, to
cope with the problems with which it is concerned.Since
a country's present ability to cope successfully depends in
large part on its past ability, there is a natural sort of
division between the older established states and the newer 
8 7ones. The older small states such as Switzerland, Sweden, 
and Austria tend to behave in a different way from such newer 
states as Ghana, Senegal, and Western Samoa. A strong ten­
dency exists among new small states to emphasize symbols, 
pageantry and nationalism. Older states are less emotional 
and more concerned about mundane matters related to quality 
of life.
Because of the psychological differences between large
and small countries, behavioral differences naturally exist.
Vital notes several stances which particularly characterize
88the underdeveloped state. Invariably this is compensatory 
behavior, much of which appears pathetic to the large-state 
onlooker. Moral superiority is one oft-assumed attitude of 
the small state. Another popular stance involves falling
®^Rudolph J. Rummel makes this point in "Some Dimensions 
in the Foreign Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, 
III (1966), p. 212.
87Klaus Knorr notes this distinction in On the Uses of 
Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1966), pp. 129-131.
88vital. The In e q u a lity  . . . , pp. 33-35 .
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back on stubbornness and dignity. Or, the inferior state may 
hold to a philosophical idea with which it hopes to ration­
alize itself out of its predicament. In making these points. 
Vital notes that both large and small power statesmen approach 
relations with each other holding the opinion that a small 
power is of a particular "species to which certain attitudes 
and considerations are appropriate, while others are 
not. . . ."89
Thus, not only resources, size, population, and economies 
differ, but also the mental and psychological outlooks of 
small states vary from those of large states. While this 
study cannot delve deeply into this issue, the next chapter 
does reveal some of the particular attitudes of New Zealanders 
which would belie their small state origin even if otherwise 
unknown.
D. Linkages and the Small State
Because of the characteristics discussed above, the fol­
lowing propositions concerning links between small states and 
their international milieu are offered.
4:1 Small nations are more dependent on 
linkages to the outside world than 
larger states because they cannot be 
as nearly self sufficient in factors 
related to politics and economics;
4:2 linkages tend to be more numerous 
among developed lesser powers and 
their environments than among under­
developed lesser powers and their 
respective environments ;
89
vital. The In e q u a lity  . . . , p. 32.
I l l
4:3 small nation links tend to be stronger 
■ and more numerous to large states than to 
others of approximately their same size;
4:4 for small states there tend to be more
inputs from the environment than outputs 
to the environment, i.e., the small state 
is more affected by what goes on around it 
than its environment is affected by the 
actions of the lesser power;
4:5 a small state's linkages provide an indi­
cator of its ability to function as a 
sovereign entity.
Some explanation of these propositions is necessary here, 
even though further clarification may be seen in the subse­
quent chapter. For the first statement there need not be 
lengthy justification. Limitations of size result in certain 
handicaps in politico-military and economic style. These 
factors were discussed in some depth above, and deserve only 
passing comment here.
"Dependency" has been identified as perhaps the most apt 
expression which describes the plight of the small. It is of 
significance to know who the small state depends upon and in 
what ways the dependency is manifested. Answers to these 
types of questions can come from a knowledge of the lesser 
states links to the outside world. Such factors as to whom 
the lesser country is allied militarily (or if it is non- 
aligned) , who is its source of raw materials, which country 
buys the major portion of products exported by the smaller 
state, and who would side with them in matters of regional 
and/or international debate, may all be answered by examining 
the links maintained across borders.
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Concerning the second proposition (4:2), it stands to
reason that highly developed small countries, such as those
of Scandinavia, would have a broader range of consumer needs
to be filled than a developing Latin American or Central
African country. With these wider needs comes the necessity
of more links to facilitate importation of goods, services,
and expertise. International corporations now are being
recognized as an important linkage and an avenue of penetra-
90tion by one state into the internal affairs of others.
While linkages of this type are more numerous in developed 
states, links to international organizations and/or special­
ized agencies are more significant to the underdeveloped 
state. In fact, the future development of such states is 
largely dependent on the linkages to international and re­
gional groupings which disseminate aid of all types. Thus 
the loci of the linkages tends to differ depending on the 
level of development of small states. Links with private 
companies and with other nation-states are more prevalent 
among developed states, whereas the less developed states 
tend to be more closely linked to international organizations
Concerning the third statement (4:3), there is evidence 
that lesser states do not show affinity for the goods or 
services of each other. The prevailing feeling seems to be
90For an example of this type of linkage see: Jonathan
F. Galloway, "Worldwide Corporations and International Inte­
gration: The Case of INTELSAT," International Organization,
XXIV (Summer, 1970), pp. 503-519.
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that another small country would not possess anything which 
could significantly aid one's own position, whether by shared 
knowledge, trade, or otherwise. It is thought to be'wiser 
to consult a large nation where the techniques used have pro­
duced successful results. Another factor frequently con­
sidered is the attending prestige and influence accruing to 
the small state which deals successfully with a large state.
Only on rare occasion have small nations banded together in
91the hope of bringing mutual benefit. Naturally, this at­
titude seems absurd to observers. Far preferable to a big 
brother helping a little brother would be a small country 
whose knowledge and expertise in dealing with similar prob­
lems could assist a small sister-state. Thus far, the logic 
of this has been for the most part lost on the small state.
In regard to proposition 4:4, there is overwhelming 
concensus on the fact that national politics become blurred 
and are ofttimes international, and vice versa. This so- 
called "seamless web" is recognized by virtually every
contemporary writer; examples are offered above in Chapter 
92I. However, in this picture where the boundary lines
91One such occasion, which produced nothing of lasting 
significance, was a conference held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 
in 1961. It was more for propaganda purposes than anything 
else. A brief note in the New York Times, September 2, 1961, 
p. 2, quotes Tito on aims of the conference.
92The only dissenter to this view is Stanley Hoffman of 
Harvard University. In a representative excerpt he says,
"The starting point of any valid theory of international 
relations is the recognition of the radical difference between
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between domestic and international are vague, the influence
tends to flow more heavily from the outside environment into
the small state than vice versa. This point is made in each
previous section of this chapter. The small state reacts to
the external stimuli rather than exerting pressures which
force some larger entity to act. According to Deutsch this
situation is not prevalent in stable polities to the degree
93it is in unstable ones. Still, he believes the linkage 
between internal and external affairs creates this situation, 
and that nothing short of severing the links can alter it.
As to the last statement, it is the feeling of the 
writer that Rosenau has hit upon a key to analyzing small 
state foreign policy by developing the linkage concept. He 
did not personally, nor did the contributors to his book 
Linkage Politics, attempt to apply the linkage concept to 
small states. However, the relevancy of it seems even more 
significant to the small than to the large state. Also, 
the implementation of the concept is more feasible in a
the domestic and the international milieu. There are cir­
cumstances where this difference tends to vanish. . . .
Also, at certain points in history, the two milieus are 
interlocked: at the present time, international politics
borrows various institutions from domestic politics; domestic 
politics is often subordinated to and, in some cases, even 
determined by international competition. . . . The model from 
which a theory of international relations must start is that 
of a decentralized milieu divided into separate unitsT"
Quoted from: The State of War, pp. 13-14. My underlinings.
93Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal 
Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell, ed.. Approaches . . 
• , pp. 8 , 1 0.
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smaller society than in a large. Thus for both relevancy 
and applicability the lesser power is an ideal arena in 
which to test Rosenau's theory.
CHAPTER III 
LINKAGES AND NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I. Historical Background 
New Zealand constitutes an ideal setting in which to 
test research methods of all types. The reasons have been 
noted previously in the last part of Chapter 1, but may be 
summed up in the two factors of "smallness" and "accessi­
bility." Not only is the population small, but the govern­
ment is open and there are few restraints on ordinary 
scholarly research. Also, there is not the isolation of 
public servants that is sometimes encountered by researchers 
in larger countries. Thus one may simply write or telephone 
most officials and easily be scheduled for interviews and/or 
may have records made available. It is important to note 
that government records are not held sacrosanct as they are 
by British officials.
In earlier times most study of New Zealand focused on 
the several phases of social experimentation which swept the 
country first around the turn of the century and then again 
in the interwar period. Americans, particularly, have been 
interested in the government sponsored medical plans, various 
social security and unemployment insurance schemes, and the 
generally harmonious biracial situation. In spite of such
116
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interest, not much effort has been expended to examine the 
motivating factors behind New Zealand's foreign policy. In 
order to understand the paucity of published material on ex­
ternal affairs one need only look briefly at the background 
to contemporary foreign policy making and attitudes.
Having been settled by Britons only since 1840, New 
Zealand is a comparatively young state. It entrusted vir­
tually all of its external relations to England until well 
into this century. England's lead was followed in both the 
world wars, and there appears to have been little serious 
questioning of such direction. An early Commonwealth ob­
server and scholar. Viscount James Bryce, noted just after 
World War I, "There are no questions of foreign policy, be­
cause that is left to the Motherland. . . .
Because of New Zealand's enthusiastic acceptance of 
London's leadership in international affairs, she was the 
first Dominion to join the war effort in 1914, and the first 
Dominion to capture enemy territory. Out of a population of 
just over one million at that time, one hundred thousand men—  
most of whom were volunteers— served overseas, and there
2
were nearly sixty thousand men either killed or wounded.
A similar intensity in effort was shown in World War II. In
James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. II (New York: 
MacMillan, 1921), p. 313. My underlinings.
2
Kenneth Melvin quotes these figures in: New Zealand:
The Small Utopia (Auckland, New Zealand: Collins Publishing
Company, 1962), p. 31.
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that effort, one-sixth of the entire population was under
arms, a higher proportion than any other country except Soviet
• 3Russia.
Participation in overseas war efforts has not been 
restricted to the two world wars. New Zealand troops have 
been in Korea and in South Africa (during the Boer War), to 
name only the most important efforts. This worldwide involve­
ment has not derived from a war-mongering culture or people. 
Neither has it resulted from a careful assessing of the 
country's national interests in strictest security terms.
Rather it has derived from a composite of factors which re­
late to the numerous links and ties which bind New Zealand to 
England but which are now pulling in other directions. These 
newer linkages are illustrated by her recent participation 
in Viet Nam.
However, the foreign policies have not been restricted 
to military and security matters. More important for the 
livelihood, prosperity and growth of the small country have 
been the business and trade ties. Historically, these also 
have been to Britain, especially since refrigeration came to 
shipping in 1882. Thereafter, New Zealanders relied on England 
for overseas trade; England replaced Australia which had been 
the largest early trade partner. During the years 1880-1940, 
New Zealand sold no less than 74 percent of its exports in
^M elvin , New Zealand . . . , p . 32.
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any year to Great Britain, and bought no less than 47 percent
4
of its imports from her. From these figures it is no wonder 
that F. L. W. Wood.described his own country as "a very 
junior partner— the smallest, most distant, least self- 
sufficient member of the British household."^
Not only was the Wellington government reliant on 
England in security and commercial dealings but also in diplo­
matic representation. New Zealand allowed Britain to take 
care of her diplomatic needs, which were few. This practice 
continues today in several countries where New Zealand is not 
represented.
The pattern of allowing England to speak for Wellington 
underwent a change in the mid-1930's. Most students of for­
eign policy agree with R. M. Burden that the first major 
break with London occurred over the Ethiopian crisis of 1935. 
Endorsed by the British government, the Hoare-Laval proposals 
met with immediate protest in New Zealand. For months the 
New Zealand position was one favoring maintenance of sanctions 
against Italy and respect for the self-determination principal 
of the League of Nations. Burdon quotes an editorial which 
shows how clear-cut the difference of opinion was between 
Britain and New Zealand.
New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1970 (Wellington, 
New Zealand: Department of Statistics, 1970) , p. 610. At
times the figures reached higher, e.g., 88 percent exports 
(1940) and 67 percent imports (1890).
^F. L. W. Wood, This New Zealand (London: Hammond,
Hammond, & Company, 1958), p. 208.
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New Zealand has had the courage to 
criticise severely the British atti­
tude to the League and to the Spanish 
War. New Zealand, once Britain's 
white-headed boy, has now, under a 
Labour Government, taken Australia's 
place as the most intractable member 
of the family.&
World War II represents a watershed which further and 
more drastically altered the relationship of London and 
Wellington. As early as June, 1940, the British government 
indicated to New Zealand that if Japan entered the war, the 
United Kingdom would have to rely on the United States to
7
protect her interests in the Pacific. This was followed by 
the difficult war years when a pulling back of Britain's 
sphere of influence was made mandatory by the results of the 
conflict. Thus, by 1945 it was clear that New Zealand was 
being forced to stand on her own strength and with such other 
assistance as she might be able to gain. In accordance with 
the new demands Britain had thrust upon New Zealand by virtue 
of the former's default, Wellington's representatives acted 
alone in helping to set up the United Nations. Having had a 
Department of External Affairs only since 1943, there was, 
somewhat surprisingly, no hesitation in assuming the role of 
a full-fledged member of the international system. However,
R. M. Burdon, The New Dominion; A Social and Political 
History of New Zealand Between the Wars (Wellington, New 
Zealand; A. H. and A. W. Reed, 1965), pp. 267-268.
7
Noted in a speech by Angus Ross, "New Zealand in the 
Pacific World," Fifth Lecture in the Sir Sidney Holland Memo­
rial Lectures, 1965, sponsored by the New Zealand National 
Party.
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New Zealand's independence still was ambivalent. Not until
1947 was the statute of Westminster, which granted the
dominions full equality with the mother country, adopted by
the New Zealand Parliament. This was sixteen years after the
United Kingdom Parliament passed the Statute and five years
after Australia, the next-to-last holdout, had done so. By
accepting the terms of this statute. New Zealand gave "legal
fulfillment to the fact of sovereignty" for which she had
0
never really lobbied.
Since that time there has been a steady movement away 
from the womb of Britain. This may be seen in the declining 
import-export links, and also in the attitudes of the people. 
Between 1940 and 19 69 the percentage of New Zealand's exports 
to England declined from 88 percent to 39 percent and imports
Q
from England fell from 47 percent to 31 percent. During 
these same years exports to Australia rose from 3 percent to 
8 percent, to the United States from 4 percent to 17 percent, 
and to "other states" from 5 percent to 36 percent. This is 
a picture of diversification attesting to the awareness of 
independence which has increasingly characterized commercial 
dealings.
This awareness has been evident in security affairs in 
at least as marked a pattern. In 1951 Wellington entered into
0
Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (Ringwood, 
Victoria, Australia; Penguin Books Australia, Ltd., 1969), 
p. 307.
9
New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1970, p. 610.
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a tripartite defense pact with Camberra and Washington (ANZUS) 
signalling her recognition that "the countries bordering her 
own ocean will make or mar her f u t u r e . I n  1954 New 
Zealand joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, a 
further sign of her new regional orientation. On the eco­
nomic and cultural levels, she participates in the Colombo 
Plan, and she is actively looking for markets around the 
Pacific basin from Peru in the east to South Korea and Japan 
in the west.
None of these activities has impaired seriously the 
historic ties of the peoples of New Zealand and England. Al­
though some in both countries decry the British entry into 
the European Economic Community as harmful to relations, the 
cultural and traditional links have continued to be strong. 
New Zealanders will continue to look first to Europe and 
Great Britain, but they are taking an increasingly open-eyed 
view of their immediate environment. Such nations as Japan, 
China, Indonesia, India, the United States, and, perhaps 
most importantly, Australia, are assuming greater importance 
for contemporary’ New Zealand. Economic and political links 
to Britain probably will loosen further, but simultaneously, 
close cultural and personal connections are likely to be 
maintained.
H. Oliver, The Story of New Zealand (London: 
Faber and Faber, I960), p. 228.
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At the same time, ties with Australia are becoming 
stronger. Being the closest real neighbor of New Zealand, 
and sharing a similar culture and heritage, it seems strange 
that modern, truly intimate trans-Tasman ties have been so 
long in developing. Now, however, the New Zealand-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement is helping to foster closer economic 
and official links. There even has been some suggestion that 
federation of the two states could be accomplished with mu­
tual benefits. This idea has not gained much currency, es­
pecially in New Zealand where their inferior status in such 
an arrangement is clearly predictable.
At present one can see the great distance which New 
Zealand has traversed in foreign policy in just the past 
three decades. From the position of a willing supernumerary 
she has emerged as a full-fledged international participant, 
and has exercised without much question an increasing amount 
of influence in this brief time. Long-held ties with Britain 
gradually have been loosened and new relationships have formed 
to take their place. The long term success of such a policy 
is still in doubt. With no real choice in the matter. New 
Zealand is attempting to make the most of the situation.
Even with the foregoing brief review of recent inter­
national developments, one can see that New Zealand fits well 
the category of a small, developed nation trying to exercise 
its sovereignty in a world of superpowers. With less than 
three million people demanding a high level of consumer goods
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but with an economy largely dependent on agriculture, she 
must export. But the area of the world which she has devel­
oped as a market has a surplus of agricultural produce. Thus
she faces very real problems which have caused some to
11examine seriously her future prospects.
And yet. New Zealand finds herself in no worse condi­
tion than many other small states. As a typical developed 
lesser country, she offers a suitable example for a summary 
verbal juxtaposition of her characteristics against the pre­
theory suggested in the preceding chapter. The chronological 
order of the hypothetical statements presented above is fol­
lowed, beginning with security considerations.
In examining New Zealand's security policy it is ap­
parent that it fits some of the propositions but not others. 
The notion that New Zealand's security is dependent on 
Britain's security, and therefore that New Zealand must be 
ready to go where needed to assist the United Kingdom, has 
declined sharply since World War II. Thus, the concept of 
defense has been greatly narrowed, her allies have been sub­
stantially altered, and the net result is a regional outlook
An excellent study of New Zealand's current situa­
tion and a look into the crystal ball is offered by W. 
Rosenberg, an economics lecturer at Canterbury University, 
Christchurch. Entitled A Guidebook to New Zealand's Future 
(Christchurch, New Zealand; Caxton Press, 1968) , it pre­
sents very provocative data which would bring apprehension 
to every Kiwi.
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which replaces the old global perspective inherent in British 
dependency
The propositions cited in Chapter II, page 56, must 
be examined critically in New Zealand's case. The assertions 
allege that small states are preoccupied with security affairs, 
and that matters important to defense assume a larger sig­
nificance than in large states. New Zealand is concerned 
about such affairs, but certainly not to the degree other 
small states are. Her geographic location is the reason for 
a generally less intense interest in security considerations 
than, say, Switzerland, Finland, or Cambodia. New Zealand 
illustrates well the essential verity of proposition 1:7 on 
page 58, Chapter II, i.e., that geographic factors have great 
importance for the security of small states.
New Zealand's experience in alliances lends credence 
to propositions 1:4-1:6, which posit small nation reliance 
on larger states for protection. Wellington consistently 
has been aided in its defense arrangements, first by England 
and more recently by the United States and Australia. Fur­
thermore, New Zealand has depended upon the diplomatic and 
intelligence machinery of other states, as is suggested in
12This narrow view of defense may be seen in the de­
fense expenditures of the 1960's. From 1960-1969 the spend­
ing for defense varied from 1.8 percent to 2.3 percent of the 
Gross National Product annually. This represented in no year 
more than 7.1 percent of total government expenditure. New 
Zealand Yearbook, 1970, p. 274. While these percentages are 
not rock bottom, they are low when compared with small mid­
east countries who are in geographically strategic areas and 
are poor.
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proposition 1:9. On the other hand, her smallness has been 
used to good advantage by focusing upon moral issues and 
rallying other small states to seek common cause against the 
larger states. Militarily, however. New Zealand is not now 
and never will be able to compete with large states, nor is 
she desirous of doing so.
Policy direction is narrow, as is hypothesized in 
1:13-1:15, and principally looks to the Pacific basin. More 
particularly, Wellington seeks to protect herself from the 
possibility of armed aggression from Southeast Asia and ul­
timately China. She is definitely in a position to react to 
external stimuli rather than to cause other states to react 
to her policies. Having committed herself to a policy of 
alignment, she plans to rely heavily on others in case of 
imminent threats to her security.
New Zealand also relies on international organizations 
to prevent war and to provide a variety of humanitarian ser­
vices. She has been a willing participant in the League of 
Nations and the United Nations as well as in the regional 
groups which function in the Pacific. Her influence in these 
organizations has not been great, and the basic, though not
the sole, reason for participation is enlightened self-
 ^13 interest.
For example of this tactic see: J. K. Cunningham,
"New Zealand as a Small Power in the United Nations," 
Political Science, IX (September, 1957), pp. 33-46.
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This small South Pacific nation provides verification 
for several of the economic propositions forwarded. As pre­
viously noted. New Zealand depends heavily on its exports and 
imports for economic prosperity. The small domestic market 
makes it impossible to manufacture certain types of durable 
goods, e.g., heavy machinery and commercial aircraft. Such 
major items must be brought from Western Europe, America, or 
Australia. In practice, many types of consumer durables also 
are imported.
In order not to fall into a severe deficit trade bal­
ance, the agricultural produce of New Zealand has been sold
to England and other areas. The vulnerability of Wellington 
to overseas pressure may be seen nowhere more clearly than in 
its attempts first to avert and then to adjust to the entry 
of Britain into the Common Market. As her number one agricul­
tural market, England could have demanded some harsh conces­
sions from New Zealand if she had so desired.
There is a lack of certain natural resources which
places New Zealand at a further disadvantage. Petroleum, for 
example, thus far has not been discovered in sufficiently 
large quantities to sustain the domestic needs. Therefore, 
the oil must be imported from the Middle East in foreign- 
owned tankers to supply the local demands.
Because of these economic handicaps New Zealand has 
sought relief by joining trade communities. She is a member 
of the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT),
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originally a United Nations sponsored group. This consortium 
of some sixty nations has come under fire from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but 
Wellington has felt that her interests were being served by 
adherence to the GATT.^^ In addition to participating in the 
GATT, Wellington also has worked to create several bilateral 
trade agreements. These have been contracted with the United 
Kingdom and with Australia, and they have contributed much to 
the total trade situation existing between New Zealand and 
these countries.
New Zealand has other bilateral arrangements, but they 
have been neither as structured nor as important to her trade 
policy. For example, there is a "voluntary agreement" with 
the United States concerning beef and veal exports from New 
Zealand. This is a one-sided arrangement which involves the 
United States dictating the amount of beef it will accept and 
New Zealand agreeing voluntarily to ship no more rather than 
having a quota system imposed on her by Washington. There is 
also a trade agreement with Japan which has been revised 
periodically since first being contracted in 1958. New 
Zealand has tried in each of these cases, with varying degrees
14For a discussion of New Zealand's policies in GATT 
and UNCTAD, respectively, see; W. Rosenberg, A Guidebook to 
New Zealand's Future, pp. 120-124.
^^The agreements spoken of here are the New Zealand- 
United Kingdom Trade Agreement and the New Zealand-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
129
of success, to keep as much control over her trade as possible. 
Her dealings with Australia have been more successful than 
those with the larger powers.
It is obvious that New Zealand is not an exception to 
the statements listed above in propositions 2 ;1-2 ;4 which con­
cern trade policies. She is heavily dependent on both import 
and export trade. She lacks certain resources which force her 
to look beyond her borders for overseas help, taking her to 
GATT and other arrangements to fulfill her economic needs.
New Zealanders have used admirably the intangible fac­
tors of education, ingenuity, and culture to overcome many of 
the handicaps inherent in their situation. As was suggested 
earlier, human factors may either alleviate or complicate the 
physical qualities of the small country. In the case of New 
Zealand, the effect has been positive. Her national charac­
ter, to use an imprecise term, has helped New Zealand to over­
come strategic and economic problems, and to produce a 
developed society which looks inward more than outward. New 
Zealanders are concerned about their problems and do a lot 
of thinking, researching, and reading about themselves. Some 
overseas observers have mentioned this trait and have been 
pointed in their evaluations. One American in particular 
failed to endear himself to Kiwis by expressing the following 
opinion which is typical of other statements by David 
Ausabel.
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New Zealanders also tend to have 
quite unrealistic notions about the 
extent to which people in other parts 
of the world are concerned with 
events in their country. Although 
they frequently admit to being tiny, 
insular and unimportant, they really 
don't believe that this is the case 
and confidently expect such protesta­
tions to be contradicted by overseas 
visitors. . . . Another manifestation 
of this exaggerated sense of national 
importance is the peculiar expecta­
tion that, for reasons apparently 
assumed to be self-evident. New 
Zealand is entitled to specially 
favoured treatment in her relations
with other nations.16
Despite the impression they give of thinking and acting 
like the British, New Zealanders have a very distinctly dif­
ferent Anshauunq, and add support to the first statement made 
in the pre-theory relating to psychological and emotional 
characteristics (3:1). They also seem to derive their atti­
tudes from their perceived ability, or inability, to alter 
the world in which they operate, a trait supportive of propo­
sition 3:3. As noted below in the treatment on linkages. New 
Zealanders readily admit to their smallness, but they try to 
act as if they were larger. There is, thus, a distinctiveness 
about their psychological and emotional characteristics which 
defies easy explanation or description.
16David P. Ausabel, The Fern and the Tiki (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 57. This type 
of statement has not been popular with New Zealanders, but 
more than one admitted to me that Ausabel's observations 
were accurate.
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Propositions 4;1-4:5 concern the effect which linkages 
have on New Zealand, particularly on her foreign relations.
It is to this topic that we now turn for in-depth study.
II. Research Procedures 
Through funds provided in a Fulbright Research Grant, 
it was possible for the writer to reside in New Zealand from 
October 1, 1970, until July 1, 1971. During these months re­
search was conducted on the types, intensity, and impact of 
overseas linkages on New Zealand society and government.
The research design was twofold. Early months were 
spent in perusing the library materials available at the 
Rankin-Brown Library of Victoria University in Wellington, 
the House of Representatives Library in the Parliament com­
plex, and the smaller number of holdings in the New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs. In this preliminary 
study, careful attention was given to theories of small state 
foreign policy and to recent New Zealand politics and foreign 
affairs. Rosenau's Linkage Politics was carefully studied, 
and the questions which were later researched began to emerge.
Secondly, the personal interview technique was decided 
upon as the best method of securing responses to the questions. 
Because of the lack of precedent in constructing a question­
naire on linkages, it was deemed advisable to present a short, 
open-ended format which could possibly be refined in successive
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projects. After two pre-test interviews, the original 
questionnaire was slightly altered to its final form as shown 
in Appendix
The questions which prompted the form and substance of 
the questionnaire were general. It was first necessary to 
discover which types of groups maintained overseas linkages 
and which did not. Further, the nature of these links was 
important in understanding what if any effect they might have 
on an organization or department. Given New Zealand's his­
toric ties to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, it was 
also necessary to test whether or not such links were still 
strong or if they were loosening. If the latter, it was es­
sential to determine what other poles might be exerting an 
attraction. Finally, it was hoped that by gaining knowledge 
about travel trends and policies of New Zealand respondents, 
some further dimension could be gained concerning external 
influence on New Zealand, and vice versa.
Subjects for the interviews were selected with an eye 
to getting as complete a sampling of total societal links as 
possible without contacting every business, government agency, 
and, indeed, each citizen. As the interview task came to its 
final stages, the similarity of responses from within the
Dr. Alan Robinson of Victoria University was most 
helpful in the early stages of the project. He assisted in 
the choice of interview subjects, the refinement of the ques­
tionnaire, and gave a number of suggestions which made the 
launching of the project decidedly easier.
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groups confirmed in the writer's mind the conviction that the 
sample had uncovered the major linkages even though the total 
number of interviews was but sixty-seven. The distribution 
of these is shown in the following chart.
TABLE 2
BREAKDOWN OF INTERVIEWS BY SUBJECT-RESPONDENT
N=67
Agency N %
Government departments and ministries 42 63
Political parties 3 4
Private groups, lobbies, interest groups, etc. 12 18
Quasi-governmental agencies, boards, etc. 7 10
Businesses 3 4
Totals 67 99*
♦Total percentage does not reach 100 because of 
rounding.
There was no formula used in the selection of groups 
or individuals to be interviewed. Government pervades every 
area of New Zealand life, so the majority of the study 
focused there. Major political party officials were inter­
viewed, including a representative of the Social Credit Party. 
The Communist party was contacted in Wellington but the 
leadership admitted to a very decentralized organization na­
tionwide, with some groups maintaining links to Moscow and
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others to Peking. It was decided that their performance 
collectively at the polls (less than 1 percent in the 1972 
elections) did not warrant tracing the numerous branches of
18the party and for this reason no interview was accomplished.
Private groups interviewed under the third category
above included a wide sampling of organizations. Heading the
group in importance would probably be the Federation of Labour,
with the Manufacturers Federation, the National Council of
Women, and the New Zealand University Students Association
being other leading organizations. Also included in this
category were groups representing religious life, sports, and
19promotion of alcoholic beverage sales. From group four, 
the major produce boards were examined as well as other simi­
lar organizations. Finally, three large companies were 
queried representing the business field.
In each individual case, care was taken to interview 
someone knowledgeable on the international ties of the organi­
zation. As far as government was concerned, someone from the 
senior level of career public servants seemed best qualified 
in most departments or ministries. Several were the top 
executive officers of their respective departments. Among 
non-governmental interviewees, most were top officials of
18Actually, several appointments were made for inter­
views with the Wellington branch of the party, but the party 
representative failed to keep any of these.
19The complete list of interviewees may be found in 
Appendix D.
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their board or council. The prime concern in every instance 
was to get authoritative responses to the questions.
Administration of the questionnaire was by personal
20interview in all but one case. The duration of each inter­
view was approximately forty-five minutes, but these were 
frequently longer. Respondents were encouraged to give full 
explanation of their answers, and the data was recorded as 
given. The writer was the sole interviewer for the project.
At this juncture a reminder on the nature of the data 
is in order. The whole purpose of the project was to gather 
impressions which were based on personal experience as well 
as fact. As recorded, the interview data was the opinion, 
feeling, surmise, or intuition of the subject, and no attempts 
were made to prove or disprove the respondent by research in 
records, interviews of other officials who might have differ­
ent views, or intensive questioning of the responses received. 
Care in selection of the subjects was the key factor in trying 
to insure the integrity of the data, and the responses were 
accepted at face value.
Coding and interpretation of the data was carried out 
in pursuance of suggestions for open-end questionnaire analy­
sis given by Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh in
20Exception: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service,
Mr. H. E. Gilbert, Security Chief, sent some materials from 
which part of the information on the questionnaire could be 
derived.
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21their book Survey Research. Coding sheets were used on 
which all non-identical responses were recorded; then these 
were reduced in number so as to give a fair distribution of 
opinion, but also to place into a manageable number of cate­
gories the overlapping and duplicative responses. Analysis 
of the coded data represents the writer's attempts at drawing 
defensible and logical conclusions from the material gathered. 
In addition, some inferences which were substantively sup­
portable were noted. Cross-category and intra-category anal­
yses were utilized in an attempt to show relationships which 
helped to answer the queries posed to the interviewees. These 
techniques also helped draw out additional information indica­
tive of the importance of linkages in New Zealand.
Ill. The Findings
Extent of Linkages
It was somewhat surprising to find that the sixty-six 
interviewees believed unanimously that their sectors had some 
links to the external environment. Although not revealing in 
regards to the nature or intensity of links, the overwhelming 
presence of ties to the environment enables one to see clearly 
to what levels penetration from the environment goes. It 
touches every government department and ministry, every 
political party, every private interest, and every business
21 (Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 153-170.
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22from which information was received. Considering the 
divergence of subjects this fact was noteworthy.
Understandably, not all sectors experienced the same 
degree of external contact. Some, in fact, noted only a few 
unimportant points of overseas linkage. However, this type 
was in the minority, as may be seen in Table 3.
TABLE 3
COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF LINKS 
N=6 6
How many links does your sector maintain? N %
Numerous links 31 47
Considerable number 12 18
Some 15 23
A few 8 12
None 0 0
Total 66 100.00
Nearly one-half of all respondents stated that their sector 
maintained "numerous ties" to the overseas environment. The 
thirty-one who thus responded represented more than twice as 
many as the next largest group. When the first two categories 
were combined, representing those sectors who had "considerable" 
and "numerous" ties, the figure was 65 percent of the total
22No information was available from the New Zealand 
Intelligence Service, but the existence of overseas contacts 
to this department are unquestioned.
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number. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the interviewees 
said that their sectors were in close contact with the e x ­
ternal world by virtue of the links which they maintained.
A further breakdown of the responses in Table 4 re­
veals the following pattern. Among the five categories, the 
lowest intensity of linkage was that maintained by the polit­
ical party organizations. This was to be expected since the 
focus of such a group is clearly domestic and only secondarily 
international. Of the three parties polled, the two major 
ones were more active than the Social Credit Party. Both the 
National Center Party and the Labor Party are affiliates of 
international associations which share ideological viewpoints. 
Contacts mainly involved interchange of literature in what
Mr. Ralph Wilson, General Director of the National Center
23Party, characterized as an "exchange of paper." Social 
Credit reported no hard core contacts, but some irregular 
correspondence and sharing of ideas with the Australian Social 
Credit League and the Alberta government.
Each of the remaining four categories reported a high 
frequency of overseas links. In terms of percentages, the 
businesses unanimously ranked in the highest category. These 
represented a variety of products and ownership schemes and 
are representative of other large companies. The Bank of New 
Zealand (BNZ) is government-owned, but disclaims any special 
favors. New Zealand Forest Products, Limited, is a
23In te rv ie w  #2-1 , answer to  question #1.
TABLE 4
LINKAGE FREQUENCY BY SUBJECT CATEGORY
N=66
Subjects By 
Category
Gov't. Depts. Political
Parties
Private Groups, 
Lobbies, Int. 
Groups
Quasi-Gov't.
Boards,
Agencies
Busi­
nesses
Frequency of 
Linkages N % N % N % N % N %
Numerous 19 46 0 0 3 25 6 86 3 100
Considerable 9 22 0 0 2 17 1 14 0 0
Some 7 17 2 67 6 50 0 0 0 0
A few 6 14 1 33 1 8 0 0 0 0
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 41 100 3 100 12 100 7 100 3 100
to
VO
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shareholding company partially owned by locals, but the 
majority of shares are held by individuals or interests over­
seas. Europa is the only wholly New Zealand owned petroleum 
company of the five firms which have permission to operate in 
the country.
BNZ reported many ties abroad through its branches in 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Pacific Islands. Also, 
it maintained arrangements with banks around the world, at­
tended conferences on international banking, and sponsored 
liaisons for overseas companies which trade in New Zealand.
New Zealand Forest Products, being controlled from outside, 
was very much influenced by linkages. Perhaps more important 
than the ownership was the overseas markets which took a high 
percentage of the annual produce. Also, pricing on the world 
market affected all three of the businesses polled. Europa, 
while locally owned, was dependent for its crude oil on its 
supplier, the Gulf Oil Company of the United States. Also, 
there is a joint refinery for all five petroleum firms operat­
ing in New Zealand, the others being either wholly or mostly
24owned by outside interests. These three subjects are big 
businesses with a multiplicity of worldwide interests. While 
representative of larger commercial ventures they are not 
typical of many New Zealand enterprises which are smaller and 
certainly less global in their scope of operation.
24The other four are Mobil, British Petroleum, Caltex,
and Shell.
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The quasi-governmental boards, agencies and bureaus 
showed the next most frequent and intense linkage contacts.
Of the seven polled, six reported regular and numerous over­
seas relations, and the seventh reported a considerable amount 
of contact abroad. The only agency polled which fell below 
the others was the Vice-Chancellor's Committee of the Univer­
sity system, and Mr. Peter Hampton, the Secretary, still ac­
knowledged a high degree of international interchange of ideas 
25and staff.
Government provided a wider number of services and 
touched more diverse areas than any of the other single cate­
gories. Despite this divergence of interests there was still 
a high intensity of international contact. As previously 
noted, some 65 percent of the respondents reported that their 
sectors had at least a considerable number of linkages, and 
47 percent had "numerous" contacts. Among the latter were 
some which are predictable, including the Treasury Department, 
Defense Department, Department of Agriculture, Customs Depart­
ment, Industries and Commerce Department, Maori and Island 
Affairs Department, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
However, there were several interviewees reporting "numerous" 
ties which were not anticipated, including the Electricity 
Department, Ministry of Works, State Insurance Office, and 
Railways Department. Of those who reported "considerable"
^^ In terv iew  #4-6 .
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frequency in overseas links, unanticipated agencies were also 
present, e.g.. Forest Service, Department of Labor, Police 
Department (not Intelligence Security), and Lands and Surveys 
Department. It was clear that world standards greatly con­
cerned most of these agencies, and kept them receptive to 
outside advances in technology and methods.
Even the subjects who reported "some" or "few" overseas 
contacts seemed in many cases to value such links. Several, 
including Mr. K. Gillies, the Auditor-General, valued the 
infrequent overseas trips for attendance at conferences and 
the like. Others reported less usefulness and seemed to feel 
that external ties were next to valueless. The Public Trust 
Office, for example, derived little from its overseas ties. 
This was exceptional among governmental respondents and for 
the entire study.
While less involved with the overseas environment than 
the previous three categories, "private groups" still main­
tained regular linkages. Considering the intention of this 
group of organizations, i.e., to influence the domestic polity 
and society, the degree to which they maintained at least some 
overseas ties was significant. Forty-two percent reported 
"considerable" or "numerous" international ties with the 
Chamber of Commerce, the National Council of Churches and the 
University Students Association in the latter category. The 
only group of this type which maintained only "a few" link­
ages was the Table Tennis Association, an impoverished group
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that would become more interested in international contacts
26if financial resources allowed.
Looking at the total number of interviews one can see 
how numerous the ties of New Zealand organizations are to 
outside nations and international organizations. As to the 
details of the relationships between New Zealand and the out­
side world, a look at the nature of the linkages provided 
some insights.
Nature of Linkages
Of equal importance to knowing how extensive the link­
ages were which tied New Zealand to her environment was the 
knowledge of the type of links which existed. In trying to 
analyze the nature of New Zealand's links, several questions 
arose. First, whether the links were established and main­
tained on an official basis or by unofficial and personal 
contacts was deemed important. Second, the issue of extent 
of linkage influence, while difficult to determine precisely, 
was probed. The number of ties could be at the same time 
numerous and unimportant if no substantial influence crossed 
the international boundary line. Also, the direction of the 
influence flow presented a factor difficult to measure but 
which holds significance for small state studies. Third, 
the actual physical contacts made by the various sectors 
were charted. This helped to validate what turned out
26In te rv ie w  #3-7 , answer to question 7c.
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frequently to be none too definite impressions by 
interviewees.
In trying to learn what sorts of contacts were most 
common, the interviewees were asked whether their contacts 
were official or unofficial, impersonal or personal, or a 
combination. Table 5 shows respondents' replies in brief 
form.
On the basis of figures in Table 5, most of the 
respondents maintained both official and unofficial contacts 
with overseas individuals and agencies. In fact, only 8 per­
cent stated their contacts to be unofficial only, and none 
maintained strictly official ties. What happened in many 
cases, as described by the interviewees, was that an official 
meeting or conference would establish the initial contact 
which would then be pursued on a personal friendship basis. 
This trend emphasized the interest which New Zealanders have 
in other nations as evidenced in their high rate of interna­
tional travel. Once established, personal links are dili­
gently maintained.
The five respondents who maintained only "unofficial" 
links were distributed among three of the five groups and 
represent a very small percentage of the total. Two were 
from government, i.e., the Crown Law Department and the Gov­
ernment Life Insurance Department. Both of these reported 
only a few outside links, and their work does not require 
them to look elsewhere for ideas, techniques, or advice.
TABLE 5
UNOFFICIAL V. OFFICIAL LINKS AMONG SUBJECT CATEGORIES
N=66
Subjects By 
'■'..^ Categories
Gov 't. Political
Parties
Private
Groups
Quasi-Gov't. 
Boards, Agencies
Busi­
nesses
Total
Types o f ^  __
Contact N % N % N % N % N % N %
Both-equal 
proportion 15 36 2 67 8 67 2 28.6 1 33 28 42
Both-official 
outweighs
11 27 0 0 3 25 2 28.6 2 67 18 27
Both-unofficial 
outweighs
13 32 0 0 1 8 1 14.2 0 0 15 23
Official
only
— —  — — —  — — — — — — — — — —  — 0 0
Unofficial
only
2 5 1 33 0 0 2 28.6 0 0 5 8
Totals 41 100 3 100 12 100 7 100 3 100 66 100
u i
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Among the political party organizations, the Social Credit 
League reported only a few unofficial ties to their counter­
parts in Australia and Canada. Both the two major parties 
reported links of both types, leaving the impression that the 
reason for Social Credit's lack of overseas contacts may be 
its more inward-looking platform and interests.
Two quasi^governmental agencies reported only "unoffi­
cial" links, i.e., the Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, and the 
Secretary of the Vice Chancellor's Committee of the University 
System, Mr. Peter Hampton. Significantly, and unlike the 
other three above, both of these agencies maintained "con­
siderable" or "numerous" overseas links. The explanation for 
this phenomenon lies in the nature of the work of the Ombuds­
man and the University system. Sir Guy Powles maintained 
numerous personal ties with other Ombudsmen, academics, and 
occasional governmental contacts on legal matters. However, 
these did not bear directly on the discharge of his responsi­
bilities. Being a highly individualized office, the overseas 
contacts depend on the person holding the position and poten­
tially change when each one in turn retires. There were not 
as of 1971 any formal international associations for ombudsmen.
Mr. Hampton described his contacts as being initiated 
via correspondence and later established at conferences.
Most of these personal links led to exchange of ideas, infor­
mation, and staff, but were always on an "unofficial" basis.
In summary, where the type of interviewee concern was almost
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exclusively domestic, only a limited number of unofficial 
contacts were maintained. On the other hand, where frequent 
personal contacts were reported, the specific individual 
and/or sector represented had some particular characteristic 
which rendered official ties unnecessary.
Ninety-two percent of the respondents reported both 
"official" and "unofficial" links to the overseas environ­
ment. Sixty-five percent of the total sample reported main­
taining either "considerable" or "numerous" ties. A combining 
of these two factors yields the following results showing the 
types of contacts maintained by the most active agencies or 
sectors.
TABLE 6
RESPONDENTS REPORTING 
CONSIDERABLE/NUMEROUS CONTACTS 
N=43
Types of Contacts N %
Both-equal proportions 17 39
Both-more official 13 30
Both-more unofficial 11 26
Unofficial only 2 5
Total 43 100
A comparison with Table 5 shows that these figures do 
not differ greatly from the entire sample. Thus it may be 
assumed that whether or not a department, agency, ministry.
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or other sector had a low or high frequency of overseas links, 
the general distribution of linkages would be as presented in 
Table 5.
The significant fact is that 92 percent of all respon­
dents maintained "official" and "unofficial" links to the 
international environment. To determine the incidence and 
distribution of the linkages is one thing, to determine their 
effect on the respective New Zealand sectors interviewed is 
another. We now turn to the individual representatives and 
their evaluations of outside influence.
Policy Influence of Linkage Contacts
Influence measurement is one of the most difficult 
tasks with which political scientists grapple. The reason 
for this is the inability of the researcher to get inside 
another person's mind where, after all is said and done, ac­
tual influence is felt. Karl Deutsch has distinguished be­
tween influence and power in these terms. "Influence then
tries to get inside the personality of a person, whereas
27power operates upon him mainly from without." Thus far, 
only neurologists are directly probing the minds of men, and 
their work does not primarily concern itself with cultural 
background and traits.
In studying a particular society and asking questions 
which relate it to the external world there are several
27Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 24.
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possible types which may be expected. Among small nations 
the psychological perspective colors every response. There 
may be the tendency to sell short the abilities, power, in­
fluence, and importance of one's homeland in comparison with 
more powerful neighbor states. On the contrary, some indi­
viduals will not see realistically their nation's weaknesses; 
instead they will pick out some area in which they as a 
society excel and simply disregard other important factors.
Both of these tendencies were observed by the writer in the 
course of this project. Influence proved difficult to weigh, and 
the subjects' objectivity was very questionable.
Sixty-five of the interviewees responded to the ques­
tion of how great an influence the overseas contacts they 
maintained had on the policy decisions of their respective 
sectors. Results of the responses are in Table 7. This 
chart shows that all who responded believed that the external 
world influenced their sector through the contacts maintained.
At the extremes, there were three times as many who believed 
the international influence "marginal" as those who felt it 
was "decisive." By far the greatest cluster of responses was 
equally distributed in the three middle categories. Probably 
the most striking result is that 59 percent of the respondents 
felt at least a "fairly strong" policy influence from without 
the country. Such a level of penetration is indicative of 
the small nation's plight. A much lower level of perceived 
policy influence is predictable in larger, developed states.
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TABLE 7
PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF OVERSEAS 
CONTACTS ON POLICY FORMATION 
N=65
Level of Influence N %
Decisive 6 9
Very strong 16 25
Fairly strong 16 25
Some 17 26
Marginal 10 15
Totals 65 100
Governmentf comprising the largest number of respon­
dents, closely followed the total pattern of influence per­
ception as shown in Table 7. There was only a slight change 
evident, this showing up in the two categories of strongest 
influence. Although feeling less "decisive" influence, gov­
ernment respondents had a higher percentage who felt "very 
strong" influence on policy formation than the total sample. 
Still, these changes were minor, and the government sample 
seemed to parallel closely the total societal perception of 
outside influence.
According to Table 8 government departments which 
felt most keenly the outside influence were the Foreign Aid 
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Post 
Office Department. In the dispensing of New Zealand's
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TABLE 8
PERCEIVED POLICY INFLUENCE BY INTENSITY AMONG 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (N=41)
Decisive
N=2
%=5
Very Strong 
N=13 
%=32
Fairly Strong 
N=10 
%=24
Foreign Aid Div. 
(Min. of Foreign
Treasury Dept. Customs Dept.
Affairs) Defense Dept. Forest Service
Post Office Dept, of Justice Dept.
Department Agriculture 
Elec. Dept.
Marine Dept. 
Maori & Island
Ind. & Commerce 
Dept.
Aff. Dept.
Prime Minister's
Dept. of Educ. Dept.
Labor Dept. Statistics Dept.
Lands & Survey Min. of
Dept. Transportation
Min. of Works 
Economic Section,
Soc. Security 
Dept.
Min. of For. Aff.
State Ins. Office 
Dept.
Min. of For. 
Affairs
Tourist & 
Publicity Dept.
Dept, of
Scientific & Ind. 
Research
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TABLE 8-Continued
Some
N=10
%=24
Marginal
N=6
,%=15
Health Dept. Crown Law Dept.
Inland Revenue Dept. Gov't Life Ins.
Audit Dept. Gov't Printing Office
Law Drafting Office Public Trust Office
Police Dept. Valuation Dept.
Mines Dept. 
Legislative Dept.
Gov't Research Unit, 
Legis. Dept.
State Services Comm.
State Advance Corp. 
Dept.
Railways Dept.
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overseas aid the requests received were considered the most
important factor in formulating policy. Likewise, the New
Zealand Post Office was subject to the decisions of several
international organizations whose policy directives could
28only be overridden by act of Parliament.
Ministries or departments which reported a "very strong" 
influence from abroad included the Treasury, Agriculture, 
Defense, Electricity, Industries and Commerce, Education,
Labor, Lands and Survey, State Insurance and Scientific and 
Industrial Research Departments, as well as the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Works. Most of these were predictable, 
but several were somewhat surprising. For example, the 
Electricity Department representative pointed to both techno­
logical and sociological influences which affected his depart­
ment. In Mr. Nicholson's words, "What's proved itself overseas
29will soon be adopted here." Mr. Ian Stirling, the Assistant 
Surveyor-General, spoke of a continual reliance on techniques 
pioneered overseas.Perhaps the least expected affirmation 
of strong external influence came from Mr. R. W. Prestney, 
Manager of the State Insurance Department. Ties to the 
International Union of Credit Insurers, otherwise known as
28Interviews 1-22 and 1-35 with Mr. Ian Clark and 
Mr. J. Struthers.
29Interview 1-7 with Mr. William Nicholson, Office 
Solicitor for the Electricity Department.
^^ In terv iew  1 -26 .
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the Berne Union, bound New Zealand in such a way that policy 
could in some cases be determined from abroad.
Government agencies which were influenced least from 
overseas included the Crown Law Department, Government Life 
Insurance, Government Printing Office, Public Trust Office, 
and Valuation Departments. These were engaged nearly entirely 
in domestic concerns and the marginal influence exercised from 
other nations or organizations is understandable and predict­
able. There are no particular surprises in those departments 
included in the "fairly strong" and "some" categories.
Non-governmental influence followed roughly the same 
pattern of intensity as that of the governmental as Table 9 
indicates. A comparison with Table 8 shows that there are 
some differences. Most notable was the smaller percentage of 
non-governmental subjects who reported at least "very strong" 
influence from the external world, i.e., 27 percent as opposed 
to 37 percent among government respondents. This is important 
because more than 17 percent of the non-governmental responses 
perceived external influence to be "decisive" as compared with 
only 5 percent of the government responses. At the other ex­
treme, a slightly higher percentage of non-governmental 
opinion perceived there to be but "marginal" outside influence 
than was expressed by government response, 17 percent and 
15 percent, respectively.
^^ In terv iew  1 -34 .
TABLE 9
PERCEIVED INTENSITY OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 
INFLUENCE FROM OVERSEAS CONTACTS (N=24)
Decisive
N=4
%=17
Very Strong 
N=3 
%=12
Fairly Strong 
N=6 
%=25
Some
N=7
%=29
Marginal
N=4
%=17
NZ Rugby NZ Manufact. Chamber of NZ Retailers Nat. Center
Football Fed. Commerce Fed. Party
Union
Meat Board Nat. Council NZ Employees NZ Labor Party
NZ Table of Churches Fed.
Tennis Assoc. Wool Board Medical Assoc.
Nat. Council Fed. of Labor of NZ
NZ Council of of Women
Educ. Research Nat. Council Vice-
Bank of NZ Chancellor ' s
NZ Dairy NZ Univ. Comm.
Board NZ Forest Students
Products, Ltd. Assoc.
Europa Oil Co. Ombudsman
NZ Broadcast­
ing Company
Ln
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It is interesting that both major political parties 
felt very little overseas influence. The Social Credit 
League reported to be "not at all influenced" from the ex­
ternal environment and was not included on the chart. It 
may be concluded that except for maintaining general ideo­
logical accord with affiliated groups abroad, political 
parties operated exclusively on the domestic scene.
A further fact was that three of the seven sectors 
which reported at least "very strong" external policy influ­
ence were marketing boards, i.e., the Meat, Wool, and Dairy 
Boards. Typical of the strong influence felt by these groups 
which promote New Zealand products abroad was the statement
by Mr. R. Jones of the Meat Board when he noted, "When
32Britain spits, we put up an umbrella." A small country
which depends a great deal on overseas trade feels keenly
this type of influence from its largest trading partner.
Other organizations which felt the influence from
abroad were the two sports associations interviewed, the New
Zealand Rugby Football Union and the New Zealand Table Tennis
Association. Mr. R. E. Morgan, Secretary, noted the "absolute
effect" which the International Rugby Board has on New
33Zealand's rugby.
In the category which felt "some" outside influence, 
the Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, gave a fairly typical response.
32Interview 4-2.
33In te rv ie w  3 -6 .
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He reported gaining some "very helpful ideas" from his 
personal contacts, though not being greatly influenced by any 
official organizations or bodies. Of those groups reporting 
"fairly strong" influence, Mr. H. P. Brown of New Zealand 
Forest Products, Ltd, gave a representative reply. He be­
lieved his business was affected "to quite a great extent,"
34
particularly in the area of pricing on the world market.
Summarily, the extensive contacts which New Zealanders 
maintained with international entities resulted in significant 
direct and indirect policy influence internally. This influ­
ence was felt most strongly and directly by the government 
agencies which dealt in foreign affairs, including aid, and 
trade, and by the non-governmental agencies which had to be 
in more or less continual contact abroad. Generally speaking, 
the greater the number of contacts, the greater was the policy 
influence emanating from the contacts. Table 10 contains a 
complete breakdown of all the categories and their comparative 
influence distribution.
Countries and Regions of Strongest Linkage
Because of the geographic isolation of New Zealand and 
her former colonial status, the tracing of overseas links to 
particular countries and regions was designed to chart any 
changes which may be taking place. Despite the loosening of 
ties with the United Kingdom, there was still evidence of a 
strong attachment between the two countries. However, the
^^Interv iew  5 -2 .
TABLE 10
PERCEIVED POLICY INFLUENCE OF OVERSEAS CONTACTS BY CATEGORY
N=65
Degree of Vcategory 
Influence \
Gov't
Political
Parties
Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov' t Business Totals
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Decisive 2 5 0 0 2 17 2 28.6 0 0 6 9
Very Strong 13 32 0 0 1 8 2 28.6 0 0 16 25
Fairly Strong 10 24 0 0 3 25 0 0 3 100 16 25
Some 10 24 0 0 5 42 2 28.6 0 0 17 26
Marginal 6 15 2 100 1 8 1 14.2 0 0 10 15
Totals 41 100 2 100 12 100 7 100 3 100 65 100
o i
00
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diversification of links is becoming more obvious. A 
heightened awareness of the Pacific basin region and 
Australia were among the trends in linkage association that 
emerged in this study. One fact which reconfirmed itself 
was the necessity of trade for a developed small state. If 
the doors to the English market are closed, the New Zealander 
must look elsewhere to ensure economic survival.
In trying to discover which countries and/or organiza­
tions were the strongest influencing agents, respondents were 
asked to identify in rank order the three overseas entities 
which most strongly affected their sector. Some of the inter­
viewees were indefinite or could not discern more than one or 
two influencing agents. Thus the number of respondents de­
clines in the second and third areas of choice. Also, some 
sectors believed outside influences were about equal from 
two entities. In such cases, the response was recorded for 
both regions or countries.
Table 11 shows the distribution by nation or region of 
the New Zealand agencies interviewed.
With a clear margin over all other states or organiza­
tions, nearly a majority of the respondents listed England 
as New Zealand's most influential overseas link. Most inter­
viewees noted that their ties to Great Britain and Australia 
were for two reasons; (1) trade and (2) geographic proximity. 
These two factors are key in explaining any linkages between 
New Zealand and her overseas environment. With most sectors
160
TABLE 11
PRIMARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY SECTOR
United Kingdom & 
Western Europe 
N=31 
%=49
Australia
N=8
%=13
Treasury Dept. Gov't Printing Gov't Life Ins.
Agriculture Dept.
Office Dept.
Justice Dept. Inland Revenue
Crown Law Dept.
Law Drafting
Dept.
Customs Dept. Office Lands & Survey 
Dept.
Forest Service Marine Dept.
Dept. Tourist &
Electricity Dept.
Police Dept. Publicity Dept.
Mines Dept. State Advances
Industries & Dept.
Commerce Dept. Min. of Foreign
Education Dept.
Affairs NZ Manufac. Fed.
Legislative Dept. NZ Retailers
Health Dept.
Prime Minister's
Fed.
Audit Dept. Dept. Vice-Chancellor's 
Comm.
Public Trust Gov't Research
Office Unit (Pari.)
Post Office Dept. Dept, of
Scientific & Ind.
Railways Dept. Research
Medical Assoc. Chamber of
of NZ Commerce
Meat Board 
NZ Broadcasting
Vice-Chancellor's 
Comm.
Company 
Bank of NZ
NZ Dairy Board
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TABLE 11-Continued
United States 
& N. Amer. 
N=6 
%=9
Japan 
& Asia 
N=1 
%=2
Pacific Islands 
Int'l. Organ. 
N=17 
%=24
Defense Dept. Railways Maori Sc Isl. State Ins.
Dept. Affairs Dept. ■ Dept.
Min. of Works
External Aid Valuation
Railways Dept. Div. (Min. of Dept.
For. Aff.)
Council of NZ Employees
Ed. Research Statistics Fed.
Dept.
Europa NZ Rugby
Social Football
Security Union
Dept.
NZ Table
Economic Sec. Tennis
(Min. of For. Assoc.
Affairs)
Nat. Council
NZ Fed. of of Women
Labor
NZ Univ.
Nat. Council Students
of Churches Assoc.
NZ Forest Wool Board
Prod. , Ltd. ______ 1
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there was little question as to which linkage was most 
influential, especially among those whose choice was England. 
Those who felt stronger influences from elsewhere are par­
ticularly noteworthy.
Certain New Zealand sectors were much more closely 
tied to one or another of the environmental entities. For 
example, as indicated in Table 12, government sectors are 
closely linked to United Kingdom counterparts as twenty-four 
of the forty-two respondents (57 percent) identified England 
or another Western European country as the most influential 
overseas agency. This percentage was higher, by a factor of 
more than two, than for any other country. The other three 
categories of groups chose England as primary influencing 
link in only seven of twenty-one cases, or 33 percent. On 
the other hand, nine of the twenty-one private, quasi-, and 
non-governmental sectors (43 percent) felt the greatest in­
fluence was from international organizations. Primary link­
age influence by international organizations was felt by only
six governmental agencies, just 14 percent of the total for 
35government. Political parties denied that any country or 
organization influenced them more than another, and there is 
thus no listing for them.
35Those government departments which listed interna­
tional organization as their main overseas influence were the 
Department of Labor, Statistics Department, Economic Section 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Insurance Office, 
and the Valuation Department.
TABLE 12
PERCEIVED PRIMARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=63
Region, Country\ Category of 
or Int'l. Org. \Respondent
Gov't Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov ' t.
Business Total
N % N % N % N % N
United Kingdom & W. Europe 24 57 2 18 4 57 1 33 31
Australia 5 12 2 18 1 14 0 0 8
United States & N. America 4 10 0 0 1 14 1 33 6
Japan & Asia 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pacific Islands & 
Int'l Org. 8 19 7 64 1 14 ■ 1 33 17
Totals 42 100 11 100 7 99* 3 99* 63
a\
w
*Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.
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The foregoing gives a portion of the New Zealand linkage 
scene, but not all of it. Even though the United Kingdom con­
tinued to hold a significant influence over many segments of 
the public and private sectors in New Zealand there were per­
sistent signs that this trend is weakening. A number of inter­
view subjects frankly pointed to a diminution of English in­
fluence. For example, Chief Inspector L. F. Jones of the 
Mines Department mentioned the originally decisive influence 
of Britain, but noted that there had been a marked decrease. 
While it was not the objective of this project to chart the 
comparative ebb and flow of influence among the prominent 
states in Wellington's environment, it was possible from the 
data gathered in the questionnaire to chart the countries 
and/or international organizations which were making encroach­
ments on what had been in the past a British monopoly of in­
fluence. Subsequent tables show the estimate of which nations 
or international entities exercised influence that was some­
what less than the most influential, but still major.
Some changes are evident in Table 13 as we focus upon 
the respondents' second most significant overseas influence. 
Australia emerged as the nation thought to be most influential 
next to the United Kingdom. Geography and culture would ap­
pear to be the two decisive factors in this trend. It is 
noteworthy that the government perceived that North American
In te rv ie w  1 -21 .
TABLE 13
PERCEIVED SECONDARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=4 9
Region, Country\ Category of 
or Int'1 Org. \ Respondents
Gov't
Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov ' t Total
N % N % N % N %
United Kingdom & W. Europe 8 24 3 33 1 14 12 24.5
Australia 9 27 3 33 3 43 15 30.6
U.S.A. & N. America 11 33 0 0 2 29 13 26.5
Japan, Asia 1 3 2 22 1 14 4 8.2
Pacific Islands &
Int'l Org. 4 12 1 11 0 0 5 10.2
Totals 33 99* 9 99* 7 100 49 100
t-*
a\
u i
♦Total is less than 100% because of rounding.
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influence was stronger than Australian. Also, Japan showed 
an increase in the secondary influence totals. From 1.5 per­
cent who believed the Japanese were a primary influence, the 
percent who perceived them as a secondary force rose to over 
8 percent. Conversely, international organizations and South 
Pacific regional influence declined somewhat, from 27 percent 
to 10 percent. The overall picture is one of Australia and 
the United States very close to Britain as secondary influ­
ences. Many who did not perceive England as the most signifi­
cant overseas power still felt their presence to a considerable
37extent, as evidenced by the 24 percent who judged them second.
As displayed in Table 14, tertiary influence emanated 
from the following main sources. The United States and North 
America emerged as the strongest influencing agent at this 
third level with 37 percent of the respondent opinion. Japan 
and Asia remained a fairly definite contender for influence 
in the future, while Australia was runner-up to the United 
States. International organizations and regional states were 
listed by 13 percent of the respondents.
Taken in their entirety the results of the three fig­
ures show a rough distribution of perceived influence as 
follows. While not taking into account the value of the 
respondents' rankings. Table 16 shows the distribution of 
total numerical occurrence on the questionnaires, i.e., the
37All three businesses listed only a first choice, thus 
there are no figures for their secondary and tertiary influence.
TABLE 14
PERCEIVED TERTIARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=38
Region, Country Category of 
or Int'l Org. Respondent
Gov't
Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov ' t. Total
' N % N % N % N %
United Kingdom & W. Europe 4 14 0 0 0 0 4 11
Australia 7 24 0 0 1 25 8 21
U.S.A. & N. America 11 38 3 60 0 0 14 37
Japan & Asia 5 17 1 20 1 25 7 18
Pacific Islands & 
Int'l. Organization 2 7 1 20 2 50 5 13
Totals 29 100 5 100 4 100 38 100
cn
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TABLE 15
TOTAL PERCEIVED LINKAGE INFLUENCE 
BY COUNTRIES/ORGANIZATIONS
Country/Region/Organization N %
United Kingdom & W. Europe 47 31
Australia 31 21
United States & N. America 33 22
Japan and Asia 12 8
Pacific Islands & 
International Organization 27 18
Totals 150 100
frequency with which each country/region/organization was 
ranked as most, second most, and third most influential.
The data in Table 16 were created by giving a value of 3 to 
a most influential ranking, 2 to a second most influential, 
and 1 to a third most influential ranking. From the data in 
Tables 14-16, we can draw the following conclusions about 
New Zealand's linkage characteristics. First, Great Britain 
still was the most influential external influence, even 
though situated half way around the globe. Most basic gov­
ernmental service agencies looked first to England, as did 
the majority of the trading boards which marketed New Zealand 
products abroad. However, by consulting Table 16 it was pos­
sible to note a counter-trend which focused on North America.
TABLE 16
RANKED VALUE OF LINKAGE INFLUENCE 
N=326
Country/Region/Organization
By Place Totals
1st x3 2nd x2 3rd xl N %
United Kingdom & W. Europe 31 93 12 24 4 4 121 37
Australia 8 24 15 30 8 8 62 19
United States - N. America 6 18 13 26 14 14 58 18
Japan & Asia 1 3 4 8 8 8 19 6
Pacific Islands, 
Int'l Organization 17 51 5 10 5 5 66 20
Totals 63 189 49 98 39 39 326 100
VO
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Australia, to be sure, emerged as the second most 
influential national linkage. However, the types of links 
maintained there were not as likely to affect the country's 
long-range development, whereas the types of links increas­
ingly being forged with North America were. For example, 
agencies which listed Australia as the number one influenc­
ing state included the Government Life Insurance Department, 
the Inland Revenue Department, and the Tourist and Publicity 
Department, among others which were characterized by their 
similarity to Australian counterparts. It may be stated that 
these types of agencies do not determine the broad develop­
mental policies of a country. On the other hand. North 
America was listed as the primary influencing area by the 
Defense Department, the Railways Department, and the Minis­
tries of Transport and Works. These powerful government 
agencies were and are vitally involved in the planning of 
New Zealand's future. In addition, the Council of Educational 
Research listed the United States and North America as its 
primary influence. Thus in several key areas American influ­
ence was being felt.
A second somewhat predictable result was the manner in 
which the linkage pattern closely paralleled the external 
trade pattern. Great Britain accounted for approximately 
35 percent of New Zealand's total trade, a percentage very 
close to the 37 percent figure listed for United Kingdom
171
3 8linkages in Table 16. While the comparative amounts of
overseas trade to Australia, North America and the other
categories used in.this study did not correspond as closely,
they were nevertheless similar and in the same basic order.
This seems to reemphasize the proposition in the previous
chapter which underlines most small states' characteristic
39dependence upon trade.
Another feature of New Zealand's linkages was the 
major role played by international organizations. According 
to Table 12, 17 percent of the respondents listed interna­
tional groupings as their principal overseas link and influ­
encing agent. Among "private groups" the percentage was 
particularly high; seven of eleven respondents singled out 
organizations abroad rather than nation states. Such a trend 
clearly supports proposition 2 ; 4 above which noted the ten­
dency of smaller nations to seek some relief from their small­
ness by aligning themselves with other like-minded states.
Despite the admission of Britain into the Common 
Market and all the other signs of loosening ties, London re­
mained the strongest voice heard by New Zealanders. Another 
decade may drastically alter this fact, but for the early 
1970's the cultural and economic ties to England will con­
tinue to be the most important single external linkage.
38
See New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1970, p. Sllff.
39See P rop osition  2:3,  p.  96.
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Influence Flow Via Linkages
Influence is not a one-way process; it moves both into
and out of all countries, and the difficulties in charting
such a fluid and comprehensive force are great. Recent
studies have attempted a number of analytic methods for
measuring power and influence, but thus far results have not
been entirely satisfying. Probably the most satisfactory have
been studies emerging from the communications theorists. Karl
Deutsch's early attempt to chart cross-national mail flow re-
40mains one of the more rigorous efforts of this school.
For this aspect of the study we continue to rely on 
respondent attitude and opinion. The following questions were 
asked: What percentage of interviewees believed their sectors
were trying to exert an influence abroad? What outside enti­
ties would be influenced most by such attempts? Does more 
influence flow into or out of New Zealand?
Not all New Zealand sectors attempt to exert external 
influence, but, as Table 17 indicates, a considerable number 
do. Some 65 percent of the sectors polled (forty-three of 
sixty-six) did make some attempt to exert influence beyond 
the boundary of the nation. Some made very feeble efforts 
and expected little for them. For example, the Social Credit 
League reported making a trip abroad to acquaint others of its 
party's stand without expecting to see much results.Others
40Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1953) .
^^ In terv iew  2-3.
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TABLE 17
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE INTENTION 
AMONG RESPONDENTS (N=66)
Yes— Try to in­
fluence Overseas 
Entities 
N=23 
%=35
Some Weak 
Attempts 
N=20 
%=30
No Attempt 
N=23 
%=35
Treasury Dept. Forest Service Crown Law Dept.
Defense Dept.
Dept.
Inland Revenue
Agriculture Dept.
Electricity Dept.
Gov't Printing
Gov't Life Ins. Office
Customs Dept. Dept.
Industries & Education Dept.
Law Drafting 
Office
Commerce Dept.
Health Dept. Marine Dept.
Labor Dept.
Audit Dept. Maori & Isl. Aff.
Prime Min. Dept. Dept.
Min. of Transport
Justice Dept.
Police Dept.
Econ. Section,
External Aid Div. 
Min. of Foreign Mines Dept.
Min. of Foreign Affairs
Affairs Legislative Dept.
Dept, of
Lands & Survey 
Dept. Public Trans. Off.
Scientific & Ind. 
Research Statistics Dept. State Services
NZ Labour Party Tourist & Pub.
Comm.
Dept. Min. of Works
NZ Manu. Fed.
Social Credit Social Security
NZ Employees Fed. League Dept.
NZ Table Tennis Chamber of Post Office Dept.
Assoc. Commerce
NZ Univ. Students NZ Rugby Foot­
State Advances 
Corp. Dept.
Assoc. ball Union
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TABLE 17-Continued
Yes— Try to in­
fluence Overseas 
Entities
Some Weak 
Attempts No Attempt
NZ Meat Board Federation of Railways Dept.
NZ Wool Board
Labor
Valuation Dept.
NZ Dairy Board
Nat. Council 
of Churches Gov't Research
Bank of NZ Nat. Council
Unit
of Women Nat. Centre
NZ Forest Prod., Party
Ltd. National
Council NZ Retailers Fed.
Europa
Coun. of Ed. Res. Medical Assoc.
State Ins. Office of NZ
Min. of Foreign
NZ Broadcasting 
Company Ombudsman
Affairs
Vice-Chancellor's 
Committee
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were involved primarily in overseas influence, e.g., the Meat 
and Wool Boards and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sub­
ject matter of each individual sector determined its involve­
ment and interest in overseas contacts.
Eighteen of the twenty-three sectors (78 percent) which 
claimed to exert no intentional influence abroad were govern­
ment departments or sub-departments. In addition, the 
Ombudsman and the Vice-Chancellor's Committee of the Univer­
sity system were tied closely to government. This heavy pre­
dominance of government agencies among the sectors which did 
not attempt to exert an international influence reflected the 
more purely domestic aspect of government services.
All three of the businesses polled were among those 
respondents who reported definite influence attempts.
Europa, New Zealand Forest Products and Bank of New Zealand 
were all explicit in their desires for procuring better mar­
kets, trying to finance overseas projects, or trying to get
42the best arrangements in the refining consortium. Also 
prominent in this list were the trading boards (Wool, Meat 
and Dairy) and several of the more influential government 
departments and ministries, e.g.. Treasury, and Industries 
and Commerce. Thus, a clear majority admittedly were trying 
to exert an international influence.
The next question was "Do you feel that your attempts 
are having the desired results?" Put differently, the
42 In terv iew s  5 -2 , 5 -1 , and 5 -3 .
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respondents were asked to assess whether or not their efforts 
were being taken seriously by the objects of the influence.
A comparison of the totals in Table 17 with those in Table 18 
reveals several interesting trends. Sixty-five percent of 
the respondents admitted intentionally exerting at least a 
minimal amount of influence on external entities. A consid­
erably higher proportion of respondents, 73 percent, believed 
that their sector had at least a minimal influence on the 
overseas environment. This means that some respondents be­
lieved that they had an influence which they did not con­
sciously seek to exert. Further, although we have no 
comparative data, the fact that over half of the respondents 
felt that they had more than slight influence over their 
international contacts seems to contradict the propositions 
on the psychological effects of small size. The group-by- 
group distribution of perceived overseas influence reveals 
several things. First, the private groups, guasi-governmental 
agencies, and businesses felt that they had fairly good suc­
cess in influencing overseas entities; fifteen of twenty-two 
respondents (68 percent) believed their efforts were suc­
cessful beyond the minimal level. This was a much higher 
perceived average influence than was expressed by government 
sectors. Perhaps this reflected the greater specialization 
of government departments, some of whom deal wholly with 
domestic concerns.
TABLE 18
CATEGORICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED SECTORAL OVERSEAS INFLUENCE
N=66
Response
Gov't
Political
Parties
Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov ' t Business Totals
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Yes 18 44 1 33 8 66 5 71 2 67 34 52
Slight 10 24 1 33 2 17 1 14 0 0 14 21
None 13 32 1 33 2 17 1 14 1 33 18 27
Totals 41 100 3 99* 12 100 7 99* 3 100 66 100
-j
♦Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.
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The overall picture was still one in which New 
Zealand interviewees perceived themselves as exerting influ­
ence even beyond their own admitted attempts. However, this 
does not appear to the writer as either unduly idealistic or 
chauvinistic. Most respondents conceded the overall small­
ness of their country and their relative paucity of interna­
tional influence. For example, the Agriculture Department's 
interviewee, Mr. John B. Quigg, noted that "no state is overly 
influenced because of New Zealand's smallness." Speaking
personally he felt that some states sounded as if they were
43affected, but that New Zealand did not feel they were. One
respondent questioned just how much net influence could be
44brought to bear by New Zealand. These types of responses 
were common even from sectors like Agriculture and Industries 
and Commerce where successful trade arrangements were of vital 
importance. Thus, even when the opinion was expressed that a 
sector's influence was being felt abroad, the amount of that 
influence did not seem to be overestimated.
Table 19 indicates the respondents' opinions as to 
which external entities were affected by New Zealanders. A 
preliminary word may clarify some seeming discrepancy between 
the data in Table 19 and those in the preceding ones. Whereas 
only forty-three respondents believed they were influencing
^^Interview 1-3.
44Interview 1-9, Mr. W. E. B. Tucker, Director of Trade 
Policy, Department of Industries and Commerce.
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overseas entities, sixty external entities were named as being 
receptive to New Zealand efforts. The reason for this dis­
crepancy is that some sectors believed they had about an 
equal influence on several international bodies, and these 
opinions were recorded in any and all categories mentioned.
TABLE 19
PERCEIVED OVERSEAS INFLUENCE BY NEW ZEALANDERS
N=60
Nation, Organization, or 
Region Influenced N %
International Organization 15 25
Australia 13 21
United Kingdom & W. Europe 8 13
Pacific Islands 18 30
Others— Including U.S. Japan, SEA 6 10
Totals 60 99*
*Totals do not reach 100% because of rounding.
The respondents thought that outgoing influence was 
widely dispersed. No single state, region or international 
organization was thought to be the focus of influence to the 
extent New Zealanders believed they were influenced by the 
United Kingdom. Comparison with Table 16 above showed that 
37 percent of the respondents felt England's influence keenly, 
if not most intensely, while 30 percent believed the Pacific 
Islands were the most influenced by New Zealand.
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Besides being more dispersed, the outgoing influence 
was thought to be more successful in a different range of 
powers than those which brought the most influence to bear in 
New Zealand. The interviewees felt that the Pacific Islands, 
Australia, and international organizations were the most 
likely to respond favorably to influence emanating from New 
Zealand. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and Western 
Europe and the category "others" were thought to be the least 
influenced by New Zealanders. This was significant because 
it clearly pointed to the perceived inability of a small state 
to have very much influence on its larger counterparts, even 
though long cultural, linguistic, racial, and national inter­
est ties existed.
Also evident was the tendency of smaller powers to be 
restricted in influence to their own geographic region.
Whereas the respondents believed that some 61 percent of the 
linkage influence came into New Zealand from outside her im­
mediate area, some 76 percent of the perceived outgoing in­
fluence was restricted to the South Pacific region or to 
international organizations. This emphasized the relevancy 
which geography— as it affects perception— has even in the 
1970's for the lesser state. This may be contrasted to the 
global influence of the superpowers and even some secondary 
states. Small states like New Zealand can have only a 
limited range of influence and power.
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As was noted in Chapter II, small nations tend to rely 
on collective action as a means of overcoming their individual 
smallness. This type of reliance may be seen in the fact that 
nearly one-fourth of the respondents mentioned international 
organizations as an influence receiver. Such an attitude is 
understandable, especially in New Zealand's case. She has 
had one of her own. Sir Leslie Munro, serve as President of 
the United Nations General Assembly, as well as numerous other 
officers serving in influential posts for other organizations. 
Whether these types of honors have resulted in more real in­
fluence is subject to question. The fact remains that New 
Zealanders think it has.
Tables 20 and 21 provide the breakdown by category of 
the various interviewees' perceived outgoing influence. A 
fact which emerged was that certain types of New Zealand 
sectors gravitated toward certain overseas entities. This 
was not surprising since the type of service provided, the 
commodity dealt in, or the subject matter involved would 
naturally determine the linkages maintained.
It is clear from Table 21, for example, that those 
sectors which tended to feel that their influence was great­
est upon the Pacific Islands were for the most part "service" 
sectors. The Department of Education, Council of Education, 
Maori and Island Affairs Department, Statistics Department, 
Lands and Survey Department, and Council of Women are "ser­
vice" in orientation and felt in the interviews that the
TABLE 20
PERCEIVED OVERSEAS INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=60
Nation, Organization 
or Region Influenced
Gov't
Political
Parties
Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov ' t Business
N % N % N % N % N %
International Org. 8 24 0 0 4 33 2 20 0 0
Australia 8 24 0 0 3 25 1 10 2 67
United Kingdom & 
W . Europe 5 15 1 50 0 0 2 20 . 0 0
Pacific Islands 11 33 1 50 4 33 1 10 1 33
Others— Including 
U.S.A., Japan, SEA 1 3 0 0 1 9 4 40 0 0
Totals 33 9 9 * 2 100 12 100 10 100 3 100
00
ro
*Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.
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TABLE 21
PERCEIVED OVERSEAS INFLUENCE BY 
NEW ZEALAND AGENCY 
N=60
International 
Organization 
N=14 %=23
Australia 
N=14 %=23
United Kingdom 
& W. Europe 
N=8 %=12
Treasury Dept. Defense Dept. Health Dept.
Indus. & Comm. Customs Dept. Agriculture
Dept.
External Aid Lands & Survey
Div., Min. of 
For. Affairs
Dept. Audit Dept.
Prime Min. Dept.
Min. of Trans. Prime Min. Dept.
Tourist & Valuation Dept.
State Serv. Comm. Publicity Dept.
NZ Labor Party
Min. of Trans. Min. of For.
State Ins. Off.
Affairs NZ Meat Board
Dept. 
Dept, of
State Advances 
Corp.
Ombudsman
Scientific & Ind. 
Research
NZ Empl. Fed.
NZ Table Tennis
Railways Dept.
NZ Manu. Fed.
NZ Retailers Fed.
Assoc. NZ Fed. of Labor
Nat. Council NZ Council of
of Churches Education
NZ Univ. NZ Forest Prod.,
Students Assoc. Ltd.
NZ Wool Board 
NZ Dairy Board
Bank of NZ
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TABLE 21-Continued
Pacific 
Islands 
N=18 %=30
Others 
N=5 %=9
Dept. of Educ. Inland Revenue
Dept. of Labor NZ Manu. Fed.
Maori & Xsl. Aff. 
Dept.
Legislative Dept. 
Lands & Survey Dept. 
Statistics Dept.
NZ Meat Board 
Ombudsman 
NZ Wool Board 
NZ Broadcasting Co.
Min. of Works
Min. of Transportation
Tourist & Publicity 
Dept.
State Advances Corp.
Min. of For. Affairs
NZ Labor Party
NZ Manu. Fed.
NZ Rugby Football 
Union
NZ Fed. of Labor
Nat. Council of Women
NZ Council of Educ.
Bank of NZ
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developing areas near them were most receptive. None of the 
independent boards (Meat, Wool, or Dairy) fell into this 
category; in fact none of the sectors felt they had much to 
gain by sharing with this region. Benevolence and generosity 
seemed to be key reasons for association at all.
Composition of the other lists was based more on self- 
interest. For example, the list whose members thought them­
selves successful in influencing Australia had definite 
interest-oriented commodities, e.g., the Departments of De­
fense, Customs, Tourist and Publicity and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs from government, and the Manufacturers' Federation, 
Federation of Labor, Forest Products, Ltd., and Bank of New 
Zealand from the private or quasi-governmental sector.
Having treated several other facets of internation 
influence among New Zealand and her external environment, 
let us now examine New Zealanders' attitudes about the direc­
tion of influence flow. As has been clear from the data 
presented thus far, there was both inward and outward influ­
ence flow. The influence was dispersed, coming from several 
geographic areas and directed chiefly toward several geo­
graphic areas. Interviewees were asked to express their 
opinions as to whether more influence was brought to bear on 
their sectors from abroad, or whether they provided more in­
fluence to their overseas environment. This was an attempt 
to evaluate the perceived directional influence flow. Results 
from respondents are presented in Table 22. Clearly, the most
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TABLE 22
SECTORAL RESPONSE OF PERCEIVED INFLUENCE FLOW
N=66
Equal Influence 
Flow 
N=8 
%=12
More Comes 
Than Goes 
N=38 
%=58
Forest Serv. NZ Treasury Dept. Post Off. Dept.
Dept.
Defense Dept. State Advances
Inland Revenue Corp.
Service Dept of Agric.
Railways Dept.
Audit Dept. Electricity Dept.
Min. of For. Aff.
External Aid Div., Dept, of Ind. &
Min. of For. Commerce Dept, of
Affairs Scientific & Ind.
Dept, of Educ. Research
Chamber of
Commerce Gov't Printing Nat. Center Party
Office
Nat. Council NZ Manu. Fed.
of Churches Labor Dept.
NZ Retailers Fed.
Nat. Council Mines Dept.
Medical Assoc, of
NZ Council of Ed. Prime Min. Dept. NZ
Research
Lands & Survey NZ Rugby Football
Dept. Union
State Serv. Dept. NZ Table Tennis
Assoc.
Statistics Dept.
Nat. Council of
Min. of Works Women
Min. of Trans. NZ Univ. Stud.
Assoc.
Tourist & Pub.
Dept. NZ Meat Board
Min. of For. Aff. NZ Wool Board
State Ins. Off. NZ Broadcasting Co.
Vice-Chancellor's NZ Dairy Board
Comm.
NZ Forest Prod.,
Bank of NZ Ltd.
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TABLE 22-Continued
More Goes 
Than Comes 
N-10 
%=15
- ....... —
Not Certain 
N=6 
%=9
■— . .. . . . — .— ■
Negligible
Influence
N=4
%=6
' Customs Dept. Justice Dept. Crown Law Dept.
Gov't Life Ins. Police Dept. Law Drafting
Dept.
Soc. Security
Office
Healtli Dept. Dept. Public Trust 
Office
Marine Dept. NZ Labor Party
Gov't Res. Unit
Maori & Isl. Aff. 
Legis. Dept.
Soc. Credit 
League
Fed. of Labor
Valuation Dept.
NZ Employees Fed.
Ombudsman
Europa
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prevalent attitude which emerged from the table was that of 
a dominance of influence flow into New Zealand. The 58 per­
cent becomes 68 percent if the last two categories, which 
represent vague answers, are removed. When this is compared 
with the 15 percent, or 18 percent if categories four and 
five are left out, who believed that New Zealand affected 
the environment more than it affected her, the picture is 
definitely one of strongly perceived external influence and 
of weakness in the projection of New Zealand influence. What 
this may mean in terms of psychological and emotional response 
is difficult to calculate, but it is clear that they did not 
feel capable of influencing their environment very strongly.
A minority of the respondents felt differently. Ap­
proximately one-fourth of the interviewees thought the influ­
ence flow to be either balanced or to flow outward more than 
inward. Such a minority was to be expected in a developed 
small country in a region with underdeveloped small countries.
From Table 23 several additional observations may be 
proffered. In all categories except that of political 
parties, where the totals were too small to be of real sig­
nificance, the influence flow was perceived to be inward 
rather than outward. Having already noted the extreme impor­
tance of agricultural overseas trade to New Zealand, it is 
significant to note that the Departments of Agriculture and 
Industries and Commerce, and the Meat, Dairy, and Wool 
Boards, all felt that more influence "comes than goes." In
TABLE 23
PERCEIVED DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCE FLOW BY CATEGORY
N=66
Response
Gov't
Pol. 
Parties
Private
Groups
Quasi- 
Gov' t Business Total
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Equal Influence 
Flow 4 10 0 0 3 24 1 14.3 0 0 8 12
More Comes 
Than Goes 23 56 1 33 7 58.3 5 71.4 2 67 38 58
More Goes 
Than Comes 7 17 0 0 1 8.3 1 14.3 1 33 10 15
Not Certain 3 7 2 67 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 6 9
Negligible 4 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6
Totals 41 100 3 100 12 99.9 7 100 3 100 66 100
CO
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this particularly important area of the national economy
representatives from several of these agencies gave revealing
comments. An example would be that of Mr. John B. Quigg of
Agriculture when he stated in response to queries on influ-
45ence flow, "We follow rather than lead."
Overall, the picture is one of New Zealand as an ob­
ject of perceived influence. This supports propositions 1:15, 
2:3, 3:3, and 4:1, all of which posit that small states are to 
a great extent "dependent" on external nations, organizations 
and agencies.
Overseas Travel, Training, and Immigration
Other indicators of external linkage were the direct 
contacts gained by virtue of overseas travel and training.
It was not expected that the overseas travel would in any 
sense be equal to the total linkages, but it did represent 
one additional type of link. As such, the following data 
were gathered which show the level of travel which was found, 
and also demonstrate the degree to which a large percentage 
of New Zealand sectors do send trainees abroad.
About one-fourth of the sectors queried reported no 
overseas training. Nearly one-half sent only an occasional 
trainee abroad. The other one-quarter showed a regular and 
frequent use of training facilities in other countries. 
Perhaps the significant fact to recall is that nearly
45In te rv ie w  1 -3 .
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TABLE 24
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL RECEIVING 
OVERSEAS TRAINING (N=66)
Response N %
None 17 26
Very few 32 48
Quite a few 9 14
High Percentage 4 6
Most of Sector 4 6
Totals 66 100
three-fourths of the sectors did send personnel overseas for 
training. The sectors which fell at the two extremes, that 
of no overseas training and that of "most of sector," were 
predictable. Examples of sectors utilizing no training 
facilities abroad included the Government Printing Office, 
Statistics Department, the National Center Party, and the 
New Zealand Manufacturers Federation. Those reporting that 
most of their sector received training abroad were the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which made overseas training 
almost a prerequisite for hiring, the Medical Association of 
New Zealand, an estimated 95 percent of whose members go 
abroad for at least some of their trai n i n g . T h e National
46 In te rv ie w  3 -4 .
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Council, and the Council of Educational Research.
When asked if officials make overseas visits, sixty 
of the sixty-five respondents replied affirmatively. Of 
course, most sectoral visits were by the top officials, but 
the 92 percent figure was impressive nonetheless. Some of 
the sectors reported only infrequent trips, while others had 
continual traffic abroad. The breakdown of travel by fre­
quency is given in Table 25.
TABLE 25
FREQUENCY OF OVERSEAS TRAVEL 
N=59
Reported Overseas Visits ■ N %
Rare 12 20.3
Occasionally 20 33.9
Often 22 37.3
Continuously 5 8.5
Totals 59 100
Government respondents followed pretty closely the aggregate 
percentages. Business and quasi-governmental sectors 
exhibited the greatest tendency toward travel, and the 
political parties made the fewest trips. All five sectors
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which reported continuous overseas travel were from the 
(government, i.e., Department of Agriculture, Department of
Industries and Commerce, Maori and Island Affairs Depart-
i
ment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research.
This means that there was nearly universal overseas 
travel on sectoral business among respondents. Also, a sig­
nificant number of New Zealand agencies and departments re­
lied on overseas training, whether by other countries or 
through international organizations. Influence most certainly 
was transmitted through these media, though measurement of 
such was not attempted.
IV. Conclusions
More extensive conclusory remarks are offered in 
Chapter IV, but a few brief comments are in order here. New 
Zealand maintained a multiplicity of linkages to her regional 
and worldwide environment. These links included all types of 
official and unofficial ties, from international organization 
memberships to close personal friendships. Examples of two 
extremes in linkages would be the official relations main­
tained by the Department of Labor with the International 
Labor Organization in Geneva, and, in contrast, the friendly 
but private links maintained by the much respected New 
Zealand Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, who reported no official 
ties. In between were a variety of combinations of official
194
and unofficial links. These bound New Zealand very closely 
to her external world.
New Zealand's professed need for overseas participa­
tion in trade and security matters rendered these links a 
very important, if frequently intangible, part of her eco­
nomic, social, and military welfare. Due to this fact of 
life there was a healthy awareness among key sectors of the 
need to guard, extend, and nurture these links. The verity 
of the foregoing was not lessened by those New Zealanders 
who failed to see the need for extensive international in­
volvement, and who would, presumably, seek an isolation akin 
to that of Imperial China during the Manchu Dynasty.
Such a need will continue to exist as long as small­
ness of a society, economy, and military establishment con­
tinue to be of importance in national development. Small 
size dictates a borrower's life style, and New Zealand will 
never be a relatively larger nation than she is now. Thus, 
one may reasonably expect to see increasing attention paid 
to linkages, rather than the reverse. A policy of establish­
ing a greater variety of ties has been adopted by the govern­
ment and will probably be followed by private groups.
New Zealand's past heavy reliance on linkages will 
not change in intensity, only in direction. There is a 
noticeable shift in interest from Western Europe toward the 
Pacific Basin. Countries in the latter region seem to hold 
the best chance of replacing the European trade links, and
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perhaps even the strong emotional links to British culture 
and tradition. This will require time to assess accurately. 
What seems most certain is that New Zealand will continue to 
have its life and development conditioned by the links it 
maintains to overseas entities.
CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Introduction 
Small nation foreign policy and the concept of 
"linkages" have been brought together for the first time in 
the foregoing pages. Hopefully, this effort will prove to 
be preliminary to further similar works, as the combination 
of subject and method appears to yield pertinent information. 
As conclusions have been drawn throughout the paper on a 
topic-by-topic basis, it is the intention here to minimize 
redundancy and evaluate the overall project as succinctly as 
possible. In so doing, two basic aims are pursued.
First, pertinent evaluation of both the research 
methods employed and the resultant data is undertaken. In­
cluded is an assessment of the entire topic of small nation 
foreign policy theory. Also, the "linkage" concept receives 
some final comment as a tool for research. Reflection on 
the writer's method of information gathering and processing 
leads to some suggestions for future possibilities of link­
age research. These evaluative remarks attempt to assay the 
"macro-analytic" portions of the total project.
Additional remarks are also directed toward the con­
clusions which can be drawn relative to the New Zealand case
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study. Extended comments beyond those found in Chapter III, 
are offered to juxtapose more thoroughly the historical pos­
ture of the Wellington government over the thirty-two propo­
sitions presented in Chapter II as a "pre-theory." This 
portion of the final chapter treats the "micro-analytic" 
side of the project in as specific a way as possible, given 
the nature of the study.
II. Research Evaluation 
The current project has involved implementing several 
research techniques not previously tried conjunctively. 
Basically two assumptions have been taken and tested with 
varying degrees of success. The two premises are; small 
nations and their foreign policies constitute a unique field 
of study as distinguished from larger counterparts, and by 
understanding the links which are maintained by the lesser 
powers one may explain to a great extent the motivations for 
their external policies. Each of these statements deserves 
separate treatment before some critical comments are offered 
relative to the writer's methodology in testing them.
Small Nation Theory
While small nations still are not universally accepted 
as a distinct class of states among the entire academic com­
munity, its reception by some has proceeded apace since the 
first chapter of this paper was written some months ago.
The best evidence of this is to be found in the scholarly
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works which have appeared recently, each accepting the
uniqueness of the lesser power. Included in a growing
bibliography is another book by David Vital, The Survival
of Small States, which examines three case studies, each of
which analyzes a situation of weak power-great power con- 
1
flict. The author in this volume, as his first on the sub­
ject, was still preoccupied with security threats, a problem 
which is not major for many small nations.
Another recent book. Small States in International 
Relations, edited by August Schou and Arne Olaf Brundtland,
brings together papers presented at the Seventeenth Nobel
2
Sumposium in 1970. It contains selections from a represen­
tative group of large and small state scholars and statesmen. 
Treated are such topics as the role of small nations in al­
liances, their potential for conflict resolution, and their 
actions in international organizations.
In addition to the foregoing there have been a number 
of related books which treat various world regions in which 
weak states are prominent. An example is Patterns of Foreign 
Influence in the Caribbean, edited by Emanuel de Kadt.^ This 
collection was based on the assumption that size and limited
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1971). Case 
studies include Israel, Finland, and Czechoslovakia in recent 
power confrontations.
^(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971).
^(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
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resources were the common denominators of the countries of 
the West Indies and that their dependency upon larger, more 
powerful nations gave each a similar foreign policy outlook.
Articles also have been appearing in increasing num­
bers. Two of the more pertinent recent ones are Jorge I. 
Dominguez' "Mice That Do Not Roar," and Wu Yuan-li's "Plan-
4
ning Security for a Small Nation." These are only a few of 
a considerable number of scholarly analyses which take as 
their central theme the "weak" state.
Graduate schools and research institutes are also pro­
ducing material which treats the present subject. A disser­
tation was completed by Vaughan A. Lewis entitled "The 
Structure of Small State Behavior in Contemporary Interna­
tional Politics" at Jamaica, West Indies, in 1971.^ Jean K. 
Laux presented a paper at the International Studies Associa­
tion meeting (March, 1971) in San Juan, Puerto Rico, entitled 
"Small States and Inter-European Relations."^ Other works
4
Jorge I. Dominguez, "Mice That Do Not Roar," Inter­
national Organization, XXV (Spring, 1971), pp. 175-208; Wu 
Yuan-li, "Planning Security for a Small Nation," Pacific 
Community, III (July, 1972), pp. 661-674.
5
Vaughan A. Lewis, "The Structure of Small State Be­
havior in Contemporary International Politics," (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Jamaica, W. I., 1971).
®Jean Kirk Laux, "Small States and Inter-European 
Relations: An Analysis of the Nine," a paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 
(San Juan, Puerto Rico: mimeo, 1971).
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have appeared on related topics such as micro-states and
7
small territories.
While the foregoing list is neither exhaustive nor 
long, it does show that the concept of the small nation as 
a distinct entity is being increasingly accepted in the pro­
fession. Country studies have appeared on a number of indi­
vidual states which would further lengthen the listing, but 
that is not necessary. That the identity of the lesser 
powers is being respected and widely studied as something 
different than the large power demonstrates the acceptability 
and utility of one of the writer's premises.
Linkage Concept
The other basic premise of this project, i.e., that 
linkages provide a clue, if not a key, to understanding the 
external relations of the smaller states, has also been re­
ceiving some attention and testing in recent months. James 
N. Rosenau, the formulator and articulator of the general 
theory, has personally undertaken to analyze the usefulness 
of the linkage concept. He found a mixed picture. In a 
paper presented to the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association he noted the early criticisms 
which had been levelled at the concept after its initial 
christening in 1966. After recalling some valid and some
For example, George L. Reid, "Linkage Theory in 
Application to Micro-States," a dissertation prospectus 
(Southhampton: mimeo, 1970); also, Jacques Rapaport, Ernest
Muteba, and Joseph Therattil, Small States and Territories: 
Status and Problems (New York: Arno Press, 1971).
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excessive beratings, he mentioned that the concept had not
g
died. He then proceeded to list a number of articles, 
graduate theses, and books which had utilized the linkage 
concept in some way. The list is diverse and quite lengthy, 
and while acceptance and use should not alone accredit such 
an approach, the linkage idea must be acknowledged as an 
interest stimulator.
In rethinking this project, the linkage concept brought 
the national-international contact points into focus for the 
writer, a main object of international relations study for 
several years. However, identifying phenomena and finding 
ways to successfully study them are quite different procedures. 
Rosenau's book Linkage Politics provided some usable ideas as 
to how interactions could be isolated and studied; still, to 
suggest that the value of linkage theory could be judged on 
one project is unreasonable. More time and studies are needed 
before assessment of the linkage idea can be fairly undertaken.
A strong advantage of the approach has been the variety 
of methods which may and have been used in researching linkages, 
Methods of some early works, e.g., those in the volume Linkage 
Politics, have been expanded and extended. Rosenau notes that 
one characteristic of linkage studies has been the "readiness
g
James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage
Politics Revisited," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association (Chicago: mimeo,
1971), p. 17.
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of their authors to tailor the original framework to the
9
specific foci of their research."
Another characteristic of linkage studies, according 
to Rosenau, has been the tendency of authors to use it to 
explain "hierarchical p h e n o m e n a . T h i s  observation vin­
dicates in some ways the joint use of small nation theory 
and linkage theory in this paper. Most of the studies have 
involved linkages between large powers and neighboring in­
ferior powers. Rosenau feels that this trend is normal, but 
hopes a shift in interest will occur to bring about analyses 
which treat equally ranked states. Nevertheless, the relat­
ing of unequal national entit ies has laid the groundwork for 
further work in the field.
Review of Methodology
In assessing the methods used for gathering and pro­
cessing the data used in Chapters II and III several impres­
sions linger. Generally, these relate to some ideas 
concerning the value of joining the small state concept with 
the linkage concept, the pros and cons of the questionnaire 
used, the analysis of New Zealand responses, and the future 
prospects for this type of research. Briefly and sequentially, 
these impressions follow.
As previously noted, most linkage studies have focused 
upon unequal states. This is not surprising because the ties
Q
Rosenau, "Theorizing Across . . . ," p. 19. 
^^Rosenau, "Theorizing Across . . . ," p. 18.
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ties between a large and a smaller nation are more easily 
recognizable. Linkages between two large entities inherently 
leave more latitude for mutual maneuverability because of the 
greater independence of each power.
Assuming that the pre-theory outlined above has 
validity, it points to the fewer policy alternatives which 
small states possess. Large states generally have more 
policy options by virtue of their wider linkage contacts, at 
least a partial result of their greater magnitude. When two 
large nations engage in negotiation on trade, security, or 
other matters, the larger number of alternatives open leaves 
the researcher with problems of tracking down such options 
and verifying them. More importantly, many contacts made by 
larger states with each other may remain unknown because of 
the still prevalent use of secret diplomacy. Such a situa­
tion is less likely between unequal nations where the stakes 
are not as great for the large power. Thus, part of the rea­
son for combining the study of linkage politics and small 
state foreign policy lies in the ease with which they com­
plement one another.
Secondly, the greater dependency of the small nation 
makes the study of its connections to outside entities rea­
sonable. An understanding of the lifeline which helps to 
sustain a lesser power provides many answers to the behavior 
patterns and policies pursued by the state. It thus seems
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that the linkage politics concept fits the small state case 
study approach better than the large state.
New Zealand was particularly well suited for linkage 
research of the type conducted. Survey methods were well re­
ceived and produced quite satisfactory results. Being a 
dependent state, the study of ties to overseas entities was 
revealing and in most cases followed the pre-theory proposi­
tions . Some contrary examples are noted later in this 
chapter. All things considered, the use of tlie linkage con­
cept with the small state provided a productive project.
As for the research instrument, several impressions 
remain. There were advantages and disadvantages in the 
questionnaire utilized. One advantage was its ability to 
evoke a wide range of response. With open-ended questions, 
the respondents often gave very lengthy and rambling opinions, 
some of the most valuable data resulting from remarks which 
might have been by-passed in a tool eliciting more specific 
answers. A further plus was the personal contact afforded 
the interviewer with a variety of sectors in the host 
country. This would have been lost to a great extent in a 
mail survey or a more structured questionnaire which offered 
less editorializing on the part of respondents.
However, with the advantages were some drawbacks. For 
example, some of the opinions lacked the clarity one would 
desire, despite efforts of the interviewer to seek qualifica­
tion and clarification. Whereas the open-end questions
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encouraged candor and freedom, they often resulted in 
answers which left a considerable burden on the interviewer 
in evaluating responses. This added a higher degree of sub­
jectivity than might have been attained with a more specific 
questionnaire. In partial justification for the subjective 
character of the data, to the writer's knowledge this was 
the first survey research attempted on linkages. If future 
similar attempts probe a common source, the open-end question 
could be combined with more specific response options to em­
ploy the best aspects of both questionnaire types.
National character and culture inevitably have some 
effect on this type of research. The degree to which such 
factors might alter the results of a questionnaire are dif­
ficult to establish. Also, the possible effect which cul­
tural uniqueness might have on respondents' data is not a 
topic encompassed within the purview of this project. Never­
theless several considerations which relate to New Zealand's 
special outlook bear review.
New Zealanders tend to be either overly apologetic 
or excessively boastful for their country and the ways of its 
people. David Ausubel noted this and felt that the under­
selling was usually with the idea that the visitor would 
object to some self-inflicted slights.Another character­
istic of respondents in the study was their stati as high
^^David P. Ausubel, The Fern . . . , p . 25.
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government bureaucrats or successful private citizens. While 
their positions rendered them the logical authorities to 
speak for their departments, it nevertheless colored the out­
look they had for the questionnaire. A further factor was 
that a small number of the interviewees were actually immi­
grants from other countries. There were several from other 
Commonwealth countries and even one from eastern Europe.
These represented a scant minority and should not be over­
emphasized. What significance these factors had for the data 
results is not clear. In the context of western democratic 
research. New Zealand opinion is probably very little differ­
ent, as far as analysis goes, from opinion in France, the 
United Kingdom, or Canada.
Future prospects for this type of study appear bright. 
The cautionings of Rosenau do not seem to represent insur­
mountable problems as several possible directions could be 
profitably pursued in trying to diminish the objectionable 
and disappointing aspects. Group research would open the 
possibility of gathering much more data. There were times 
during the data gathering stages of this project when addi­
tional manpower would have been helpful. Also, the chance 
for continual interchange and sharing of ideas during the 
planning and research stages would have been beneficial. 
Ability to gather and process a greater amount of data would 
enhance the linkage concept as it has been applied thus far.
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More sophisticated quantitative tools also could 
benefit this type of research. No claim was made in this 
project for a high level of data processing expertise or 
sophistication. It was intended to probe the possibility 
for further similar efforts, and it is conceivable that 
statistical and cybernetical methods could be applied to 
small nation linkage research to bring out variables with 
greater clarity and meaning.
To fill one of the lacunae in linkage research, indi­
cated by Rosenau, some future studies should focus on states 
of fairly equal status and power. Developing countries offer 
a good opportunity for this type of research, and the com­
parative dimension could be added. To date none of the link­
age studies have seriously attempted to integrate the approach 
with other newer methods of comparative politics. This could 
provide some of the older, tested tools with new data options, 
and would provide linkage theory a chance for maturation.
Summarily, there are several ways in which the small 
nation and linkage concepts could be extended profitably. 
Results of research thus far has been mixed. The future di­
rection will depend on two factors; first, how fruitful the 
joining of small state studies with linkage research proves 
to be/ and second, how well these methods can dovetail with 
older, more established tools.
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III. New Zealand and the Pre-Theory
The essential uniqueness of each nation-state hardly 
needs to be argued. Despite the rapid increase of indepen­
dent states since World War II to a total of around 150, 
there are still vast differences which distinguish each 
country from all the rest. This is certainly true with 
reference to New Zealand. What this means, among other 
things, is that each state must be individually analyzed if 
the pre-theory of Chapter II is to be tested.
General historical statements were related in the 
early sections of the previous chapter. However, no system­
atic attempt was made to treat New Zealand as a prototypal 
small state and to juxtapose it against the propositions 
stated. An assessment of New Zealand foreign policy in light 
of the thirty-two statements of the pre-theory may show how 
the pre-theory can be applied to such states. Examination 
of the propositions will be in the order presented in Chapter 
II and reproduced in Appendix E. As widely differing opinions 
exist among the citizenry of this small country on various as­
pects of its culture and politics, the writer has used his 
perspective in presenting the major differences. Wherever 
possible, judgments are made as to which body of opinion most 
nearly represents government and/or popular opinion.
Four basic areas of propositions are treated in the 
pre-theory: general security and diplomacy, economic,
psychological, and linkage. Before summarizing the total
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picture, a brief discussion of each area separately is in 
order.
General Security and Diplomatic
By far the largest number of hypotheses are posited 
on various aspects of this topic. For purposes of organiza­
tion, the total number of propositions can be grouped into 
four sub-groups: (a) general, (b) geographic, (c) diplomatic
and military, and (d) international organization participa­
tion .
(a) General security is said to dominate foreign
policy considerations for small states. This point would be
questioned by many citizens in New Zealand. There tends to
be a feeling that there is safety in isolation among many
citizens, a feeling that the world is largely by-passing
their insular and remote land. However, this feeling is not
shared by those in government whose responsibility is to
maintain New Zealand's position in the world community.
Mr. Dennis McClain of the Defense Department noted in private
conversation that there is no apathy among his colleagues on
12the topic of security. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs conveyed the same interest in preserving the external 
position of New Zealand. In general hypotheses 1:1 was sup­
ported by the attitudes of the government officials inter­
viewed.
12 In te rv ie w  1 -2 .
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Hypothesis 1:2 is more difficult to assess in 
reference to New Zealand. The thesis is that due to the im­
portance of security affairs, the foreign policy of the na­
tion receives at times more attention and is thought to be 
more important than domestic policy. Foreign policy does 
get a great deal of notice from the populace. Being small, 
a vast majority of what takes place in the world happens 
outside her borders. However, there is a strong tendency 
toward introversion, certainly not an unusual circumstance 
among nations. The outside perspective is strongly colored 
by Commonwealth events which are a tie to tradition. Basic­
ally, though, the New Zealand citizenry seem more preoccupied 
with internal concerns than with foreign policy, thus consti­
tuting a situation that would seem to contradict the second 
proposition. However, the hypothesis referred to, and the 
interview data, reflected opinions of decision makers, not 
of "public opinion." As applied to the former, the statement 
has more validity.
The third statement in the pre-theory cannot be 
definitely assessed for New Zealand. It posits that certain 
questions relating to security assume greater importance for 
small than large states. Since security is of utmost import 
to most nations, since the ability to judge such a factor is 
lacking, and since no data was available from a contrasting 
large state, the question is impossible to decide. It is 
interesting to note the plans announced by officials of the
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United Arab Republic and Libya to unite, resulting in the 
swallowing up of the smaller power. This would seem to in­
dicate that some small states do not hold sovereignty to be 
as valuable as others. Contrariwise, New Zealand has re­
sisted proposals to federate with Australia. Of course 
neither the UAR case nor the New Zealand-Australia case in­
volve threats to security, only to continuation of sover­
eignty in a historical sense.
Proposition 1:4 alleges that the small state will seek 
outside assistance to help maintain her sovereignty. This 
has been true of New Zealand. Founded as a colonial off­
shoot of Great Britain, there was no rush to independence; 
then after independence there was the tendency to remain 
close to London for cues in foreign and military policies. 
Although the New Zealand government has realigned itself 
since World War II with Pacific basin powers (Australia and 
the United States), Wellington's security policies have al­
ways been alignment oriented.
The fifth statement summarizes the policy goals of all 
states, large or small. National leaders tend to pursue 
postures that will befit their abilities, whether that means 
alignment or nonalignment. Proposition 1:6 is supported by 
New Zealand and relates to the previous one. It notes the 
tendency of developed small states to align and the opposite 
trend of underdeveloped small states to remain neutral. The
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national interest perspective dictates this, and the 
respective positions of the older and newer states is under­
standable.
Other hypotheses of a general security character are 
those numbered 1:13-1:16. The first of these notes the nar­
rower perspective with which small state governments, as 
contrasted with large, view their environment, a point which 
is undeniably true. New Zealand policies are definitely in 
line with proposition 1:14 as Wellington's foreign policy 
actions tend to be focused more in a single region than a 
major power's actions. This has been shown in security mat­
ters since the Second World War as the United States and 
Australia have assumed the role of the most important allies 
replacing the United Kingdom. Likewise in trade. Pacific 
basin partners are being developed rapidly, even though 
Western Europe still is a major patron.
Proposition 1:15 defies easy verification for New 
Zealand. It is difficult to determine whether a given small 
state is more dependent than a given large state; however, 
the context of the proposition found in Chapter II provides 
explanation for such a statement. In New Zealand's situation 
the dependence on others for security and trade are such that 
there is little reason to call into question the hypothesis
The final general hypothesis, i.e., 1:16, alleges that 
small states must pursue negative foreign policies because of
^^See page 68.
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their inability to take the offensive. Although New Zealand 
has positive programs in aid and certain nonpolitical areas, 
with reference to general defense and security matters this 
proposition is supported by her experience. To date there 
has not arisen an instance where positive unilateral actions 
were necessary, and it is hard to imagine what circumstances 
would present such an opportunity. If such an occasion pre­
sented itself. New Zealand would hardly be effective against 
any but her small island neighbors. From hardware and logis­
tical standpoints she would be very limited.
(b) Fortunately, geography provides a very comfortable 
surrounding environment for the Wellington government and 
her people. The nearest neighbor of any size is Australia, 
a friendly Commonwealth state some 1200 miles to the west. 
When this type of isolation is compared with the position of 
Switzerland, Finland, or Libya, the advantages of New 
Zealand's position are obvious. Thus, as well as any other 
small power. New Zealand supports the proposition (1:7) that 
geographical factors such as insularity, position, and acces­
sibility are still vital for the lesser powers.
Of course, what is advantageous in security terms be­
comes disadvantageous in commercial terms. Being small and 
relying on trade. New Zealand must pay shipping costs on 
goods coming into and going out of the country, and competi­
tion with states located closer to trade routes is therefore 
more difficult.
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(c) In diplomatie and military affairs a small power 
is at an obvious disadvantage to large states. Disparities 
of manpower, industrial capability, and intelligence all 
are present to some degree in big power-small power relation­
ships. New Zealand being a developed nation could certainly 
compete against a large power better than most underdeveloped 
states of similar size. Still, there would be little chance 
of victory for Wellington against a larger state.
Diplomatically, New Zealand does not attempt to main­
tain high commissions and/or consulates in all nations of the 
world or even in all of the most important ones. Much of the 
routine diplomacy with smaller powers is handled by the British 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the efficiency of New 
Zealand's diplomatic corps, it will always be limited in man­
power; general experience supports propositions 1:8 and 1:9.
Lack of size and an innocuous nature have provided at 
times good opportunity for overseas political leadership, 
thus adding weight to hypothesis 1:10. New Zealand's lead 
in various international organizations has been widely recog­
nized. As a small member of the world community. New Zealand 
has been able to lead in assisting development of other small 
but underdeveloped countries, a role which might be denied 
a larger power because of unallayed suspicions.
Hypothesis 1:11 posits an inferior position militarily 
and diplomatically for the foreseeable future. With the
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resources available to it, it is difficult to imagine the 
Wellington government opting for a high priority military 
development program. The only proven shortcut that could 
drastically alter New Zealand's weakness would be an effort 
to acquire a nuclear capability. Given the smallness and 
remoteness of the country, her alignment with the United 
States, and the feeling of the government and people, such 
a possibility is remote. If asked to reply to the question 
of perpetual military weakness for the foreseeable future, 
the average New Zealander would probably respond, "Who 
cares?" New Zealand's prospects, as well as past experience, 
support the proposition (1:11).
The last of the diplomatic and military hypotheses 
(1:12) alleges that small states possess a tenuous character 
resulting from their inability to defend themselves against 
security incursions. For New Zealand, there is not enough 
evidence to fully support or refute this statement. Presently, 
there appear no contingencies which would threaten the con­
tinued existence of the small insular nation. However,
Japanese submarines prowled her coasts early in the Second 
World War, and alert conditions similar to those implemented 
along the west coast of North America were affected. It would 
be unwise to discount totally the possibility of any future 
wars which might threaten to disrupt New Zealand's quietude, 
but from our 1973 vantage point the future does not appear to 
hold imminent military peril.
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(d) New Zealand has been an active participant and 
supporter of a variety of international organizations, a 
position very much in line with the first proposition on 
this topic (1:17). Particularly since World War II there 
has existed a firm commitment to the principles espoused by 
the major world and regional organizations. Proposition 
1:18 reports small nation attitudes in these groupings as 
being opposed to some large state practices such as colonial­
ism, military development, and economic imperialism. New 
Zealand's stand in this type of organization has been very 
consistent with these stands. Wellington's key platform 
has been in promoting the relaxation of trade barriers, a 
policy which would obviously suit New Zealand's national in­
terest and which adds support to hypothesis 1:19. Thus far, 
small nations have not been very effective as go-betweens 
and mediators. Individuals from lesser powers, such as Dag 
Hammarskjald and U Thant, have experienced some success in 
negotiating disputes, but as a bloc, weak states possess 
neither the cohesiveness nor the mutuality of interest to be 
effective as a counter to major powers. New Zealand has been 
very typical in this regard. Interestingly, small states 
tend to cooperate with and support large states, rather than 
acting together.
Economic Policies
New Zealand benefitted from the years of tutelage as 
a British colony. It, therefore, avoided many of the growing
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pains of developing nations in economic matters. Nevertheless, 
the future offers possibly the greatest challenge of New 
Zealand's national life. As the United Kingdom has entered 
the European Economic Community, Wellington has had to search 
for supplemental outlets for its products to replace the 
diminishing British market. This has.placed considerable 
strain on an economy which has typically lived with a fairly 
fragile balance of trade.
In regards to proposition 2:1, New Zealand experience 
supports the assertion that economic vulnerability is part 
and parcel of being small. The international trade system 
has not been particularly congenial, with quotas often limit­
ing the amount of imports a given country will accept. During 
the years the British entry into the Common Market was being 
negotiated, New Zealand worriedly, and even frantically, tried 
to protect its single most important trade outlet. Yet, there 
was not a great deal that could be done to alter the final 
outcome. There is a very real economic vulnerability which 
is not always tangibly evident.
Hypothesis 2:2, positing the marginal character of 
small state economies, cannot be supported by the New Zealand 
experience. Pressures are persistent, but one could not say 
objectively that their economy was functioning near the limits 
of viability. Indeed, if all nations used their economic 
potential to the degree Wellington does, the average standard 
of living would rise quickly. Smallness will always be
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present/ b ut the New Zealanders have learned how to cope 
with its economic p r o blems.
Geographical location and lack of key resources make 
dependence on trade a fact of economic life. With numerous 
overseas trade contacts, the New Zealand government and busi­
ness community must be apprized of economic trends in other 
areas of the globe, a condition which supports proposition 
2:3. The writer recalls an interview with two Bank of New 
Zealand executives the afternoon after the Deutsch-mark was 
floated on the international monetary market in early May, 
1971. There was concern, caution, and a protectiveness of 
New Zealand's position— a posture which typifies the atti­
tude necessary among all states, but which is more intensely 
felt by the small country.
As noted above. New Zealand is active in international 
organizations, particularly in regard to economic unions such 
as the General Agreements on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Beyond these multilateral associations. New Zealand works 
toward effecting more relaxed trade barriers. Her experience 
strongly supports proposition 2:4.
Generally, New Zealand possesses similar economic 
characteristics to other smaller developed states. She has 
made the most of her assets, but because of the size and 
character of her economy she will continue to feel pressure 
to a greater extent than the average large power.
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Psychological and Emotional Characteristics
From the data gathered in the research project and 
from numerous conversations informally, hypothesis 3:1 seems 
to be supported by New Zealand culture. This project was 
not designed to elicit responses which would measure psycho­
logical and/or emotional characteristics of New Zealanders.
Yet in responding to the prepared questionnaire, many respon­
dents volunteered comments on their country's smallness and 
ineptitude. Though unsolicited, these comments revealed a 
great deal about the national self-perception of the citizenry.
Most of the respondents noted the smallness of their 
country. Mr. John B. Quigg, in the Department of Agriculture, 
described his land as a "small fish in a big sea. Several 
interviewees noted the "brain drain" problem which affects 
many small states; others mentioned "remoteness" as being a 
factor in New Zealand's overseas dealings.Although the 
author has no other experience living in a small state, the 
outlook of New Zealanders stands in contrast to the American 
view which generally seems to be one of greater control of 
its circumstances.
Proposition 3:2 was unverifiable on the basis of this 
study as it pertained to the comparatively different views
14Interview 1-3.
15See, for example, interview 1-22 with Mr. Ian Clark 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and interview 1-24 with 
Mr. Nelson, then the Secretary to the Prime Minister.
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held by underdeveloped and developed lesser nations. However, 
the next statement, hypothesis 3:3, relates to material in 
the preceding paragraph, i.e., the perceived ability of 
smaller powers to determine their own destiny. Politically, 
the New Zealanders are confident that their sovereignty is 
not now, nor is likely to be, threatened. Economically there 
is uncertainty. The persistent necessity to export large 
quantities of agricultural goods causes New Zealand to be in 
constant search for markets. Also, some interviewees noted 
their own dependence on overseas technology. For example,
Mr. L. G. Crawford of the Railways Department indicated that 
there was no fundamental research being done by his sector.
In view of such reports it is not surprising that doubts 
persist as to how much could be done to alter the condition 
of the country if faced by challenges to their well-being.
On the subject of proposition 3:4, i.e., the attitude 
assumed by small nations toward their plight. New Zealand 
opinions add support. There is seen some ambivalence of the 
type noted in the hypothesis, but a fairly large number of 
respondents recognized their national smallness and accepted 
the implications thereof. There was scarcely an attempt to 
magnify the admittedly slight role played by New Zealand on 
the world stage. In fact, many New Zealanders expressed 
derision toward the Australians for their alleged attempts 
to act like a larger power. However, tendencies to moralize
^^ In te rv iew  1 -37 .
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exist. Some assumed a status of superiority even while 
conceding that a powerful role is denied them. The fact re­
mains that their metaphysical outlook differs from that of 
large states' citizens.
Linkages and New Zealand
Chapter III dealt extensively with the linkages of New 
Zealand, and little need be added here. Several observations 
bear repeating and expanding. In line with hypothesis 4:1,
New . Zealand relies more strongly on its external ties than 
most larger states do. There is less ability to produce 
needed goods, less chance of standing alone than for a nation 
such as the Soviet Union, France, or Italy. New Zealand de­
pends on links for her livelihood economically and, to a 
lesser extent, politically.
Hypothesis 4:2, which posits that more links exist in 
developed than underdeveloped countries, cannot be verified 
or disproved by the current study. There was no research in 
the latter type nation with which to compare New Zealand data.
As to the linkage partners. New Zealand's case study 
supports the third statement which posits that small states 
tend to trade and ally with large states rather than with 
their own kind. Most of those perceived as leading influ­
encera of New Zealand policy were large states, as was brought 
out in ttie previous Chapter III. Australia was the only 
nation from the category of small nations which figured
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prominently in New Zealand linkages. Proposition 4:3 is 
strongly supported by New Zealand experience.
The fourth hypothesis concerning links (4:4) posits 
that more inputs from the environment tend to affect small 
states than outputs from small states affect the environment. 
By practically any standard of measurement, including the 
opinions of her own citizenry, New Zealand absorbs a greater 
amount of influence than it exudes. This is the normal status 
for the small nation.
Finally, the current study supports the supposition 
that linkages provide an indication of the lesser power's 
ability to survive (4:5). The New Zealand picture is one of 
dependence, one in which she must seek friendly assistance 
from larger neighbors in order to maintain development at the 
desired level. New Zealand is a borrower in most fields, even 
though her original accomplishments should not be minimized 
or discounted. Again, size considerations severely limit her 
ability to stand alone and plan a course independent of large 
states.
In summary. New Zealand's foreign policy lends firm 
support to the pre-theory in all major areas. Table 26 shows 
the results of the research as it related to the thirty-two 
hypotheses. The most striking feature is the lone proposition 
of the pre-theory which was not supported by New Zealand's 
experience. Hypothesis 2:2 which posits a perpetually 
precarious economic position for the lesser state, is not
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TABLE 26
NEW ZEALAND AND THE PRE-THEORY 
N=32
New Zealand Experience N %
Agrees with pre-theory 27 84
Disagrees with pre-theory 1 3
Insufficient data 4 13
Total 32 100
applicable to New Zealand. Though small, the economy has 
learned to cope with the problems of remoteness and with its 
essentially lopsided character. There are no verifiable signs 
that imminent collapse is a serious possibility. Four of the 
propositions related to the comparative positions of small 
developed and underdeveloped states. Since there were no 
data available from less developed countries, comparison was
impossible
By far the most significant point is the degree to 
which the data agree with the pre-theory of Chapter II. What 
is now needed is similar studies which would provide comparable 
data to that gathered in this venture. It would be particularly 
profitable to assess the differences which supposedly would 
exist between developed and underdeveloped states. There is 
much work which still needs to be done before the preliminary
224
statements of this project can be accepted or rejected. It 
is hoped that such efforts will be forthcoming.
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Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations 
As of September, 1969, With Supplementary 
___________Data Through January 1, 1970____________
Countries of under 10 million: 
Communist (UN Members)
Alphabetically and Non-
Country Population GNP (1967)
GNP Per 
Capita
1 . Austria 7,349,000 (1968E) $ 8.86 bill. $1 ,210.00
2 . Barbados 235,000 (19 68E) $105 mill. $ 420.00
3. Belgium 9,619,000 (1968E) $ 16.67 bill. $1 ,740.00
4. Bolivia 4,680,000 (1968E) $645 mill. $ 170.00
5. Botswana 611,000 (1968E) $534 mill. $ 90.00
6 . Burundi 3,500,000 (1968E) $165 mill. $ 50.00
7. Cambodia 6,557,000 (1968E) $835 mill. $ 130.00
8 . Cameroon 5 ,562,000 (1968E) $710 mill. $ 130.00
9. Central
African
Republic 1,488,000 (1968E) $175 mill. $ 120.00
1 0. Chad 3,460,000 (1968E) $240 mill. $ 70.00
1 1. Chile 9,351,000 (1968E) $ 4.3 bill. $ 470.00
1 2. Congo 870,000 (1968E) $165 mill. $ 190.00
13. Costa Rica 1,640,000 (1968E) $655 mill. $ 410.00
14. Cyprus 619,000 (1968E) $480 mill. $ 780.00
15. Dahomey 2,571,000 (1968E) $200 mill. $ 80.00
16. Denmark 4,870,000 (1968E) $ 9.44 bill. $1 ,950.00
17. Dominican
Republic 4,200,000 (1968E) $ 1.01 bill. $ 260.00
18. Ecuador 5,695,000 (1968E) $ 1.16 bill. $ 210.00
19. El Salvador 3,266,000 (1968E) $850 mill. $ 270.00
2 0. Equatorial
Guinea 281,000 (1968E) $ 66 mill. $ 240.00
2 1. Finland 4,688,000 (1968E) $ 7.74 bill. $1 ,660.00
2 2. Gabon 480,000 (1968E) $195 mill. $ 410.00
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23. Gambia 350 000 (1968E) $ 30 mill. $ 90.00
24. Ghana 8,376 000 (1968E) $ 1.63 bill. $ 200.00
25. Greece 8,803 000 (1968E) $ 6.1 bill. $ 700.00
26. Guatemala 4,864 000 (1968E) $ 1.46 bill. $ 310.00
27. Guinea 3,795 000 (1968E) $335 mill. $ 90.00
28. Guyana 710 000 (1968) $225 mill $ 330.00
29. Haiti 4,674 000 (1968E) $320 mill. $ 70.00
30. Honduras 2,413 000 (1968E) $585 mill. $ 240.00
31. Iceland 200 000 (1968E) $335 r ill. $1 ,690.00
32. Iraq 8,634 000 (1968E) $ 1.94 I 111. $ 230.00
33. Ireland 2,910 000 (1968E) $ 2.64 bill. $ 910.00
34. Israel 2,745 000 (1968E) $ 3.2 bill. $1 ,200.00
35. Ivory Coast 4,100 000 (1968E) $255 mill. $ 50.00
36. Jamaica 1,913 000 (1968E) $865 mill. $ 460.00
37. Jordan 2,102 000 (1968E) $510 mill. $ 250.00
38. Kuwait 540 000 (1968E) $ 1.81 bill. $3,490.00
39. Laos 2,825 000 (196BE) $250 mill. $ 90.00
40. Lebanon 2,580 000 (1968E) $ 1.3 bill. $ 520.00
41. Lesotho 910 000 (1968E) $ 53 mill. $ 60.00
42. Liberia 1,130 000 (1968E) $210 mill. $ 190.00
43. Libya 1,803 000 (1968E) $ 1.24 bill. $ 720.00
44. Luxembourg 336 000 (1968E) $670 mill. $2 ,000.00
45. Madagascar 6,500 000 (1968E) $635 mill. $ 100.00
46. Malawi 4,285 000 (1968E) $250 mill. $ 60.00
47. Maldives 106 000 (1968E) $ 8 mill. $ 80.00
48. Mali 4,787 000 (1968E) $375 mill. $ 80.00
49. Malta 319 000 (1968E) $180 mill. $ 570.00
50. Mauritania 1,120 000 (1968E) $145 mill. $ 130.00
51. Mauritius 787 000 (1968E) $170 mill. $ 220.00
52. New Zealand 2,751 000 (1968E) $ 5.2 bill. $1 ,890.00
53. Nicaragua 1,842 000 (1968E) $640 mill. $ 360.00
54. Niger 3,806 000 (1968E) $250 mill. $ 70.00
55. Norway 3, 819 000 (1968E) $ 7.04 bill. $1 ,860.00
56. Panama 1,372 000 (1968E) $730 mill. $ 550.00
57. Paraguay 2,231 000 (1968E) $475 mill. $ 220.00
58. Portugal 9,505 000 (1968E) $ 3.97 bill. $ 420.00
59. Rhodesia 4,670 000 (1968E) $ 1.04 bill. $ 230.00
60. Rwanda
61. Saudi
3,405 000 (1968E) $198 mill. $ 60.00
Arabia 7,100 000 (1968E) $ 2.45 bill. $ 350.00
62. Senegal 3,685 000 (1968E) $700 mill. $ 190.00
63. Sierra Leone 2,475 000 (1968E) $340 mill. $ 140.00
64. Singapore 1,988 000 (1968E) $ 1.18 bill. $ 600.00
65. Somalia
6 6. Southern
2,745 000 (1968E) $135 mill. $ 50.00
Yemen 1,195 000 (1968E) $150 mill. $ 130.00
67. Swaziland 395 000 (1968E) $110 mill. $ 280.00
68. Sweden 7,912 000 (1968E) $ 19.67 bill. $ 2 ,500.00
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69. Switzerland 6,147,000 (1968E) $ 14.03 bill. $2 ,310.00
70. Syria 5,738,000 (1968E) $ 1.0 bill. $ 180.00
71. Togo
72. Trinidad
1;772,000 (1968E) $172 mill. $ 100.00
& Tobago 1,021,000 (1968E) $800 mill. $ 790.00
73. Tunisia 4,660,000 (1968E) $960 mill. $ 210.00
74. Uganda 8,133,000 (1968E) $795 mill. $ 100.00
75. Upper Volta 5,175,000 (1968E) $255 mill. $ 50.00
7 6. Uruguay 2,818,000 (1968E) $ 1.53 bill. $ 550.00
77. Venezuela
78. Western
9,686,000 (1968E) $ 8.23 bill. $ 880.00
Samoa 13,,000 (1968E) $ 17.4 mill. $ 130.00
79. Yemen 5,000,000 (1968E) $375 mill. $ 70.00
80. Zambia 4,080,000 (1968E) $710 mill. $ 180.00
81. Fiji 505,000 No :Data Available
Addenda to Previous List
Nations with less than $300 Per Capita GNP and under 35 
million (UN Members)
Country
Population
(1968E) GNP (1967)
GNP Per
Capita
(1967)
1. Afghanistan 16,113,000 $ 1.1 bill. $ 70.00
2. Algeria 12,943,000 $ 3.14 bill. $250.00
3. Burma 26,389,000 $ 1.81 bill. $ 70.00
4. Ceylon 11,964,000 $ 1.87 bill. $160.00
5. Republic 
of China 13,466,000 $ 3.29 bill. $250.00
6. Congo
(Kinshasa) 16,730,000 $ 1.47 bill. $ 90.00
7. Ethiopia 23,900,000 $ 1.42 bill. $ 60.00
8. Iran 26,985,000 $ 7.36 bill. $280.00
9. Malaysia 10,384,000 $ 2.92 bill. $290.00
10. Morocco 14,580,000 $ 2.685 bill. $190.00
11. Nepal 10,700,000 $735 mill. $ 70.00
12. Sudan 14,770,000 $ 1.29 bill. $ 90.00
13. Tanzania 12,590,000 $975 mill. $ 80.00
14. Kenya 10,209,000 $ 1.19 bill. $120.00
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Addenda to Previous Lists
Nations with over $300 GNP Per Capita and Population From 
10-15 million
Country
Population
(1968E) GNP (1967)
GNP Per
Capita
(1967)
1. Argentina 23,617,000 $18.6 bill. $ 800.00
2. Australia 12,031,000 $23.15 bill. $1,970.00
3. Canada 20,772,000 $48.65 bill. $2,380.00
4. Colombia 19,825,000 $ 5.76 bill. $ 300.00
5. Netherlands 12,743,000 $19.15 bill. $1,520.00
6. Peru 12,772,000 $ 4.34 bill. $ 350.00
7. South Africa 19,167,000 $11.41 bill. $ 590.00
APPENDIX C
Code ;
LINKAGE QUESTIONNAIRE
Interviewee___
Official Title
Date of Interview_________________________________
1. What if any overseas ties link your sector to the external 
environment?
2. Are such links official or unofficial, explicit or tacit? 
In other words, what is the nature of these links?
What if any effect do these links to overseas nations or 
international organizations have on policy formation in 
your sector?
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4. What influence does your sector's recommendations have on 
New Zealand's external relations with nation-states and/or 
international organizations?
5. From which geographical direction do the greatest influ­
ences to your sector's affairs derive?
6. What sort of influences does your sector attempt to exert 
on other international entities? What states and inter­
national organizations are most affected by actions taken 
in your sector? Would you estimate that more inputs flow 
from your sector to outside entities, or vice versa?
7. How many of your personnel receive overseas training? Are 
there citizens from other countries serving in your sector? 
If so, how many, and in what capacities (e.g., clerical, 
administrative, etc.)? Do officials of your sector make 
regular or frequent overseas visits on business related 
to your work?
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APPENDIX D
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES BY CATEGORY
I. Government Departments and Ministries 
Mr. J. J. Bryant Treasury Department
Mr. D. McClain
Mr. John B. Quigg
Mr. B. Rockel
Mr. L. L. Meek
Mr. J. Lee
Mr. William 
Nicholson
Mr. J. Gellatly
Mr. W. E. B. 
Tucker
Mrs. L. Downey
Mr. R. J. Gray
Mr. Robert 
Phillips
Mr. K. Gillis
Department of 
Defense
Department of 
Agriculture
Crown Law 
Department
Customs Department
New Zealand Forest 
Service
New Zealand Elec­
tricity Department
Government Life 
Insurance Depart­
ment
Department of 
Industries and 
Commerce
Department of 
Education
Head of External 
Economics, Political 
Section
Assistant Secretary 
of Defense
Senior Investigating 
Officer
Crown Counsel
Administrative
Officer
Supervisor of 
Information
Office Solicitor
Supervisor of New 
Business
Director of Trade 
Policy
Head of External 
Relations Section
Health Department Executive Officer
Inland Revenue 
Department
Audit Department
Senior Investigating 
Officer
Auditor-General
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Mrs. R. Simons
Miss G. Webb 
Mr. B. Murray
Mr. L. McVeagh
Mr. W. Atkinson
Mr. W. Connal
Mr. J. Harris
Mr. L. F. Jones 
Mr. Ian Clark
Mr. C. P. 
Littlejohn
Mr. C. Nelson
Government Print­
ing Office
Publications Officer
Justice Department Senior Legal Advisor
Department of 
Labour
Law Drafting 
Department
Marine Department
Maori and Island 
Affairs Department
Police Department
Mines Department
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (External 
Aid Division)
Legislative
Department
Prime Minister's 
Department
Mr. J. C. Kerslake Public Trust
Mr. I. F. Stirling
Mr. D. N. I^an
Mr. J. B. 
McKinney
Mr. L. J. Key
Mr. J. Kennedy- 
Good
r)c> a  I*-l-m  <= n -t-
Lands and Survey 
Department
State Services 
Commission
Statistics
Department
International Labor 
Organization Officer
Senior Draftsman
Public Affairs 
Officer
Public Affairs 
Officer
Senior Sergeant—
Correspondence
Section
Chief Inspector
Head of Experts in 
Projects
Clerk-Assistant—  
House of Represen­
tatives
Secretary to the 
Prime Minister
District Solicitor- 
Wsllington
Assistant Surveyor- 
General
Secretary
Divisional
Director
Ministry of Works Director of Personnel
Ministry of 
Transport
Senior International 
Relations Officer
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Mr. G. J.
Brocklehurst
Mr. A. Morris
Mr. R. Young
Mr. R. W. Prestney
Mr. J. Struthers
Mr. I. J. Babe
Mr. L. G. 
Crawford
Mr. D. R. B. 
Dodson
Social Security 
Department
Tourist and 
Publicity Depart­
ment
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Economic 
Section)
State Insurance 
Department
Post Office 
Department
State Advances 
Corporation
Railways Department
Valuation Depart­
ment
Director
Senior Research 
Officer
Research Officer
Manager
Public Relations 
Officer
Deputy General 
Manager
Assistant General 
Manager
Registrar
Mr. T. C. Larkin Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
Deputy Minister
Mr. K. Richards Legislative Depart- Research Officer 
ment (Government 
Research Unit)
Mr. H. E. Gilbert
Dr. R. W. Willett
Security Intelli­
gence Service
Department of 
Scientific and 
Ind. Research
Security Chief
Assistant Director- 
General
II. Political Parties
Mr. Ralph Wilson
Mr. William 
Nairn
Mr. M. J. Glubb
National Centre 
Party
Labour Party
Social Credit 
League
General Director
Assistant Secretary
Dominion Secretary
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III. Private Groups, Lobbies, Interest Groups, etc.
Information OfficerMr. S. G. A. 
Frost
Mr. T. A. Currie
Mr. M. R. Richards
Mr. G. R. Lee
Mr. G. W. Annand 
Mr. R. E. Morgan
Mr. K. C. 
Wilkinson
Mr. W. J. Knox
Rev. David Taylor
Mrs. R. K. Dell
Mr. James Thompson 
Mr. Lindsay Wright
Manufacturers' 
Federation
Retailers' 
Federation
Employers’ 
Federation
Secretary 
Executive Officer
Medical Association Executive Secretary 
of New Zealand
Chamber of Commerce Director
SecretaryNew Zealand Rugby 
Football Union
New Zealand Table 
Tennis Association
Federation of 
Labour
National Council 
of Churches
National Council 
of Women
National Council
New Zealand 
University 
Students Associa­
tion
Secretary
General Secretary- 
Treasurer
Executive Secretary 
National President 
Director
Educational Research 
Officer
IV. Quasi-Governmental Agencies, Boards, etc.
Mr. J. Watson 
Mr. R. Jones 
Sir Guy Powles
Council of Educa­
tional Research
Meat Board
Director
Office of Parlia­
mentary Commis­
sioner for Complaints
Chief Executive 
Promotional Officer
Ombudsman
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Mr. W. D. Grace Wool Board Director of 
Information
Mr. I. H. McClean New Zealand Broad­
casting Company
Mr. Peter Hampton Vice-Chancellor's
Committee
Mr. A. J. Goldfinch Dairy Board
Administrative
Officer
Secretary
Director of 
Information
V. Businesses
Mr. Gerald Scott
Mr. H. Pierce 
Brown
Mr. A. Notley
Bank of New 
Zealand
New Zealand Forest 
Products, Ltd.
Europa Oil 
Company
Deputy-Manager
(International
Division)
Deputy Export Sales 
Manager
Company Secretary
APPENDIX E
HYPOTHESES OF SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY
1. For the small state, matters of security dominate foreign 
policy considerations.
2. Therefore, foreign policy often gets more attention than 
domestic policy.
3. Therefore, questions related to military posture, align­
ment or non-alignment, and appropriate external responses 
assume proportionately greater significance than in large 
states.
4. The overriding importance of security forces the inher­
ently weak small state to seek outside assistance in 
order to ensure maintenance of sovereignty.
5. Therefore, the prevalent policies adopted by lesser en­
tities have been ^he result of leaders' assessments of 
national interest.
6. Therefore, the posture of older, developed states has 
tended toward alignment with the Western democracies, 
while the newer, underdeveloped states have pursued non- 
alignment policies.
7. Geographic factors such as position, accessibility, 
insularity, and natural boundaries largely determine the 
security and economic fate of a small nation.
S. Because of size differences, small states suffer weak­
nesses diplomatically and militarily which severely 
limit their activities vis-a-vis large powers.
9. Therefore, diplomacy of lesser states is narrower in
scope, more limited in manpower, dependent on others for 
intelligence, and more conscious of efficiency than that 
of larger counterparts.
10. However, size disparity can bring advantages which some­
what balance disadvantages in the diplomatic field.
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11. Disparity of size prevents the small state from being 
truly competitive militarily with the large state at 
the present time and for the foreseeable future.
12. Therein lies the basis of the tenuous character of small 
states, since economic, psychological, and political 
well-being ultimately depend on security as provided by 
the military.
13. Because of their diminutive size, small states neces­
sarily view the international system with a much nar­
rower perspective than large states.
14. Therefore, policy actions tend to hold local rather than 
world-wide significance.
15. These policies tend to be more strongly dependent on the
external world than policies pursued by large states.
16. This results in a negative foreign policy which is largely 
a reaction to stimuli from without, rather than a policy 
which is positively planned and executed from domestic 
origin.
17. Small nations support the principles, activities and 
institutions which have tended to further the causes of 
collective security, dissemination of technical know­
ledge, and spreading of economic advantage.
18. Their activities in such organizations are aimed at 
substituting small state wishes for policies regarding 
colonialism, military development, and economic imperi­
alism, and thus represents a major facet in the essen­
tially negative nature of small state policies.
19. Positive contributions as mediators and peace enforcers
neither assure the success of the respective organization 
nor conceal the basic self-interest motivation which 
results in enthusiastic small nation support for inter­
national organizations.
20. Small nations suffer economic problems which make them 
more vulnerable to international pressure than large 
states.
21. While not insurmountable, problems such as size of 
domestic market, difficulty of marketing goods overseas, 
and lack of natural resources force the small nation to 
always function near the limits of economic viability.
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22. Dependency on overseas trade for natural resources and 
as an outlet for manufactured goods places the small 
state in a precarious position when global economic 
trends change.
23. The result of these factors is to cause small states to 
seek special privileges in trading communities or com­
mon market arrangements which tend to reduce trade 
barriers.
24. Small nation publics' view the world from a different 
perspective than large nations.
25. This difference is more pronounced in the newer, less- 
developed states than in older, established states.
26. Differences seem to derive from the level of perceived 
ability to alter the respective state's political posi­
tion and economic condition.
27. Small nations appear to either accept their lot knowingly 
or through the imitation of large states try to act a 
part they cannot fulfill.
28. Small nations are more dependent on linkages to the out­
side world than larger states because they cannot be as 
nearly self sufficient in factors related to politics 
and economics.
29. Linkages tend to be more numerous among developed lesser 
powers and their environments than among under-developed 
lesser powers and their respective environments.
30. Small nation links tend to be stronger and more numerous 
to large states than to others of approximately their 
same size.
31. For small states there tend to be more inputs from the 
environment than outputs to the environment, i.e., the 
small state is more affected by what goes on around it 
than its environment is affected by the actions of the 
lesser power.
32. A small state's linkages provide an indicator of its 
ability to function as a sovereign entity.
